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To all the Stateless nations (particularly the victims of conflict and violence) who are being 
suppressed and brutalised because of what is theirs: distinct identity, history, culture and 





Balochistan is one of the federating units (provinces) of Pakistan; it constitutes 44 % of 
Pakistan’s total territory and has been in a state of confrontation with the state since 1948. 
This is because the majority of the Baloch consider that the Pakistani state annexed their 
land forcibly, against the will and desire of the people. The Baloch nationalists have never 
accepted this annexation, and as a result the state has been facing serious crises 
precipitated by various factors. Ever since Pakistan’s annexation of Balochistan, there has 
been an on-going conflict between the Baloch (i.e., the Baloch people) and the state of 
Pakistan. The fact is that the conflict in Balochistan is multidimensional, including 
political, social and economic factors, the avarice of the Pakistani state and the grievances 
of the Baloch people. In order to aid an understanding of the various backgrounds to the 
conflict, this thesis contributes to debates on the politics of education and conflict in 
Pakistan’s Balochistan.  
I have used statistics and analysed data gathered during my fieldwork in Balochistan and 
Pakistan to investigate the politics of education and examine various policy frameworks, 
rationales and perspectives on the role of education. In order to do so, this study adopts a 
qualitative method and employs multiple data sources: documentary data, semi-structured 
interviews with twenty-eight stakeholders (in the province and country), visual data, and 
observations.  
Drawing on functionalist and conflict perspectives on the role of education, this thesis 
examines whether education in Balochistan is designed to empower the people or is simply 
used as a tool to control them. I have found that the state is not willing to educate the 
Baloch people; rather, it wishes to control them. There are two ways in which education in 
Balochistan is being used to serve the purpose of control.  
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Firstly, the state of education in terms of its type, quality, quantity and infrastructure is 
considered by the majority of Baloch to be a failure of government’s strategic policy. For 
instance, education in Balochistan has lagged behind in various areas of government policy 
and decision-making. Major problems in Balochistan’s educational system include a 
deeply inadequate supply of textbooks, insufficient monitoring of schools, shortages of 
teachers and schools for both boys and girls, and insufficient funding. Secondly, many 
Baloch decry Pakistan’s unjust efforts to impose its culture, language and radical religious 
ideologies on the Baloch people. Indeed, the politics of (mis)representation of the Baloch 
and their history, culture and language are implemented through the state’s official 
textbooks. Education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is highly 
biased against the Baloch culture, history and social set-up, and it is thus a contributory 
factor in the generation of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. Formal education 
in Balochistan is structured in ways that indoctrinate children with a different language, 
culture and history. To many scholars, controlling education negates Baloch national 
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1.1 The Background  
This research contributes to the debate over whether education ameliorates or exacerbates 
conflict, focusing on Balochistan province in Pakistan. The emphasis here is not on 
theorising conflict but on providing a conceptually sound and empirically rich analysis of 
the politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan.
1
 
In the literature, there are three approaches to education and conflict. The dominant 
approach is that education serves the purpose of care and reduces conflict. Functionalist 
theorists look at the function and role of education. According to this view, education is a 
binding force of any society and is capable of keeping it together. It creates unity, 
solidarity, norms and values, skills and socialisation for that society. Functionalists such as 
Emile Durkheim (1956, 1962), Talcott Parsons (1959), and Kingsley Davis and Wilbert 
Moore (1945) believe that education provides universal values, merit, training, status, 
employment and better futures for people. This perspective on the role of education is 
always positive and mentions the caring part of educational institutions. However, this 
view has been challenged by the conflict theorists.  
The second approach is that education is about control. Conflict theorists reject the 
functionalist view of education and argue that the purpose of education is to maintain 
                                                 
1
 The literature on education and conflict uses expressions such as ‘education generates conflict’. In the 
Balochistan context, however, I will use alternative words such as ‘contributes to’ and ‘exacerbates’ since, in 
Balochistan, conflict is already present and multidimensional. The nature of the Balochistan conflict is 
discussed in a separate chapter.  
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social inequality in society. Conflict theorists, such as Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 
(1976), Randall Collins (1979), and Pierre Bourdieu (1977), argue that education dictates 
the ideology of the ruling class to the poor and preserves the power of those who are well-
off. Education is about the ideas of the dominant class potentially annihilating the history 
and culture of the socially lower-status people. In this regard, conflict theorists have 
provided many reasons to justify their argument that poor students do not have equal 
opportunities for education compared to their wealthier counterparts. Rich people with 
good incomes and salaries are able to provide better education for their children. Scholars 
holding this perspective reject the idea of ‘merit’ held by the functionalists. Merit is about 
maintaining the status of the ruling elite. This is because they have access to better 
educational facilities. Proponents of this view see education only as a source of 
maintaining the power of the ruling elite in society.  
The third view states that education suffers due to conflict. Education, in particular, faces a 
deepening crisis in many countries suffering economic hardship on the one hand and 
political repression and social/ethnic conflict on the other. Many scholarly works, 
including those by Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli (2000), Lynn Davies (2004 and 
2005a and b), Paulina Rose and Martin Greeley (2006a and b), and Alan Smith (2005), call 
for a more nuanced view of the relationship between education and conflict. 
After defining the critical terms for the purpose of this thesis, two main questions are 
addressed. Is education a catalyst in conflicts or is it actually a tool in conflict resolution? 
Both policy-makers and scholars have turned their attention to education as a means of 
managing inter-state
2
 and intra-state conflict, but the theoretical literature and the 
                                                 
2
 Two kinds of conflict are discussed in the literature: ‘inter’ and ‘intra’ state conflict. Since the latter form of 
conflict has become the dominant form of armed conflict, this research discusses intra-state conflict, leaving 
inter-state conflict for future researchers to tackle. Secondly, education (formal education, as attained at 
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researcher’s empirical research for this PhD thesis have led to contrasting conclusions 
concerning education’s role in preventing conflict. In this study my aim is to show that 
education in Balochistan has not been employed to prevent conflict; rather, it is a source of 
the conflict.   
Conflict is an extremely broad and overused term. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
focus on both inter- and intra-state conflict. Thus, in this project the term ‘conflict’ will 
refer specifically to an intra-state conflict. Education is also a contested phenomenon. This 
thesis is not an investigation into the ‘meaning’ or the ‘idea’ of education; rather, it is 
about its relationship with conflict. The emphasis is on the politics of formalised education 
as enacted by the state. It investigates this by focusing on how education is formulated and 
implemented by public institutions. Thus, this is a study of the top-down implementation 
and not the bottom-up reception of formal education. There is a reason for avoiding the 
reception of education by students. In this research I do not seek to engage with vulnerable 
groups such as school children or ordinary college students. The actual impact of education 
on youngsters requires a more comprehensive study that is not possible within a PhD, 
especially since the area of focus is a conflict region. Public policies around formal 
education can be studied without the need for research amongst vulnerable groups. Within 
education, the focus is on the curriculum, pedagogy and textbooks, as well as some 




                                                                                                                                                    
school at various levels, and which is enacted through public policy on a national level) is used as the main 
‘cause variable’.     
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1.2 The Case-Study of Balochistan  
For a work of this scope, this thesis is based on the investigation of a single case-study: 
Balochistan. Balochistan, one of the four federated units (provinces) of Pakistan, is a 
region of geo-strategic importance. It is rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. This 
region has remained a conflict-ridden area since 1948 (Bansal, 2006; Grare, 2006). 
Balochistan became part of the newly-created state of Pakistan in 1948 under controversial 
circumstances.
3
 With a geographical area of 347,190 sq. kms, Balochistan is the largest 
province in Pakistan, comprising 44% of the country’s total territory. It shares international 
borders with Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the north.
4
 
The Baloch people have traditionally inhabited the land that includes not only this province 
but also areas beyond it, in Iran and Afghanistan. After the invasion of Balochistan by the 
British Empire in 1839, Balochistan was divided into many parts. Presently, the eastern 
part, called Balochistan province, is under the control of Pakistan; the western part is also a 
province in Iran, called Sistan and Baluchestan, and a section of the northern part is in 
Afghanistan. Then there is the historical and cultural Balochistan, conceived as a nation 
without a state by most Baloch people. The focus of this thesis is on the Balochistan that is 
controlled by Pakistan and is one of the provinces in the federal structure of the country. 
The confrontation between Balochistan and Pakistan is fuelled in part by a commonly held 
view among the Baloch (the inhabitants of Balochistan) that Pakistan has illegally and 
forcibly annexed their homeland. The Baloch nationalists are convinced that the dominant 
                                                 
3
 Since the division of United India in 1947 into two sovereign states, Pakistan has, constitutionally, become 
a federal state. In order to keep the culturally and linguistically distinct nationalities united in Pakistan, 
political, administrative and financial powers are distributed among federal and provincial governments. 
Secondly, ‘Balochistan’ has been spelt differently by different authors; however, in this dissertation I have 
used ‘Balochistan’ and ‘Baloch’ rather than ‘Baluchistan’ and ‘Baluch’.  
4
 Here we need to clarify that Baloch is a generic term referring to people but Baloch is often used as a 




Pakistani polity (the army, the civilian bureaucracy and the religious leaders) not only 
usurped their independence but has also been exploiting their natural wealth ruthlessly for 
decades. These deeply held convictions have led to a series of insurgencies against 
Pakistan. To suppress these insurgencies, Pakistan launched five army operations, in 1948, 
1958-59, 1963-69, 1973-77, and 2002 to the present day. In addition to a critical discussion 
on education, conflict and conflict resolution as conceptualised by leading researchers, the 
thesis contributes to debates over the conflict in Balochistan. One of the chapters (chapter 
2) examines the political, economic, historical, social, and geopolitical factors that have 
contributed to Balochistan’s conflict with Pakistan.  
The Baloch also argue that the federation of Pakistan did not undertake any social sector 
development, such as in education and health, to the level that is enjoyed in other 
provinces of Pakistan. One of the indicators of its under-development is the poor state of 
education: all the indicators of education standards show that Balochistan lags far behind 
the other three provinces of Pakistan. Therefore, it is pertinent to explore whether 
education ameliorates or exacerbates regional ethnic tensions, and what effect it has on the 
conflict in Balochistan.  
While policy-makers and international organisations such as the UNDP focus mostly on 
quantifiable aspects of education such as the level of literacy or extent of schooling, in this 
research the primary emphasis is on the quality of education, most specifically on what 
notions of nation, ethnicity and history are being promoted through the Pakistani education 
system in Balochistan. What versions of history and identity politics are being removed 
and excluded? Do Baloch nationalists see these politics of silence and selective emphasis 
as contributing to the conflict? 
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According to the World Bank (WB) and Human Rights Watch (HRW), the current state of 
education in Balochistan is extremely poor (WB, 2005 and HRW, 2010). It has failed to 
produce the human capital that the province requires to run its public and private sectors. 
The state education system is functioning beyond its capacity in order to run schools in far-
flung areas. The education policy of Pakistan does not take into account the poor 
infrastructure, difficult terrain and scattered population of the province. Hathaway and 
Burki (2005) are of the opinion that the education policy of the government pertaining to 
Balochistan has adopted a ‘top-down’ approach, where the central government barely 
considers local demands and ground realities. They further add that education, along with 
other social sectors in Balochistan, has become the scapegoat for the troublesome political 
relationship between the centre and the province. The number of teachers in Balochistan is 
insufficient. It is worth mentioning that in one of the policies the government defined a 
primary school as consisting of two rooms with five teachers with no consideration for 
overcrowding. This example illustrates the extent of the authorities’ indifference to the 
state of education in Balochistan compared to other provinces in Pakistan.  
Another argument that might be made here is that formal education in Balochistan is 
structured in such a way that it negates Baloch national aspirations and thus contributes to 
the conflict. Formal education in Balochistan, particularly in government-run schools, is 
biased against the Baloch culture, history and social set-up, and is a potential factor in 
generating retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. The student organisations, active 
in educational institutions, highlight the biased syllabus to support their arguments that the 
state has engineered the education syllabus in order to suppress the distinct identity of the 
Baloch people. This mundane fact provokes Baloch students into political activism and, 
subsequently, into joining the Baloch resistance movement against the state of Pakistan. 
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The thesis also explores how the formal education pursued in Balochistan does not reflect 
the history, culture, national identity, and social and economic wellbeing of Baloch. 
Balochistan, with a weak and dysfunctional educational infrastructure, has the lowest 
literacy rate of all the provinces in Pakistan. My research also intends to show how a shift 
in quality and type of education may aid conflict resolution. The shift in the policy will be 
a sign that the Pakistani state has changed its strategic plan and wants to normalise its 
relationship with the Baloch. The existing education system in Balochistan is not the 
panacea for conflict resolution between Balochistan and Pakistan. Policy-makers at federal 
level should make serious attempts to resolve this long-lasting conflict by giving priority to 
education in Balochistan and by empowering the Balochistan government to make major 
changes in the educational system. Only a major change in Pakistan’s approach to 
Balochistan will resolve conflict in the province. 
 
1.3 Rationale for this Study   
Despite the long-lasting conflict and the depressing state of education in Balochistan, no 
academic research using primary ethnographic sources has been conducted on the 
relationship between education, conflict and conflict resolution in Balochistan. No one has 
conducted any empirical research on this topic. No scholarly work has been conducted to 
answer questions such as the following: Do the nature, type and extent of education 
designed by the state of Pakistan in Balochistan exacerbate the conflict there or do they 
offer an effective venue for conflict resolution?  
Baloch claim that the failure of the state and its policies towards Balochistan has resulted 
in this conflict. This is a historical perspective on the conflict. The current state of 
education in Pakistan is being used as a political tool to control the Baloch people and 
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make them loyal to Pakistan. The official educational textbooks either represent the Baloch 
people, their history, culture and language negatively or ignore them altogether. This type 
of education is primarily a mode of control. In reaction, in schools and colleges in most 
parts of Balochistan, students do not sing Pakistan’s national anthem or fly Pakistan’s flag. 
In the majority of the Baloch areas, students perform the Balochi anthem Ma Chuke 
Balochani... (we are the sons of the Baloch, free and sovereign, masters of our own 
destiny) and hoist the flag of Greater Balochistan (envisaging independence) consisting of 
all Baloch lands currently under the control of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. This 
resistance leads to more conflict. 
The available literature on the topic of this research is very limited, both in scope and 
depth. However, there is a huge body of literature discussing the causes of backwardness 
of Balochistan province in terms of the vastness of the territory, lack of funds, tribal 
structure and so on (see Ahmed, 2013; Dashti, 2012; Baluch, 1987; Harrison, 1981).  
Although these are not the only causes of conflict, the prevailing literature on the subject 
also fails to critically analyse the educational policies and their implementation by the 
federal government in Balochistan. Hence, this research aims to identify and classify the 
politics of education and explore how the conflict shifts the balance between the state and 
the Baloch people.      
In short, this research aims to fill the gap in the existing literature on the link between 
education and conflict in Balochistan. The research will make a substantial contribution 
and might be used by international academics with an interest in education and conflict as 
well as by policy-makers in Balochistan and Pakistan. This study is the only one of its kind 
in this area of research to use extensive literature, expert opinions and descriptive statistics. 
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It provides an in-depth insight into this conflict, explaining how education has been 
employed to exacerbate it, and how it might be used to resolve it.  
The location of the fieldwork I selected to investigate the main questions is Balochistan, 
one of the most dangerous places in the world for reporting and conducting interviews. 
Although education is potentially a source of conflict resolution, this research describes the 
education system in Balochistan as poor (as a result, on the one hand, of ‘radical 
indoctrination’ and, on the other, of the Pakistani government’s refusal to allow the 
inclusion of Baloch rights). Therefore, one cannot imagine how it might play such a role. 
In this thesis I try to explain the notion of how, exactly, education might ‘resolve conflict 
in Balochistan’. I have interviewed various individuals and clarified what we are seeking to 
uncover. I have also focused on the limitation of this approach that considers education to 
be exacerbating conflict in Balochistan.  
 
1.4 Research Topic and Questions 
The topic of this thesis is ‘The politics of education, conflict and conflict resolution in 
Balochistan, and Pakistan’. Since 1948, when Pakistan annexed Balochistan, there has 
been an on-going conflict between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan. The provision and 
quality of education in Balochistan has always been extremely poor, and it is very likely 
that this has a causal relationship with the conflict: education, potentially, has a massive 
impact on the conflict while the conflict, equally, is likely to affect the quantity and quality 
of education provided. To the best of our knowledge, this issue has not been examined 
systematically until now. To examine the politics of education and conflict I have selected 
Balochistan as a case-study. Thus, the main research question for this project is as follows:   
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In what ways do the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled 
Balochistan exacerbate the on-going conflict there? Can education offer opportunities for 
conflict resolution?  
In order to investigate the key research question, this thesis also explores the causes of 
conflict in Balochistan, the politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani 
state, and the significance of those politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This section describes the proposed methodology for this study. An analysis of the research 
requirements for this topic indicated that a qualitative method would be most suitable. 
Prior to discussing the method and research framework under which this research was 
conducted, it is relevant to highlight some of the theoretical issues concerning the research 
methods of any social research.   
It is important to discuss various research paradigms and the matter of ontology and 
epistemology while conducting research. When undertaking research, one needs to develop 
a well-defined frame of scientific methodology comprising different ideas, rules, 
techniques and approaches in order to produce and assess information. There is no single 
best way to undertake a research scheme. Therefore, the researcher must select the 
approaches, strategies and methods that are most suitable for the researcher’s own research 
project. This frame is essential at this stage of the research project in order to consider the 
philosophical position of the study.  
This project applied a semi-structured method to interview the stakeholders 
(educationalists, academics, historians, scholars, policy-makers and politicians) and used 
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primary sources (stakeholder interviews, statistics, reports etc.), secondary data and grey 
literature in order to explore the state of education and conflict in Balochistan. The 
purpose of using numerous methods was not only to reduce the limitations of one method 
but also to increase the reliability and validity of the results of this research. This research 
is a critical analysis of primary and secondary literature/data and a discourse analysis of 
educational textbooks. Through interviews, observation and visualisation in the field, it 
was possible to determine the significance of both education and conflict affiliation in the 
province. Layder (1998) argues that a multi-strategy framework in social research employs 
various data collection techniques. This helps in the investigation of social reality, 
formulation of research questions and choice of research project.  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of research methodology, further examination is 
necessary. Here, I briefly examine the process of data collection (both primary and 
secondary data), discourse analysis and stakeholders’ interviews. Second, the data analysis 
and various ethical dimensions of the research are described. These include the issues of 
reflexivity, confidentiality, and personal background of the researcher.  
Primary data were collected from various sources, such as policy documents, government 
statistics and content analysis of educational literature. Data sources for education and 
other variables came mainly from the provincial government’s Education Department as 
well as from the Economic Survey of Pakistan (various issues), Pakistan Year Book 
(various issues), State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports (various issues), reports of human 
rights organisations, and the database of the Planning and Development Department, 
Government of Balochistan. It should also be mentioned that I visited Balochistan and had 
access to the datasets on primary, secondary and tertiary education in Balochistan, which 
are mainly used to show the quality and quantity of education in the province. The conflict 
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data and materials came from different national and international sources, such as Human 
Rights Watch, United Nations, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and International 
Crises Group, and through interviews and observations. 
In addition, I interviewed 28 public figures, educationalists and policy-makers. The 
research was conducted through: 1) individual interviews with relevant government 
officials, Baloch leaders and intellectuals, and experts on the subject; and 2) analysis of 
school textbooks and curricula to examine how Baloch identity is ignored or subsumed 
within the larger Pakistani nationalist narrative. In this aspect of my research, Discourse 
Analysis (DA) helped me to realise the shortcomings in the policy texts, curricula and 
textbooks, and to transcribe interviews. That is because this is a study of top-down 
implementation rather than bottom-up reception of formal education. This investigation 
was intended to address the Baloch grievances that their culture, language, history and 
people are alienated in the Pakistani education system.  
I gained access to participants to conduct semi-structured interviews. In order to approach 
them and make appointments with them for the interviews, I contacted them by telephone 
and e-mail. I sent separate e-mails along with a covering letter to all potential participants, 
explaining the aim of my research (see details in appendix I and II). The letter also 
included my personal details. As mentioned above, potential participants included 
education experts and subject specialists, government officials, social scientists, academics 
and politicians (see list in appendix VI).
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All interviews were recorded, archived and transcribed during the fieldwork. The interview 
language was English (preferably), Urdu (another option as a national language in 
                                                 
5
Observing interviewee behaviour during interviews is an important tool, and interaction with interviewees, 
in most cases, produced more information for my research questions. In this research, observations also took 




Pakistan) and Balochi (the language of the Baloch). Where English was not used, I 
translated the interviews into English as I can read, write and understand all three 
languages. The translation of the interviews contained only the analysis of relevant parts. 
The subsequent Table 05 (in the appendix IV) provides information and the participants’ 
biographies. 
Interviews were conducted individually. Participants did not receive any kind of 
compensation or money for providing information. I have named these interviewees in my 
thesis because the majority of them are well-known writers, political commentators, 
academics and educationalists. I used the actual names of the majority of my participants 
because they had already given me their consent (see consent form in appendix I) for the 
use of their names, and I quoted some of them openly in my thesis. However, it has been 
noticed by the researcher that there are a few sensitive statements given by the research 
participants. Therefore, the researcher has decided to use pseudo names for six 
interviewees. They are renamed with fictitious names. This decision has been made on the 
basis of security concerns and the changing situation in Balochistan. 
Conventionally, no one asked me not to mention them. Had they done so, I would have 
used pseudo names for all participants to protect their anonymity. The exact dates and 
locations of interviews and additional identifying details have not been withheld (apart 
from six of them) since the interviewees gave their consent (see interview questions in 
appendix III).  
I kept a diary in order to record the reflexivity of this project during my fieldwork. I took 
notes as soon as possible after each interview. The note-taking process began by describing 
the setting, place and the way the interview took place. The field study and interviews were 
conducted in various locations such as public places, government offices and educational 
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institutions. This diversity of interviewees provided both Baloch and non-Baloch 
perspectives. Most of the interviews were conducted face to face, for which purpose I 
travelled to Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan. I stayed in the field for a maximum of 
five months. For various reasons, a few interviews could not be arranged in person; in such 
cases, electronic means such as e-mails were used to conduct them. For face to face or 
electronic interviews (telephone, skype, e-mail, and video links), a tape recorder was used 
to record the respondents’ answers. 
Given that Balochistan is a conflict-ridden province, accessing potential participants was a 
daunting task. However, due to my personal origins and work in the same province, I was 
able to access the majority of potential participants without any associated risks to them or 
to myself. Those potential participants who hailed from other provinces of Pakistan were 
easy to approach because of the academic links that were established while I was in a 
public sector university in Pakistan (see Table 05 in appendix IV, which provides the 
names included as participants). 
Baloch nationalist political parties and student pressure groups have been in existence for 
decades, and some of them have been mounting an armed insurrection against the 
government of Pakistan in various phases for the last six decades to gain greater autonomy 
or independence. Thus, the evidence of all insurgencies was used to measure the intensity 
and magnitude of the conflict in Balochistan. 
For the description and presentation of the historical background of conflicts between 
Balochistan and the state of Pakistan, I analysed secondary sources such as books, journal 
articles, working papers, and reports. This literature was used to gauge the relationship 
between education and conflict in Balochistan and to explore the ways in which they have 
been interconnected.  
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This research contains documentary reviews and secondary data analysis. It has utilised 
various sources, such as official statistics and texts. Bryman (2004) argues that, in social 
research, researchers study documents such as newspapers, books, articles, magazines and 
governmental reports. I had access to these materials, which provided important sources to 
gain a deeper understanding of the research topic. In addition, online newspapers, reports 
of international organisations and magazines are considered important for such research. 
Thus, the collection and review of grey literature, including newspapers, was a valued part 
of the field research, providing a sound background and theoretical knowledge in 
conducting and writing up this research work.  
This research also used discourse analysis (DA) as a tool to describe and analyse the ways 
in which education affects conflict in Balochistan. There is no single definition of 
discourse analysis but it is capable of showing reality in the form of text and narratives 
(Hewitt, 2009). It is about the interpretation of texts. Scholars in the field of DA argue that 
discourse is a reality itself. Therefore, our conception, perception, recognition and 
imagination of reality can be interpreted by discourse (Hewitt, 2009). Discourse analysis 
can neither resolve any problem nor provide any absolute solution but it can provide an 
opportunity to highlight the reality behind the text, such as narratives and ideological 
issues. In other words, it can highlight a specific problem in the text and help the 
researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues under investigation.  
In this thesis, DA, particularly critical discourse analysis (CDA), helped the researcher to 
understand the philosophical issues in the textbooks of Pakistan’s education system. It 
enabled the researcher to identify the main messages around identity and nationalism as 
provided by the education system and, thus, to determine whether these messages were 
affirmative to those being educated or whether they were primarily a political tool to 
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represent a certain nation-state ideology of Pakistan. “More specifically, critical discourse 
analysts want to know what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal 
interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (Van 
Dijk, 1993: 250). In this research, apart from educational texts, various other data from 
government, non-government and scholarly literature are used.  
Although qualitative research is undertaken in a visible world, using visual data for a 
research study, it is rarely used in methodological literature (Brannen, 2002). Collecting 
visual data in terms of taking pictures helps the researcher to capture the visual dimensions 
of social life. Emmison and Smith (2000) argue that visual research is about images, 
objects, places and everyday interactions. For scholars, visual data are not only 
photographs and advertisements but also material objects such as buildings, clothing and 
body language. 
Bearing this in mind, pictures were taken to visualise, for example, buildings where the 
interviews took place or rallies on behalf of conflict victims and against educational 
disparity. It should be mentioned here that, during the time of my fieldwork, the 
International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (IVBMP) and Baloch Human Rights 
Council (BHRC) were jointly holding protests and hunger strikes in various cities in 
Pakistan, especially in Karachi and Quetta (the capital city of Balochistan), calling for the 
return of disappeared political activists. Likewise, other organisations in Balochistan often 
hold rallies to show their solidarity with those who have disappeared or are engaged in 
direct conflict with the state of Pakistan. I took some pictures of schools and rallies 
organised by the various organisations during my fieldwork. Visual data such as 
photographs play an important role in describing such situations. 
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With regard to education, it is believed that the state of education has been very poor in 
terms of quality, and the majority of the schools’ infrastructure is in a poor condition. 
Visual representation of school buildings and other amenities helped me to illustrate the 
state of education in Balochistan. 
The process of data analysis involved decisions about the following: firstly, 
transcripts/field notes and interpretation; secondly, which data to use and which to omit; 
thirdly, whom to quote and how to quote them. This was an ethical issue because it 
exposed power and privilege in relationships, decision-making around maintaining or 
curbing relationships with research subjects, and the potential for profound relational 
violations (Doucet and Mauthner in Mauthner et al., 2002). 
In my research, the main part of the qualitative analysis of the material was the 
interpretation of the analysed text and interviews. I interpreted the qualitative analysis of 
the material and analysed the characteristics of the phenomenon based on my judgement. 
The field notes and stakeholder interviews were first transcribed. All other data collected 
from the study were tabulated. The data analysis, collection, and storage as well as all 
interactions with research participants were undertaken according to the University of 
Westminster’s ethics policy and under the assurance of anonymity and confidentiality.  
Many ethical issues had to be taken into serious consideration for this research. Fieldwork 
can give rise to a plethora of ethical dilemmas, many of which are related to power 
gradients between the researcher and the researched. Combined with this were complex 
issues of knowledge generation, ownership and exploitation (Scheyvens et al., in 
Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). I was aware of having the responsibility to secure the actual 
permission and interests of all those involved in the study. I did not misuse any of the 
information, and maintained a certain moral responsibility to the participants. It was my 
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duty as a researcher to protect the rights, privacy and sensitivities of the people in the 
study. The confidentiality of those who could be at risk has been preserved. Thus, when 
visiting Pakistan and Balochistan I obtained consent from the respective interviewees (all 
stakeholders) through written correspondence, clearly outlining the method and intentions 
of the research.  
Invasion of privacy of potential respondents can be viewed both as a harm in its own right, 
in the sense of being morally wrong, and also as a condition that subjects people to the 
possibility of future harm by depriving them of the protection that privacy affords 
(Kelman, 1982). People give information on the basis that it will be used for the agreed 
purposes of the research; researchers are responsible for preserving information 
confidentially and anonymously unless explicitly agreed otherwise. With regard to 
information furnished by individuals, the risks of public exposure can be virtually 
eliminated by maintaining the confidentiality of the data and scrupulous adherence to the 
procedures agreed.  
A researcher may be entrusted with private information. Hence, I stored my field notes, 
tapes and questionnaires in a safe place. Secondly, I only used data for the purpose agreed 
with the participants and did not share them with others, apart from my supervisory team.   
Here it is vital to provide a description of my personal background and an explanation of 
the limitation of the research process in describing the impact of my dispositions as a 
researcher. According to Jemielniak and Kostera (2010), the accuracy of an investigation 
starts with the identity of the researcher. It is an important part of the research process. 
Describing my personal background and, hence, giving an idea of my identity is 
particularly necessary considering the research topic under scrutiny in this study. 
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I am a male, and was born in Balochistan. I am a Baloch national and obtained my early 
education in Balochistan. I read for an MSc. in History from Quaid-e-Azam University, 
Islamabad, in 2006. I joined Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences 
(LUAWMS) Uthal, Balochistan, as a lecturer in Social Sciences in May 2007 and have 
been employed there ever since (on study leave since September 2010). I applied for and 
was awarded a four-year fully-funded scholarship for a Master’s leading to a PhD under 
the faculty development programme of the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan 
(HECP).  
I gained admission to the University of East Anglia (UEA), Norwich, in the School of 
International Development. In the said School I took an MA in the field of Conflict, 
Governance and International Development, which ended in September 2011. Since my 
scholarship was for four years, I continued to study for a PhD in September/October, 2011, 
at the Department of Politics and International Relations in the University of Westminster, 
London.  
Studying History, Politics and Conflict as a main subject, I focused my interest on 
Balochistan’s conflict in Pakistan. However, I designed a Research Proposal during my 
MA on “The Effects of Education on Conflict and Conflict Resolution: the Case of 
Balochistan” (initial title of research proposal). Apart from this, as I was already working 
in a public sector university in Balochistan, I decided that I would like to continue working 
in this field.  
Keeping in view my personal background, I now move on to a brief account of the 
research process. The research process starts with an idea, a research question or a couple 
of questions. Similarly, in this research the question(s) and selection of interviewees were 
partially the result of my personal background. Some of them may or may not represent the 
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Baloch perspective and many of them are non-Baloch scholars, educationalists and policy-
makers. The selection of these participants was a very conscious decision based on the 
need to have ethnic diversity in the field. Because of the nature of my research topic, I was 
aware of the risk involved in securing access to my research data. But my origins, personal 
relations and sentiments do not dictate the conclusions and analysis in my research project. 
Therefore, it was necessary for me to handle every type of situation very carefully.  
This thesis provides various insights into education, conflict and conflict resolution in 
Balochistan. Like other projects, this PhD thesis has its limitations. The first concern was 
time and funding restraints. Time and resources often play a crucial role during the 
undertaking of PhD research. Both time and funding remained conditional for me to carry 
out this research project. I was sponsored and given a minimum time and a specific 
stipend. This stipend was insufficient for me to stay in London, and it is very difficult to 
complete a PhD study in a minimum of three years.   
Secondly, I faced difficulties in gaining access to many of my interviewees. This research 
was conducted through individual interviews with relevant government officials, the 
Baloch and non-Baloch leadership, intellectuals, and experts on the subject. In order to 
approach them and arrange appointments with them for the interviews, I contacted them by 
telephone and through e-mails. I sent separate e-mails along with letters of request to all 
likely participants, explaining the aims of my research. The letters also included my 
personal details. Despite all this, there were some misperceptions. A few of the non-Baloch 
treated me as a Baloch while some of the Baloch considered me a government person. This 
mixture of Baloch and non-Baloch interviewees was very important for my research. 
Hence, it took many days for me, as a researcher, to gain their trust.
6
 All (except two) of 
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My note-taking process was often disturbed because the field study and interviews were conducted in 
various locations such as public places, government offices and educational institutions.    
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the interviews were conducted face to face. For these, I travelled to Balochistan and other 
parts of Pakistan.  
Thirdly, out of twenty-eight participants, I managed to interview only four females. I 
actually wanted to interview more females to maintain parity among the interviewees but, 
ironically, very few females were available. It is a limitation of the system that patriarchy 
exists not only in Balochistan but also in other parts of the country. It was very important 
that females participated in my research if I was to obtain more information about girls’ 
education in Balochistan. In Balochistan female education is among the least prevalent. 
This gap is more visible in rural areas of the province. One of the main reasons for the 
small number of female interviewees is that they are not occupying government positions 
and do not have an effective role in political decision-making. 
Fourthly, given that Balochistan is a conflict-ridden area, accessing potential participants 
was a daunting task. I was able to access the majority of potential participants without any 
risk to them, despite some crucial methodological challenges. For instance, soon after my 
departure from the UK the government of Balochistan province was dismissed as a result 
of a Hazara killing. This was an excuse for the central government of Pakistan to take such 
action. Hazara
7
 is a small ethnic group in Balochistan and they are ‘Shiite’ Muslims. 
Lastly, the election in Pakistan (11
th
 May, 2013), which I consider to be a crucial time for 
my research, has left me with unforgettable memories. During that time I had virtually no 
access to the Internet or the news channels (both electronic and print media) in most of 
Balochistan. The state news channels were banned from broadcasting by the various 
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 It is believed that some of the Sunni militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were involved in the 
killing. Most of the LeJ accept responsibility for targeted killings and suicide bombings. The federal 
government had imposed ‘Governor’s Rule’ in the province after a suicide bomb blast in Quetta (the capital 
city of Balochistan) that killed more than a hundred people from the Hazara community. Under these 
circumstances and a new bureaucratic set-up (so-called Governor’s Rule), my fieldwork was disrupted. Some 




Baloch armed organisations, whose members started wall-chalking and distributing 
pamphlets against the election. I received various pamphlets/literature from the Baloch 
guerrillas by hand. The literature declared that the Pakistan election was not the solution to 
the Baloch problem. The security forces wanted to cast their votes by hook or by crook, 
while the Baloch organisations had already warned everyone to boycott the election. 
Government servants were taking part in strikes against the election because they were 
being threatened by both sides. I have gained new insights from these challenges during 
my research fieldwork. 
 
1.6 The Structure and Organisation of the Thesis  
Overall, this study is organised into seven chapters. These chapters can be briefly 
described as follows:  
Chapter I (the present chapter), the introduction to the thesis, presents the research aim, a 
brief overview of the politics of education and conflict, the rationale for this study, the 
research topic, and the questions that this project intends to explore. Then, the research 
methodology and structure of the thesis are introduced.  
The second chapter investigates the national, historical and geopolitical background to the 
conflict. It highlights the different aspects of this multidimensional conflict in Balochistan 
and provides a context for understanding the grievances of the Baloch, which it is crucial 
to mention as they are fundamental causes of the conflict. First, there is a historical 
overview of Balochistan, including its relationship with the British Empire and the newly-
formed state of Pakistan in 1947-48. Second, the five phases of the conflict since 
Balochistan’s annexation by Pakistan are discussed. Finally, the factors behind the conflict, 
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i.e. the distinct cultural identity and sense of historical nationhood of the Baloch, the 
grievances of the Baloch people, the exploitation of their natural resources, and the 
geopolitical and international causes of the conflict, are explored. 
In brief, it is argued that, in the past six and a half decades, state officials at both the 
federal and provincial levels have continually made false promises concerning the 
Balochistan quagmire, where people are suffering, living below the poverty line, and 
lacking education, development, nutrition and health facilities. Each newly-elected 
government coming to power in Pakistan apologises to the Baloch people for the past 
wrong doings and promises to change the living conditions of people, but unfortunately all 
of them have failed to abide by their promises. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
grievances of the Baloch people and the excesses of the State have resulted in a conflict 
that is bringing systematic economic exploitation and political and historical 
discrimination.  
The third chapter discusses different issues pertaining to the relationship between the 
concepts of education, conflict and conflict resolution. This chapter has enhanced my 
understanding of the politics of education and conflict between Pakistan and Balochistan in 
a much wider context. This chapter also forms the foundation of my research. It attempts to 
answer this question: Is education a mode of control or empowerment?  
In this chapter, various themes related to education and conflicts are analysed: what is 
education; what are its purpose and its relationship with conflict; how might it generate 
conflict, and in what ways can it be used as a political tool? Furthermore, to what extent 
might it be effective in resolving conflict? The concepts and approaches are critically 
reviewed for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the politics of education by 
theorising about its perspective on conflict. This perspective is known as the functionalist 
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theory of education or ‘functionalism’. The functionalist perspective on education looks at 
how it plays a role in serving the demands of society. This perspective emphasises the 
positive aspects of education such as skills, learning, behaviour and attitude, and the 
provision of a sense of solidarity.  
However, in order to understand the politics of education, conflict perspective, one of the 
major theories, is discussed here. This is also known as a Marxist perspective on the role of 
education. It is the opposite of the functionalist view. According to this view, the purpose 
of education is to maintain inequality by keeping power in the hands of those who are 
influential in society. Criticising the functionalists, this perspective maintains that the 
education system moulds the lower classes and social groups into obedient citizens and 
workers. In this viewpoint, education policies have served to control citizens and make 
them subservient.  
The main conclusion of this chapter is that education is a double-edged sword in terms of 
its effects on conflict. That is, effective and balanced education may help to redress 
conflict but, at the same time, biased education will increase the level of conflict. In this 
chapter I have noted that education often contributes to the promotion of conflict. In 
theorising about various concepts regarding education and conflict, this chapter will follow 
the main argument that education, as a means of fundamental human rights, will help to 
resolve conflict if the state provides objective, good-quality education. In response to intra-
state conflicts in the context of severe socio-economic deprivation, policy-makers and 
scholars often talk of education as a possible tool for conflict management, and even for 
conflict resolution. The emphasis is on raising the level of education, assuming that 
education will open up employment opportunities for people and thus divert them from the 
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business of conflict. In mainstream politics, activism and even development studies, this 
simplistic assumption remains dominant.  
The fourth chapter is about the state of education in Pakistan generally and in Balochistan 
in particular. It looks at the causes of the worsening educational infrastructure, its type, 
quality and quantity, and the emergence of student politics such as the formation of the 
Baloch Student Organisation (BSO). This chapter also includes statistics and interviews 
with various participants. A case is made in this chapter that the state has failed in its duty 
to provide good-quality education in Balochistan.  
In this chapter I have pointed out that Pakistan’s education performance has been in severe 
difficulties throughout its history. Although Pakistan declared ‘universal education for all’ 
in the very first year of its existence (1947), the allocation of state resources for education 
has been its lowest priority. As is pointed out in this chapter (see chapter 4), there are wide 
variations in literacy between the provinces. In the province of Punjab, the overall literacy 
rate stands at 59%, while in Balochistan it is only 45%. The pace of improvement in the 
literacy rate has been higher in provinces such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh 
over the last couple of years. The female literacy rate, particularly in Balochistan, has 
remained dismally low, at only 23%, which is one of the lowest rates in Pakistan.  
In brief, I find that education in Balochistan is lagging behind all other policy- and 
decision-making. This research shows there is no doubt that the education sector in 
Balochistan demands special attention and rigorous planning. There are currently many 
difficulties with literacy in Balochistan due to the following issues and challenges: 1) a 
shortage of girls’ schools; 2) dysfunctional teaching methods; 3) schools with just one 
teacher; 4) schools without roofs and overcrowded schools; 5) a shortage of middle and 
secondary schools; 6) a shortage of teachers’ accommodation; 7) accessibility of schools; 
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8) a review of the curriculum; 9) the medium of instruction; and 10) an 
outdated/conventional examination system. The situation regarding primary, secondary and 
higher education paints a dismal picture. It should be noted that the Baloch are unhappy 
with the existing state of education and are struggling to gain either more educational 
facilities or control over their own educational affairs, i. e. policy, review and textbooks.  
The fifth chapter is about the representation of the Baloch in Pakistani textbooks and the 
politics of control. It provides a critical analysis of pedagogy, the curriculum and the 
politics of exclusion. For the purposes of this chapter, all Balochistan textbooks from 
levels one to twelve of primary and secondary education are studied. Moreover, the other 
provinces’ textbooks are also examined in order to produce an in-depth analysis of the 
nature, purpose and role of education in the country. The question here is this: How does 
Pakistani education, at both school and college level, exclude or include Baloch history 
and identity? The main argument is that the Baloch people, their history, culture, language, 
music, art and personalities/characteristics are systematically excluded from the textbooks 
of their own provincial educational system. They are either not part of the education 
system or are misrepresented there. For example, they are called backward and tribal. The 
Baloch are excluded from and alienated in education. Balochi, the language of the Baloch 
people, is not being taught either as a compulsory or as an optional language. The children 
are forced to read and write in imported languages, such as Urdu, English and Arabic.  
The analysis shows that the state aims primarily to control/dominate the Baloch through 
education. It is argued that the state does not care about the Baloch people and wants to 
control them through their schemes of indoctrination. This is done in various ways, such as 
excluding their language and culture and imposing imported history, language, culture and 
heroes, as mentioned by experts on this subject. In this chapter, two other main issues are 
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discussed: Islamisation, and the propagation of the ideology of Pakistan. Many scholars 
believe that the dominant influences in the textbooks are those of religious prejudice and 
the serving of the agenda of the dominant ruling establishment. Non-Muslims, especially 
Hindus, are presented as enemies of Islam. As the Baloch are Muslim, the prejudices in the 
textbook against non-Muslims do not affect the Baloch. 
Chapter six brings together the theoretical strands, empirical discussion, and critical 
discourse analysis of textbooks to identify and analyse the politics of education, conflict 
and conflict resolution in Balochistan. This chapter is based on the interviews and the 
opinions of experts. This is primarily empirical, as it is based on interviews and other 
primary sources such as policy documents on education, as well as textbooks. In this 
chapter the research question is investigated more empirically. The key themes of the 
research re-emerge in this chapter. For instance, from the field research and secondary 
sources it is clear that the majority of Baloch blame the central government of Pakistan for 
not allowing Balochistan Province to have control over its educational affairs. They also 
blame state policies for subjugating the Baloch history, culture, language, art, music and 
heroes. They hold the federal government and its institutions responsible for marginalising 
Balochistan, a centuries-old nation with a distinct history, culture and geography. They 
argue that Balochistan was an independent state that was forcibly annexed by Pakistan. For 
this reason education has been designed to control rather than inform people. This is one of 
the reasons why the state used education as a mode of control, a ‘top-down approach’ that 
was imposed on the Baloch people.  
Furthermore, based on past historical facts from the field interviews with officials, 
educationalists and other experts in Balochistan, Baloch nationalists blame both the federal 
and provincial governments as well as the Baloch tribal leaders for the very poor education 
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system in Balochistan. For instance, they hold the ‘sardars’ (tribal chiefs) responsible for 
the Baloch issue and for failing to provide education to their areas. They also assert that a 
few Baloch tribal chieftains, with the help of the government, are responsible for the poor 
condition of education in Balochistan. The emerging narratives are all used to illustrate and 
critically assess the existing literature on education and conflict in Balochistan. To explore 
these narratives, the opinions of Baloch writers, scholars, nationalist leaders and 
government officials are discussed in different parts of this chapter.   
This chapter explores whether or not a change in the education system (the level and 
intensity of education as well as its quality) might act as a tool in conflict resolution. In 
addition, it ponders the issue of whether Pakistan might promote education to assimilate 
the Baloch people. Of course, the answer largely depends on the nature of the Pakistani 
state. In Balochistan, if the state is amenable, there will be chances for conflict resolution 
in the future.   
Chapter seven is the conclusion. This chapter comprises the results and conclusion and 
some key potentials of Balochistan that, under a much more enlightened political and legal 
system, might have enabled the province to be much more developed with a highly 
educated population. From the above point of view, it can be concluded that the 
educational system in Pakistan has made many mistakes, total or partial. It is highly 
defective and is one of the chief sources of the country’s chronic instability and 
underdevelopment. No one seems to pay due attention to these issues. Hence, the lessons 
of history may be able to prevent the educational system from repeating those errors 
already committed. It is hoped that this research will be a first step to examining the 
failures of the educational system in its entirety in Pakistan and its almost total collapse in 
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The Nature of the Balochistan Conflict: Its Historical, Regional, 
National, International and Geopolitical Dimensions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Balochistan, one of the four federating units (provinces) of Pakistan, is a region of geo-
strategic importance rich in oil, gas and other natural resources. It has remained conflict-
ridden since 1948 (Grare, 2006) when, under controversial circumstances, it became one 
unit of the newly created state of Pakistan. Geographically, with an area of 347,190 sq 
kms, it is the largest province of present-day Pakistan, comprising 44% of the country’s 
land area and sharing international borders with Iran to the west and Afghanistan to the 
north. The population of Balochistan is the smallest in the federation of Pakistan; it has 
around 6.5 million people, the majority of whom are ethnic Baloch, while the total 
population of Pakistan is about 132 million (see Baloch, 2006 and 2007: 6; Baloch and 
Tanik, 2007; Census Report of 1998).
8
 The figure is from the census in 1998 and may not 
be accurate, but there has been no census since then.   
According to Sabir (2003: 229) and Jahani (2013), the Baloch people have inhabited the 
land that includes not only this province but also the areas beyond in Iran and Afghanistan.  
Spooner (2013: 142) mentions that “the Baloch claim a wide diversity of origins for 
particular communities and tribes in a number of countries, including Afghanistan, India, 
                                                 
8
“Besides the Baloch, there are other ethnic groups who have lived in Balochistan for ages but they do not 
consider themselves a part of the Baloch nation because they have their own ethnic and national identities. 
For instance, Pashtuns are the second largest group who have lived in 10 out of 30 districts of Balochistan for 
centuries. According to the 1998 Census Report, Baloch are about 55% of the population, Pashtun are about 




Iran, and countries on the Arabian Peninsula”. The British occupation of Balochistan in 
1839 was part of the Imperial Forward Policy to gain control in the region and to deal with 
growing Russian power in Afghanistan (Harrison, 1981). The hegemonic desires of these 
great powers had brought about a series of wars including the Anglo-Afghan wars as well 
as the drawing up of lines of control and influence. The so-called ‘great game’ with Russia 
was one of the key dynamics that influenced British policies of warfare, peace and 
boundary-making in this region (Dashti, 2012). Balochistan and Afghanistan were divided 
and subdivided for imperial purposes. The British Boundary Commissions of Major 
General Goldsmid, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand and Sir Arthur Henry McMahon drew new 
lines.  
Since 1839, there have been many Balochistans. There is a Pakistani Balochistan, an 
Iranian Balochistan (known as Sistan and Baluchestan) and an Afghani Balochistan 
(Helmand and Nemroz); there is also a historical and cultural Balochistan imagined as a 
nation without a state by many Baloch people living in the region and beyond (see Baluch, 
1987; Harrison, 1981). Even though at one point in history, the Baloch were a nation with 
state before becoming a stateless nation.  
Many scholars, including Wirsing (2008), Khan (2009), Baluch (1983) and Grare (2006), 
underline the factors that are primarily responsible for this conflict: 1) the exploitation of 
Baloch natural resources by the Pakistani state while leaving native Baloch in an 
economically and socially deprived position; 2) the geo-strategic importance of 
Balochistan; 3) its distinct cultural identity and sense of historical nationhood; and 4) the 
Baloch grievances. 
These and other factors of lesser magnitude have compelled the Baloch to resist Pakistan’s 
policies, which the Baloch people regard as exploitative. According to Ahmad (1992) and 
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Wirsing (2008), due to its location at the crossroads to the Middle East, and South and 
Central Asia, Balochistan has attracted international and regional powers alike in their 
attempts to gain access to Central Asia’s riches throughout its land. This is one of the 
reasons why Balochistan is prone to conflict. According to Bansal (2006: 46) “[T]he 
current spate of insurgency in Balochistan is a product of repressive policies coupled with 
historical grievances that have led to increased alienation amongst the Baloch and a 
general perception that they are being exploited” (Italics in original).  
As a result, Balochistan has been locked in a serious conflict and a chaotic relationship 
with the state of Pakistan (International Crises Group, 2006; Cohen, 2005). This is because 
the Baloch are convinced that the domineering Pakistani state policies have not only 
usurped their independence but have also been exploiting their natural wealth ruthlessly. 
This chapter highlights the different aspects of this multidimensional conflict in 
Balochistan and provides a background for understanding the grievances of the Baloch, 
which it is crucial to mention as they are fundamental causes of the conflict. Firstly, a 
historical overview of Balochistan is provided, and its relationship with British India and 
the newly formed state of Pakistan in 1947 is outlined. Secondly, five phases of the 
conflict post-integration into Pakistan will be discussed. Finally, the factors behind the 
conflict, i.e. the grievances of the Baloch people, the exploitation of their natural resources 
and the geopolitical and international causes of the conflict, are explored. 
 
2.2 Historical Overview  
“We can trace Baloch history back a millennium and a half. But since they have no writing 
tradition of their own, all the information about them, down to the very recent past, comes 
from non–Baloch sources – from writers in the service of the Islamic urban establishment, 
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in which the Baloch have not participated and with which they have often been in conflict” 
(Spooner, 2013: 135). The Baloch people perceive themselves as an ancient nation and one 
with a vibrant history. Many writers agree that the Baloch have their distinctive culture and 
background which differentiate them from other nations in neighbouring countries 
(Baluch, 1987: 49). Similarly, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, a prominent Baloch political leader, 
describes in his autobiography how the Baloch as a nation and a tribal society spread not 
only within present-day Pakistan but also into present-day Iran, Afghanistan and 
Turkmenistan (Kutty, 2009). 
Gichki (2010) argues that written Baloch history is only 150 years old, but Breseeg (2004: 
57) states that “terms like “Balochistan” and mulk Balochi (country of the Baloch) are 




 centuries”. It has a 
great impact on Baloch national feelings. Thus, while the written history is one and a half 
centuries old, oral transmission of a collective identity has a far longer antecedent. 
The exact time of the establishment of the first Baloch confederacy is disputed by various 
scholars (including British travellers and other colonial writers), but Breseeg (2004: 138) 
claims that the unity of Baloch begins in the 12
th
 century when Mir Jalal-Han was the head 
of 44 Baloch tribes. “Mir Jalal Han founded a large tribal union in Makkoran with its 
capital at Bampur. The union was based on an egalitarian system. The Baloch under Mir 
Jalal Han recognised their military organisation by dividing the forty-four Bolaks into five 
military divisions” (Breseeg, 2004: 138). Similarly, to Baluch (1987) and Dames (1907) 
the 44 tribes of Mir Jalal-Han later became the basis of five major Baloch tribes: Rind, 
Lashari, Korai, Houth, and Jatoi. Stretching back from the ‘Rind-Lashar Union’ in 1485 
under Mir Chakar Khan Rind, the Baloch people have a long history (Dashti, 2012). 
According to Janmahmad (1989), the Rind-Lashar Union was one of the largest Baloch 
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tribal confederacies, stretching from Kirman (now in Iran) to the Indus River Valley (in 
Pakistan) in the east.  
Baloch unification took place later. According to Breseeg (2004: 141), the first ever union 
of the entire Baloch area occurred in the early 16
th
 century, but this was short-lived as the 
region and the people underwent frequent divisions and struggles. It was also recorded by 
British historians and travellers (see Dames, 1907; Pottinger, 1816; Hughes, 2002) that the 
Baloch tribes were unable to gain political unity, due to internal tribal conflicts and civil 
wars, until 1666. Later, the Ahmadzai tribe established the Kalat Confederacy in 1666 and 
this was an argument mentioned by the majority of the scholars (see Axmann, 2009; 
Dashti, 2012). The Khanate Confederacy was known as the Khanate of Balochistan or the 
Khanate of Kalat. 
Map 1: Khanate of Balochistan, 1758- 1795 
 
Source: Baluch (1987) 
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2.2.1 The Khanate of Kalat 
The Khanate of Kalat was established in the middle of the 17
th
 century. It included all the 
territories of the Baloch inhabitants and the areas of former Baloch ruler Mir Chakar Khan 
in Sibi (see Breseeg, 2004: Dashti, 2012). According to Breseeg (2004: 148) “Makkoran, 
Western Balochistan, Derajat, Sistan, and Lasbela” were all under the authority of one 
central body. “The Khanate of Balochistan later became known, as the Khanate of Kalat or 
Kalat State because of its capital city, Kalat” (Breseeg, 2004: 148-9).9 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Naseer Khan (the 6
th
 Khan of Kalat) ruled for almost half a century. He created a centralised bureaucratic 
structure of government and a unified Baloch army from all the Baloch tribes for the first time. Many 
nationalist Baloch historians describe the strength of the army as being 25, 000 men and 1,000 camels. There 
is some confusion among Baloch historians about Naseer Khan’s role; however, for Baloch nationalists and 
the British traveller Henry Pottinger (1816: 285), his achievements remain an important symbol for Baloch 





 November 1839, the British forces attacked the Palace of Balochistan’s ruler, 
Mehrab Khan, and he and several of his friends were killed. According to Dashti (2012), 
due to the British manipulation and the ‘great game’, the Baloch lost their Khanate. He 
argues that the Baloch state has fallen twice: once in 1839 at the hands of the British and 
again in 1948 with the advent of the newly formed state of Pakistan (this is discussed later 
in this chapter). The British were mainly responsible for the plight of the Baloch people, 
which he called the demise of the Baloch state (Dashti, 2012).  
 
There is some debate amongst historians as to whether or not there was a continuous war 
going on between the British and the Khanate of Kalat. The majority of them agree that 
hostile British-Khanate engagement began in 1838-39, after the British occupation of Kalat 
State. According to Zaidi (1993: 288), “the first British contact with Kalat State takes place 
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in the year 1838, in connection with an expeditionary force sent by the British Government 
to Afghanistan via Baluchistan”. Consequently, the British had succeeded in occupying the 
Kalat state. They occupied Khanate Kalat not because they wanted to control Khanate 
Kalat directly and incorporate it into British India, but because they wanted to create a 
buffer zone to secure their control of India at the expense of Russia (Harrison, 1981). 
 
2.2.2 British-Russian Rivalry in Afghanistan  
British-Russian rivalry in Afghanistan generated a regional clash that was named ‘the 
Great Game of the 19
th
 century’ by many writers. According to the Foreign Policy Centre 
(FPC) report entitled Balochis of Pakistan: on the Margins of History, the expansionist 
policy of Russia had threatened the British Empire in India (FPC, 2006). The British 
concern was that Afghanistan would become a base for the Russian Empire. The fear of the 
Tsarist hegemonic design and its expansion had compelled the British to retain control of 
the indigenous people of India. Therefore, in 1838 the first Anglo-Afghan war began, 
threatening the entire region. According to Harrison (1981), Balochistan, as Afghanistan’s 
neighbour, became part of the 19
th
 century ‘great game’ scheme. He holds that it was the 
‘Forward Policy’ of the British Empire in India to push “the jurisdiction of the Raj to the 
Afghan frontier” (Harrison, 1981: 19).  
Many other writers such as Bizenjo (2006) agree that Balochistan acquired a new strategic 
significance in the 19
th
 century when Afghanistan became a buffer zone. The British 
fought many battles with the Baloch people over a span of more than forty years to 
establish direct control over the access routes to Afghanistan. In 1876 they finally 
succeeded in subduing Kalat and obtained the right to station their troops there through 
treaties (Zaidi, 1993). Since the British occupation, the British and Kalat rulers had signed 
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treaties in 1841, 1854 and 1876. These treaties, according to many writers such as Brahui 
(2009), were the basis of British-Kalat relations, which are discussed below. Harrison 
(1981) mentions that the British did not try to extend their rule into the Baloch areas (with 
the exception of British Balochistan) but these treaties were indeed the main reasons for 
the division of Kalat State. Under these treaties the Kalat Balochistan was divided. 
According to Harrison (1981), the British Empire proceeded systematically to divide the 
Baloch area into seven parts. He argues that, 
In the far west, the Goldsmid line gave roughly one-fourth to Persia in 1871; in the 
north, the Durand line assigned a small strip to Afghanistan in 1894; and in British 
India, the Baluch areas were divided into a centrally administered enclave (known 
as British Baluchistan) guarding a key mountain pass, a truncated remnant of the 





In 1871 the ‘Goldsmid Line’ was drawn, dividing Balochistan between the British and 
Persian Empires. The western part of Balochistan went to Persia, which is modern-day 
Iran. Breseeg (2004: 171) states that “with the help of the British, the Iranians succeeded in 
dividing Balochistan”. The connections between the British and the Iranians were not 
explained in the literature but it is argued that the British policy of ‘divide and rule’ and the 
Iranian expansionist policies were similar. Balochistan, due to its arid desert area and tribal 
structure, created administrative problems for the British. There is a debate in the literature 
on whether the British were interested in ruling over Balochistan or not. A few scholars 
argue that the British ambition was not to rule Balochistan. However, they were interested 
in creating a buffer zone to control it because of the perceived threat from the Tsarist 
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Empire (Bizenjo, 2006). Bizenjo argues that the British were well aware of the Russian 
Tsarist ambition to control the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.  
In the 1870s, under the ‘Gandamak Treaty’, the British detached the Afghan territories of 
Zhob and Loralai (Breseeg, 2004: 161). In 1883, an agreement was made between the 
British and Kalat. Under this agreement the British leased Quetta, Bolan Pass, Nasirabad, 
Chagai and the Marri-Bugti areas of Eastern Balochistan and combined those leased 
Baloch areas with the Afghan (Pashtun) areas, making up ‘British Baluchistan’ (Marri, 
1985: 18-20). All these areas were declared to be British territory. As a result of these 
divisions the Kalat state had shrunk in size and population. Thus, the east became British 
Balochistan. Matheson (1997) argues that during this seventy-year period British 
Balochistan’s territories were subject to more or less direct British rule.  
In 1894 the ruler of Afghanistan (better known as the Afghan Amir) and the British had 
established the northern ‘Durand Line’. They had signed an agreement and transferred a 
large area of the northern region of British Balochistan (Helmand and Nemroz) to 
Afghanistan (Brahui, 2009). With this division the northern region of British Balochistan 
became part of Afghanistan. The line drawn in 1894 is still the political boundary between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, although Afghanistan has not yet recognised its legitimacy. 
According to Bugti (1996), this division resulted in a large segment of the Pashtun area 
being given to British India, while the northern part of Balochistan was given to the 
Afghan ruler. 
Thus, after this division (except for Kalat State) the Baloch remained under the control of 
three states: British India, Afghanistan and Iran. The final outcome of the boundary 
settlement was as follows: Sistan and Baluchestan including western Makran became part 
of Iran; outer Sistan including Helmand and Nimrouz came under the control of 
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Afghanistan; Jacobabad, Derajat, Sibi including Marri-Bugti tribal areas became British 
Balochistan; and, finally, the shrunken state of Kalat was recognised as an independent 
state with the status of protectorate (see FPC, 2006; Harrison, 1981). Under the political 
settlement and the treaty of 1876, Kalat was given independence in its internal jurisdiction 
and non-interference surety by the British despite losing its territories and past glory. 
 
2.2.3 British Relations with the Khanate of Kalat: the treaties of 1841, 1854 and 1876 
There are two distinctive views on relations between the British and Khanate Kalat. One is 
that the relations were based on amity, through agreements and treaties, but the other holds 
that there was a forced subjugation of Kalat State by the British. The treaties with the State 
of Kalat and the revolts by Baloch tribes illustrate both these viewpoints. Zaidi (1993: 288) 
argues in the Jinnah (Mohammad Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan) papers that “the history 
of British relations with the Kalat State and its rulers has been one of friendly alliances and 
treaties of mutual friendship and amity throughout”. After the occupation of the state of 
Kalat by the British, they finally signed a treaty and recognised Naseer Khan II as the ruler 
of Kalat in 1841. This treaty mentions that the “British troops might be stationed in Kalat 
territory” (Breseeg, 2004: 160). Various other treaties were signed at different times, 
providing the British with opportunities to station their forces in British Balochistan 
territory en route to Afghanistan. In return for these concessions, Kalat would receive 
handsome subsidies and guarantees of tribal autonomy (Harrison, 1981). Of all the treaties 
and agreements signed, the treaty of 1876 was the most important.  
It had become expedient to sign the treaty of 1876 in order to renew and reinforce the old 
treaty of 1854 and “to supplement the same by certain additional provisions calculated to 
draw closer the bond of friendship and amity between the two governments” (Zaidi, 1993: 
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288). According to the treaty of 1876, the British were committed to respect the 
independence of Kalat and to protect the territory from external aggression (Brahui, 2009; 
FPC, 2006). Article 3 of this treaty states the requirement for “the British Government to 
respect the Independence of Kalat” (Zaidi, 1993: 288).10 
However, it may be difficult to claim that relations between the British and Khanate Kalat 
were friendly, considering the Baloch protests and revolts against the British. For instance, 
the Marri-Bugti tribes fought continuously against the British occupation mainly because 
the British had divided up Khanate Kalat without any process of negotiation.  
Furthermore, Dashti (2012) argues that various tribal people including their chiefs had 
launched an armed struggle against the occupying forces. However, to control the Baloch 
revolts the British had nominated heads of tribes as alternative tribal chiefs by giving them 
land.
11
 Baloch society was tribal by nature in which lands belong to the people rather than 
chiefs of the tribes. However, the British divided the Baloch into various factions and 
rewarded them with land. The most important point to discuss here is the manipulation of 
tribal society by the nomination of Sardars. There are two different issues here: the 
corruption of the Baloch ruling elite, and the general Baloch public. Most Sardars enjoyed 
prestige and luxury during British rule. The consolidation of the Sardars was a 
phenomenon constructed by the British to prolong their rule (Naseer, 2010).  
                                                 
10
 Many of the Baloch believe that Kalat State enjoyed an independent status under the treaty of 1876 and 
that the British became responsible for protecting Kalat State’s independent status. In 1947, before the 
division of United India, the Kalat State National Party had presented their case to the British for a fully 
independent Balochistan. The territory included the Kalat State, British Balochistan and all other Baloch 
areas which were leased by the British Empire to Iran and Afghanistan. According to Baloch nationalists and 
historians, the British agreed to support an independent Balochistan and the case was submitted in the form 
of an official memorandum in March 1946.   
11
 In Baloch tribal structure or society, lands always belonged to the people of tribes, not to the heads of 
tribes. But the British introduced the Sandeman System, in which they distributed land to the nominated 
heads of the tribes called Sardars.    
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In 1877 the British had established the Balochistan Agency with its headquarters at Quetta. 
Robert Sandeman was appointed agent to the Governor General. He became head of the 
Agency for Balochistan (Hughes-Buller, 1908). Before 1877, he had been the district 
officer in Dera Ghazi Khan (a Baloch-claimed district now in Pakistan’s Punjab). 
Sandeman had introduced a new system in Balochistan known as the ‘Sandeman System’. 
The system was introduced in order to contact tribal chiefs directly, bypassing the Khan of 
Kalat (Breseeg, 2004: 161). This system had both encouraged and divided the people of the 
different tribes. People found themselves divided into segments rather than living under 
one authority. Thus “Sandeman managed to have his way, and earned the loyalty of the 
Sardars by granting them allowances” (Breseeg, 2004: 161).12 The system helped the 
British to manage their ‘divide and rule’ policy in Balochistan and enabled them to easily 
control revolts in the region.  
Many historians such as Baloch (1985), Baluch (1987: 141) and Janmahmad (1982: 158-
59) believe that British rule was responsible for promoting tribal culture in its own vested 
interests. The British divided up Balochistan for administrative and security purposes. 
Similarly, Matheson (1997: xiii) states: “the financial and military backing the British gave 
to tribal leaders made the tribal system more hierarchical and less democratic”.  
The legacy of this British imperial practice can be seen in today’s Balochistan. The 
Sardars and the Baloch tribal system have to this day remained the cause of many 
problems including lack of unity, feudalism, and animosity between tribes, leading to 
internal tribal wars. Dehwar (1994), states that the main problem of the Baloch is the 
Sardari system. This system has contributed to the backwardness of the Baloch people, 
                                                 
12
 Many writers, such as Harrison (1981: 22), describe how “the British attempted to suppress nationalist 
activity and resisted pressures for the introduction of education in the Baloch areas”. However, a few hundred 
Baloch were allowed to have an education, most of them from Sardar families. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch 
(Khan of Kalat, an educated youth) was one example.  
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both in the past and more recently. For example, the system has created hurdles to the 
unification of their territory as the Baloch Sardars remained part of the British Empire. 
They (the chiefs) had helped the British to divide the territory by signing various treaties. 
In the early 1930s, the Kalat State National Party, Anjuman-e Itehad-e-Baluchistan 
(Association for Unity of Balochistan), and weekly newspapers such as Al-Baloch began to 
raise their voices against these Sardars, demanding freedom for Balochistan. Their leaders 
were arrested, not only by the British but also by the ruler of the State of Kalat.  
 
2.3 The Role of Kalat State National Party  
In the 1920s, a group of people including Yousuf Aziz Magsi, Abdul Aziz Kurd, Malik 
Faiz Mohammad and Gul Khan Naseer began a movement that demanded equal rights for 
the Baloch people in both Kalat state and British Balochistan. They established Anjuman-e 
Itehad-e-Baluchistan, which was a political party and a social organisation. Its principal 
aims were as follows: 1) struggling against the colonisation of Balochistan; 2) a greater and 
unified Balochistan; 3) the abolition of the Sardari system in Balochistan; and 4) an 
independent Balochistan free from all powers within or without (Bugti, 1996, 93-105; 
Naseer, 2010; Baluch, 1987). Later, in 1931, the Kalat State National Party was formed 
following the Persian occupation of Western Balochistan in 1928. Anjuman-e Itehad-e-
Baluchistan and Kalat State National Party (KSNP) are still considered secular, social 
unifying parties among Baloch writers. The two parties have provided a social and political 
platform for the Baloch youth to work for the Baloch people.  
For the unification of Balochistan, conferences were held in 1930s by the Anjuman-e 
Itehad-e-Balochustan. At that time, according to Baluch (1987), a delegation from the 
western side of Balochistan (Iran) attended ‘the Balochistan and all India Baloch 
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Conference’ at Jacobabad in December 1932 (Weekly Young Baluchistan, 1934). The 
main reason for sending this delegation was to endorse the Baloch cause for a unified and 
independent Balochistan. Similarly, the first map of ‘Greater Balochistan’ was published in 
1933 by Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, demonstrating the Baloch opposition to the continuing 
division of Balochistan since 1839 (Baluch, 1987). On the political front, the KSNP had to 
play an important role in both British Balochistan and Kalat State. The KSNP had prepared 
the case for independence and asked the ruler of Kalat to urge the British to allow 
Balochistan to be unified. The ruler of the Kalat state, Mir Ahmed Yar, endorsed the case 
for independence for Balochistan and prepared a memorandum (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 
1975: 142). Ahmed Yar Khan writes in his book that he presented the memorandum of the 
Balochistan case to the Cabinet Mission. 
 
2.4 A Memorandum for Balochistan Independence in 1946   
In the various treaties signed in the 19
th
 century, it was mentioned that the British 
Government was to respect the independence of Kalat. According to the treaty of 1876 the 
Khanate of Kalat was not part of British India but had a separate status linked with British 
India by a treaty of alliance (Zaidi, 1993).
13
 
At the time of the division of united India, the issue of the independence of Kalat State was 
at its peak. As per the agreement, the British would withdraw. The nationalist leaders of 
KSNP asked the ruler of the Khanate for the independence of Kalat State, British 
Balochistan and the leased areas (Harrison, 1981). Some areas of the Kalat State, Arund, 
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The Government of India Act of 1935 treated the Khanate as an Indian state. To many writers this was 
because of British Balochistan which was under the control of the British; therefore, the 1935 Act failed to 




Dajal and Derajat, were leased and directly administered by the British Empire, as 
mentioned earlier. According to Dashti (2012), Dera Ghazi Khan was given to Punjab and 
Jacobabad (originally Khangadh) was given to Sindh; Chagai, Sibi, and Bolan Pass were 
taken away from Kalat state and leased to British India.  
With regard to the problem of the unification of Balochistan, the Khan of Kalat made a 
legal case for the unification and independence of Balochistan (known as the 
memorandum) that was supported by the nationalist leaders of the KSNP (Baluch, 1987: 
174-75). Dashti (2012: 321) claims that “The Khan of the Baloch, under the pressure of 
Baloch nationalists and anticipating the coming political scenario in the region, began to 
formulate strategies for regaining the lost sovereignty of the Baloch state”. It was also 
argued in the case of Balochistan that the Kalat State, like Nepal, had enjoyed a legal status 
based on direct treaty relations with the British government (Harrison, 1981: 23). Harrison 
further argues that, under these treaties, particularly the treaty of 1876, Kalat State was not 
bound to deal with British India or with any of the other princely states. Kalat State had 
maintained its “treaty relations directly with Whitehall” (Harrison, 1981: 23). The Khan of 
Kalat also raised the treaty of 1876, according to which the British had committed 
themselves to respecting the independence of Kalat State and protecting its land (see 
Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975; Zaidi, 1993: 288; Brahui, 2009).  
The Khan of Kalat submitted the case in the form of an official memorandum to the 
Cabinet Mission in March 1946.
14
 According to the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan 
                                                 
14
In 1946 the Cabinet Mission came to India to discuss the transfer of power. Among the members of the 
Mission were the secretary of state for India, Lord Pethic, and A V Alexander. Many of the people (Dehwar, 
1994; Baluch, 1987; Harrison, 1981) were of the opinion that the case for Kalat independence was prepared 
by Khan of Kalat and supported by M. Ali Jinnah (founder of Pakistan) because Jinnah had been legal 
advisor and lawyer to the state of Kalat since 1936. Dashti (2012: 326) argues as follows about Khan of Kalat 
and Jinnah: “One of the blunders he made in this regard was the hiring of a known protégé of the British 




Baluch, in his autobiography Inside Balochistan (1975), he had approached the Mission in 
1946 to discuss the future status of his State. The main demand of the Khan of Kalat was to 
restore Kalat’s independence with the British departure from India. He further argues that, 
in the memorandum, Kalat State was expected to restore its position by regaining its pre-
occupation independent status.  
That Kalat is not an Indian State, its relations with India being of only a formal 
nature by virtue of Kalat’s agreements with the British; that with the ceasing of the 
Agreements of 1876 with the Kalat Government, Kalat would regain its complete 
independence, as it existed prior to 1876; and that the Kalat Government would 
then be free to choose its own way without any interference by others (Ahmad Yar 
Khan Baluch, 1975: 142). 
 
The British agreed with the Balochistan case and dealt with it in a different way (as per the 
agreement) to other princely states, but the issue of the Kalat State was unresolved, 
including that of British Balochistan (see Baluch, 1987; Naseer, 2010; Ahmed Yar Khan 
Baluch, 1975). In August 1947 British colonial rule ended in Balochistan. In March 1948, 
Balochistan (Kalat State) was taken over by Pakistan. This development occurred in Kalat 
State in March 1948 when the Khan of Kalat signed the treaty and Balochistan became part 
of Pakistan (see detailed discussion later in this chapter). Ever since Kalat State and British 
Balochistan came under Pakistani control, conflict has been present in the region.  
 
2.5 Events in 1948 and Different Perspectives 
Various events took place when the State of Kalat and British Balochistan became part of 
Pakistan in 1947-48. The most important event was the issue of annexation. The 
disagreement among writers, historians and various other scholars demonstrates a 
divergence of opinion on whether this was an accession or an annexation. Pakistani 
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historians hardly ever discuss the Khanate of Kalat’s relations with Pakistan. A few writers 
seek to magnify the role of the Muslim League only.
15
 They mention that the stance taken 
by the Khan of Kalat (the ruler the State) was not representative of Baloch sentiments. On 
the other hand, many Baloch nationalist historians argue that it was a forceful annexation 
of Balochistan (the Kalat State and British Balochistan) by the state of Pakistan. The 
Baloch nationalist writers also ignore the decision of the Royal Assembly (the Shahi Jirga) 
of Quetta Municipality.  
In this section I will present a different view of both the Baloch people’s and the State of 
Pakistan’s perspectives on the Balochistan position in Pakistan. In fact, no writer has 
distinguished between the two perspectives regarding the accession and annexation of the 
British Balochistan and the State of Kalat. There are two different arguments in this 
section. The first is the Pakistani state perspective on the decision of the Shahi Jirga of 
Quetta Municipality which voted in favour of Pakistan. It was based on British 
Balochistan, but the writers failed to clarify this. The second is the Baloch perspective on 
the issue of the Kalat State. They argue that Kalat state was annexed by the State of 
Pakistan in March 1948.  
 
2.5.1 Pakistani State Perspective on the decision of the Royal Assembly (Shahi Jirga) 
of Quetta Municipality  
According to the official Pakistani version of the episode, Balochistan became part of 
Pakistan in two ways; one was through state nationalism and the other was through the 
assembly of the leaders (Baloch and Pashtun) in Quetta on June 29, 1947, who voted in 
favour of Pakistan (Harrison, 1981: 24). The creation of Pakistan is claimed to have been 
                                                 
15
 A branch of the Muslim League was established in British Balochistan in 1939 by Qazi Essa.  
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the first time a country had won its independence in the name of religion. In Pakistani 
nationalism, the entire ‘Muslim majority’ provinces and princely states had to be part of 
Pakistan and these areas were obliged to unite in order to establish Pakistan. State 
nationalism is the basis of Pakistani ideology, which emphasised the Muslim brotherhood 
and Muslim nationalism (Fatah, 2008). It clearly rejects the right to nationhood of the other 
peoples who have a distinct culture, territory, language and history, such as the Baloch, 
Sindhi, Punjabi, Pashtun and Muhajir presently living in Pakistan, considering them to be 
part of one Muslim nation under the banner of Islam. 
In British Balochistan (see map of British Balochistan in 1947 below) the organisation of 
the All Indian Muslim League (AIML) was brought into existence in 1939 by Qazi 
Mohammad Essa while Mohammad Khan Jogezai and Mir Jaffar Khan Jamali joined the 
Muslim League later (Ahmad, 2008: 1). According to Ahmad, it was these leaders who 
prepared the people in Balochistan for the creation of Pakistan. However, there is no clear 
record to indicate who these leaders were. In fact, the majority of the leaders were not 
Baloch. They were Pashtun and Punjabi. The Balochistan Muslim League favoured the 
Pakistan movement. The leadership of the Muslim League held meetings from time to time 
and supported the Pakistan resolution asking for the partition of India and the creation of a 








Map 5: British Balochistan at the time of creation of Pakistan in 1947 
 
Source: Dashti (2012: 297) 
In April 1947 a Pakistan Conference was held in Quetta in which the Muslim League 
strongly demanded a separate and independent state of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008: 4). Ahmad 
states that “the fourth meeting was held under the auspices of the Balochistan Muslim 
League attended by about 6000 persons”. However, contrary to Ahmed’s claim, there is no 
record, once again, to indicate whether these participants were Baloch or what they 
actually discussed. 
Finally, on June 3, 1947, it was declared that the Royal Assembly (Shahi Jirga) of Quetta 
Municipality) would decide the future of Balochistan (FPC, 2006). The British nominated 
a council of tribal elders, the Royal Assembly (called Shahi Jirga) in British Balochistan 
(Baluch, 1987). The member of the Shahi Jirga of Quetta Municipality had been appointed 
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by the British and “the Assembly’s recommendation related only to British Balochistan” 
(FPC, 2006: 19). The Shahi Jirga, which was given the authority to decide whether to join 
Pakistan or to be independent, voted in favour of Pakistan (Ahmad, 2008). An important 
question should be considered: was it an overwhelming vote or a divided one? The 
majority of scholars in this field have failed to find an answer, because there is no clear 
record of it. According to Dashti (2012: 333), “they were unable to muster the support of 
majority members of the Jirga. The date of the referendum was brought a day earlier, and 
without a voting, it was announced that the members of Shahi Jirga voted for the 
annexation with Pakistan”. Finally, in 1947, due to a decision by the Shahi Jirga of Quetta 
Municipality, British Balochistan became part of Pakistan. 
Most of the literature deals with the subject from the perspective of the new Pakistani state, 
which could not differentiate between Kalat State and British Balochistan. However, many 
Baloch nationalists and non-Baloch historians consider the decision of Shahi Jirga to have 
been illegal and not to have involved Kalat State (see Bugti, 1996; Naseer, 2010; Dashti, 
2012: 333). According to them, the decision of the Shahi Jirga was a brutal act executed 
forcibly. The arguments of various writers and Baloch nationalists are discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
2.5.2 The Baloch Perspective on the 1948 Annexation  
In August 1947, a round-table conference was held in Delhi to discuss the future of Kalat 
State and its leased areas that were under British control, including British Balochistan. At 
the conference, Lord Mountbatten, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan (PM of the 
soon-to-be Pakistan), Sultan Ahmed (PM of Kalat State) and the Khan of Kalat, Ahmed 
Yar Khan Baluch, all participated (see Dashti, 2012). According to many writers, 
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Balochistan was given the option of joining Pakistan (which was to be severed from the 
united India) or remaining independent (see Naseer, 2010; Bugti, 1996: 93-105). The 
‘Standstill Agreement’ between the Kalat State and Pakistan, was signed on August 11, 
1947 (Dashti, 2012: 330). “The very first clause of the agreement declared that the 
Government of Pakistan agrees that Kalat is an independent State, being quite different in 
status from other states in India” (Baluch, 1987: 256 cited in Dashti, 2012: 330). Gulawar 
Khan, in his doctoral thesis, mentions: 
In order to judge the demands and position of Kalat, a meeting was called on 
4
th
 August 1947 in Delhi, which was chaired by Lord Mountbatten (the then 
Viceroy of India) and his constitutional advisor Lord Ismay. Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
and Liaquat Ali Khan (the first PM of Pakistan) represented Pakistan, while the 
Khan of Kalat (Mir Ahmed Yar Khan), Prime Minister of Kalat (Muhammad 
Aslam Khan), and a constitutional advisor to the Khan of Kalat (Nawabzada Sultan 
Ahmed) represented Kalat. After lengthy discussions over the future organization 
of Kalat, an agreement was reached which was issued in the form of a communiqué 
from the Viceroy’s House in Delhi on 11th August 1947 (Khan, 2014: 183).16     
 
There is some confusion surrounding this event, or perhaps it is a question of 
interpretation, since another version (an argument in this regard about the declaration of 
independence) indicates that the Khan of Kalat declared Balochistan’s independence on 
August 15, 1947 (Dehwar, 1994: 308). However, many are of the opinion that the 
agreement was reached and formally announced on 11
th
 August and that the Khan of Kalat 
proclaimed independence on August 15, 1947. Dehwar (1994: 308) argues that the “Khan 
of Kalat, on the 15
th
 August 1947, has proclaimed the complete independence of his state”. 
Kalat State regained its sovereign status and independence (see letters of the Khan of Kalat 
in Jinnah’s paper, Naseer, 2010; Dehwar, 1994).17 Bugti (1996: 93-105) and Dehwar 
                                                 
16
For the communiqué full text see Mss Eur D971/2 and IOR/R/3/1/166 
17
 Dehwar mentions that the Khan of Kalat declared independence while addressing the people, who had 
gathered in large numbers. He expressed his determination regarding the achievement of the objectives, 
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(1994: 308-316) describe how, after decolonisation in September 1947, elections were held 
in Kalat State and the first two Balochistan legislative assemblies were formed. This was 
the first general election in the history of Balochistan. Members of the Kalat National Party 
participated in the election as candidates, winning 39 of the 52 seats.
18
 Further, 
“Balochistan’s two Houses of Parliament” (Upper and Lower based in Kalat) unanimously 
rejected Jinnah’s proposal after discussions (also see Dehwar, 1994: 311). The Khan of 
Kalat, Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, commented on Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s proposal thus:  
I have great respect for your advice, I replied, and it is my considered opinion that 
Kalat’s merger is necessary in order to make Pakistan stronger. In this connection, I 
would suggest that Baluchistan, being a land of numerous tribes, the people there 
must be duly consulted in the matter prior to any decision I take; for, according to 
the prevalent tribal convention, no decision can be binding upon them unless they 
are taken into confidence beforehand by their Khan (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 
1975: 153).  
 
Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, an assembly member at that time and a veteran Baloch leader in 
1947-48, was the principal spokesman for the independent forces, according to Harrison 
(1981: 25). He declared the Baloch to be Muslims but this fact did not mean that it was 
necessary to lose their independence and to merge with other nations because of their faith. 
If their accession to Pakistan was necessary, as Muslims, then the Muslim states of 
Afghanistan and Iran should also merge with Pakistan (Kutty, 2009: 62-63). However, 
after 227 days (in 1948) Pakistan attacked Balochistan (Kalat) occupied it and coerced its 
ruler into signing a merger treaty (see Naseer, 2010; Dehwar, 1994: 308-315). According 
to Dashti (2012: 339),  
                                                                                                                                                    
namely the unity of Baloch as a nation spread over a large part of Asia, and complete independence for the 
country. 
18
 The first political reform was the formation of the two Houses (Upper and Lower). The Upper House 
(Darul Umara) members consisted of tribal Sardars who automatically filled the seats without being elected. 
The Lower House (Darul Awam) members were to be elected on a limited franchise by the provincial Jirga 
members. At that time the total number of members of the Darul Awam was fifty-five (see Dashti, 2012: 
332). According to Dehwar (1994: 310), the election was held in September, 1947, and the Kalat State 
National Party won the majority of the seats in the Lower House. 
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The short-lived independence of Balochistan ended on March 27, 1948. The Khan 
of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, after hearing the news that the Pakistani troops had 
moved into southern coastal towns of Pasni and Jiwani, eventually succumbed and 
affixed his signature to the Agreement of Accession on March 27, 1948, terming 
his action as “dictate of history”.   
 
The Khan of Kalat said, “I confess, I knew I was exceeding the scope of my mandate . . . 
Had I not taken the immediate step of signing Kalat’s merger, the position of Pakistan 
would definitely have gone worse. The British Agent to the Governor-General could have 
played havoc by leading Pakistan into a fratricide war against the Baluches” (Ahmad Yar 
Khan Baluch, 1975: 162). 
 
2.5.3 The British Role  
British colonial rule and its final withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent changed the 
course of the history of the region. The departed colonial power left behind a legacy of 
artificial borders, territorial demarcations, mass migration, and various newly founded 
states in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The newly emerged 
states have been engaged in conflicts and wars ever since. The case of Balochistan being 
under Pakistani state control is one illustration. 
Other literature produced by British historians and travellers, along with a few 
autobiographies (see Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975; Naseer, 2010; Kutty, 2009; Harrison, 
1981; Axmann, 2009), shows another picture of the British role. According to them, it was 
neither the Khan of Kalat nor the state of Pakistan but the British Empire that wanted to 
merge Balochistan (Kalat State and British Balochistan) with Pakistan. Further, it is argued 
that Kalat State was recognised as an independent state by the British but a newly 
independent Balochistan would not be in their favour. They only recognised Kalat State 
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because they were bound by treaties, as discussed earlier. The FPC (2006: 21) maintains 
that it was the British instruction that led to the forcible accession of the State of Kalat to 
Pakistan in 1948. This study states the following:  
Initially, the British favoured honouring their commitments under the 1876 treaty 
regarding Kalat’s independence based upon the prospects of using an independent 
Balochistan as a base for their activities in the region…by 1946 when it was 
decided to partition India, the British felt that instead of locating a base in a weak 
Balochistan, such a base could be established in Pakistan which was more than 
willing to accommodate the British. Hence, it was in British interests to ensure that 
Balochistan was kept within Pakistan and did not become an independent entity 
(FPC, 2006: 21-22). 
  
Therefore, it was the British who decided that the independent Balochistan could not serve 
their interests, and it was therefore to be merged with Pakistan. Another example is a 
memorandum signed by the Baloch chiefs (British Balochistan) of the Marri-Bugti areas, 
Sardar Doda Khan Marri and Sardar Mohamed Akber Khan. According to Ahmed Yar 
Khan Baluch (1975: 143-144), the memorandum was sent to the British government 
demanding to be allowed to re-join the Khanate. Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari and other 
chiefs of Derajat also demanded separation from Punjab and wished to rejoin the Khanate. 
The British ignored these demands and established the Shahi Jirga. This is one of the 
reasons why many Baloch believe that the Shahi Jirga was not an elected body of the 
Khanate but the representative institution of British Balochistan created for the purpose of 
merging Balochistan against the wishes of the Baloch people (Brahui, 2009). Harrison 
(1981: 24) calls it “a pro-Pakistan assembly of Baluch leaders”. He says that Pakistani 
historians fail to note that “the participants had been appointed by the British Raj and that 
the assembly’s recommendations related only to the small area known as British 
Baluchistan” (Harrison, 1981: 24).  
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However, the contested version of the Pakistani annexation of Balochistan concerns the 
site over which the conflict took place. The history of the Balochistan conflict is one of 
contested annexation and is mostly un-integrated within the history of India and Pakistan. 
Thus, what the Baloch people had faced in 1948 was a new reality. The new reality can be 
understood in terms of various phases of conflict that are discussed in this chapter. It is 
thus logical to raise a pertinent question: why did Baloch insurgency crop up every 10 to 
12 years and then become subdued again each time? It is worth mentioning that 
Balochistan has experienced five insurgencies against the state of Pakistan since 1948, 
including the current one that surfaced in 2002. Further Baloch resistance, resulted in at 
least one major military campaign by the Pakistan Army in Balochistan in each subsequent 
decade.  
 
2.6 Balochistan in Pakistan: Five Phases of the Conflict 
Pakistan witnessed the first Baloch nationalist insurgency in 1948 soon after its 
independence; this was followed by the second phase of conflict (1958–59), the third phase 
of conflict (1962–68), and a guerrilla war in the fourth phase during the years 1973–77. 
Since 2002, the fifth phase of the Balochistan conflict has been carried out through 
guerrilla warfare, which is largely supported by the various militant organisations, i.e. the 
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch student organisations (Barakzai, 2009 and 
Bansal, 2010). The conflict in Balochistan started between Baloch and the government of 
Pakistan in 1948. Many Baloch nationalists demanded the reinstatement of independence 
from Pakistan. However, some of the Baloch demands included autonomy, control over 
natural resources, economic and social development projects, and prevention of excessive 
demographic change on the basis of the Constitution. According to many writers, there 
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were phases of active conflict, latent resentment and relative calm. Violence erupted when 
the federal government of Pakistan announced mega construction projects and the local 
Baloch perceived that they had been excluded from decision-making in these projects. The 
government of Pakistan, instead of considering the grievances and demands of the Baloch, 
has launched a series of military operations to counter Baloch insurgency since 1948. 
In recent years the conflict has become increasingly bloody. The rebels adopted guerrilla 
warfare, attacking the army and paramilitary forces and sabotaging gas and oil pipelines. 
The Pakistan Human Rights Commission (2011) and Human Rights Watch (2010) have 
reported indiscriminate bombing and strafing by the government side, resulting in the 
deaths of hundreds of students, doctors and civilians, with many thousands of Baloch 
activists disappearing. 
 
2.6.1 The First Phase of the Conflict: 1948  
The first war of resistance started within one and a half months of the takeover of Kalat 
state by Pakistan. According to Harrison (1981: 25), “The showdown between Kalat and 
Pakistan came on April 1, 1948, when the Pakistan Army ordered its garrison commander 
in Baluchistan to march on Kalat and arrest the Khan unless he signed an agreement of 
accession”. On May 16, 1948 Prince Abdul Karim (younger brother of the ruler of Kalat, 
Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch) and his people started a guerrilla war against Pakistani 
aggression. A considerable number of his followers crossed over into Afghanistan to 
organise this guerrilla war (Naseer, 2010; Bugti, 1996; Marri, 2000).
19
 In history, the 
                                                 
19
 Some of the prominent leaders who joined him were Mohammed Hussain Anka (the secretary of the 
Baloch league and the editor of the weekly Bolan Mastung), Malik Saeed Dehwar (the secretary of the Kalat 
National Party) and Qadir Baksh Nizamami (a prominent member of Sindh-Balochistan branch of the 
communist party).  
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rebellion led by Prince Karim is known as the first armed Baloch resistance against 
Pakistan.  
There were two kinds of response to the annexation of Balochistan in terms of resistance. 
One was through mass agitation, but this failed. Many of the leaders of KSNP, i.e. Ghaus 
Bakash Bizenjo, Abdul Aziz Kurd and Gul Khan Naseer, wanted peaceful agitation against 
the merger of Kalat State. According to Naseer (2010), the leaders of KSNP were arrested 
and sent to prison when they started mass agitation in 1948. The second reaction was 
through guerrilla war (see Naseer, 2010; Dashti, 2012). This was in parallel to Prince 
Abdul Karim’s actions against the merger of Kalat State. Here, one might say that rebellion 
began as a result of harassment by the state.
20
 Many of the Baloch leaders remained behind 
bars, such as Muhammad Husain Anka, Malik Saeed, Abdul Wahid Kurd and Qadir 
Bakhsh Nizamani. As a result of state brutality those leaders joined the guerrilla war after 
they had failed to negotiate through peaceful agitation.  
The other group of people who were in favour of guerrilla war supported Prince Abdul 
Karim (Dehwar, 1994: 323). According to Marri (2000: 307), more than 1,000 people 
crossed the border into Afghanistan with him and set up camp at Karez Nazar Mohammad 
Khan. Brahui (2009) mentions that the prince and his militant group were asked to return 
to the Khanate by the government to negotiate peacefully and settle the Balochistan issue. 
The weak socio-economic structure and lack of foreign support forced Prince Karim to 
return to Pakistan, where he was arrested and subsequently killed.
21
 On July 8, 1948, when 
he entered Balochistan he was attacked by the state military under the command of Major 
                                                 
20
 Prince Karim had invited the prominent members of the nationalist parties, i.e. Kalat State National Party 
and the Baloch League, to join his guerrillas to regain the former status of the Kalat state.  
21
However, it is argued by many Baloch that Prince Karim was asked to leave Afghanistan by the Afghan 
ruler because Kabul was demanding its land back, which had been leased by the British and made up British 
Balochistan. The idea of an independent Balochistan was not supported by the Afghan ruler. Prince Karim 
was seeking help from him, it being a long-standing tradition for the two leaders to help each other. Thus, a 
point of disagreement emerged between Prince Karim and the Afghan ruler. On the other hand it must be 
noted that an agreement of non-interference had been signed by Baloch-Afghan rulers after the 1758 war. 
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General Akber Khan. At Harboi the prince was captured and imprisoned in the Mach and 
Quetta jail, and many of his friends were arrested (Naseer, 2010: 526).   
 
2.6.2 The Second Phase: 1958-59, and the Third Phase of the Conflict: 1963-69  
In 1958 the first Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan, and Nawab 
Nauroz Khan led the second rebellion against the State forces during his regime. The 
second and third phases of the conflict took place during the same period when Pakistan 
was under the control of General Ayub Khan. Some writers argue that Nauroz Khan took 
up armed resistance against the One Unit Policy but one of his main demands was the 
release of the Khan of Kalat with due honour and respect.
22
 The Khan of Kalat had been 
arrested in 1948. Nauroz Khan Zarakzai led the second insurgency when the government 
of Pakistan declared itself to be one unit and merged all four provinces of West Pakistan. 
Of special concern to the Baloch, according to Matheson (1997), was the merger of the 
four different ethnic groups of West Pakistan into one unit.  
After many years of intense guerrilla fighting against the government of Pakistan, the 
insurgency came to an end when Nauroz was arrested by the military regime of Ayub 
Khan. The Khan of Kalat argues in his autobiography that the Pakistan Army assured 
Nawab Nauroz of peace if he led his men down from the mountains for negotiations. But 
he was betrayed and arrested (Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch, 1975). The Nawab’s sons and 
companions were condemned to death by hanging whereas Nauroz himself was spared due 
to his old age. He was given life imprisonment and later died in a Pakistani prison 
(Harrison, 1981). According to Brahui (2009), one of the government’s strategies was the 
                                                 
22
 ‘One unit’ was imposed by the Federal Government of Pakistan in 1954. Under this policy they merged the 
western wing (present Pakistan) into one body. Thus, Pakistan became two wings: West Pakistan and East 
Pakistan, the latter becoming Bangladesh in 1971.     
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use of religion to reassure its enemies. The government took an oath on the Quran (the 
Holy Book) guaranteeing safety for the Baloch militants (who were fighting against the 
state) if they abandoned their resistance. The Quran was used to suppress armed resistance. 
When the Baloch guerrillas abandoned their resistance and came down from the 
mountains, they were arrested and killed despite the government promises and oath sworn 
on the Quran. The cases of Abdul Karim and Nauroz Khan exemplify this. Many writers 
argue that this game of spurious negotiations, betrayal and the killing of leaders who 
refused to accept the Pakistan state line continued throughout the history of involvement of 
the state of Pakistan in Balochistan. 
 
2.6.3 The Fourth Phase of the Conflict: 1973–77  
The fourth resistance movement was launched in the early 1970s, mainly by the Marri and 
Mengal tribes, when the elected government of Balochistan was dissolved by the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In the 1970 general elections the National 
Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam Party (JUI) secured the majority of the 
seats in the Balochistan assembly. As a result of the election, the NAP and JUI formed a 
coalition government in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The 
Balochistan government was headed by Attaullah Mengal, with Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo as 
governor (Mahmood, 2002). The government of NAP was dismissed in a pre-planned way 
by the Prime Minster of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, and the leaders were declared traitors, 
which resulted in another of the bloodiest wars in the history of Balochistan (Kutty, 2009).  
The Baloch and many of the Pashtun leaders such as Attaullah Mengal (Chief Minister of 
Balochistan), Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo (Governor), Wali Khan and Samad Khan Achakzai 
were sent to jail for treason (Kutty, 2009). During this revolt the Shah’s regime in Iran sent 
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planes to support the Pakistani Army (Harrison, 1981: 37). Harrison states that, “in mid- 
1974, Iran sent thirty US-supplied Huey Cobra helicopters, many of them managed by 
Iranian pilots” (Harrison, 1981: 37). Harrison and Kutty both conclude that the Shah of 
Iran feared that the nationalist government in Balochistan might arm the Baloch 
nationalists in their struggle in Iranian Balochistan. 
To crush the early 1970s resistance, General Tikka Khan was appointed to launch the 
military operation in Balochistan. This insurgency lasted until 1977–78 when the then 
civilian government of Z. A. Bhutto was overthrown by a military junta. A reconciliation 
process was launched by Zia-ul-Haq to remove the Baloch grievances and bring them into 
line with mainstream policy in Pakistan. During the eleven-year rule of General Zia-ul-Haq 
(1977 to 1988) there was no direct conflict.  
The leadership of the NAP was given a general amnesty and Zia-ul-Haq himself made 
several visits to Balochistan. He met with NAP leaders in jail and all their sentences were 
remitted and their confiscated properties returned. It cannot be said that the military regime 
(of Zia-ul-Haq) was better than the democratic civilian government (of Z. A. Bhutto) 
simply because the Balochistan conflict subsided into latent resentment and relative calm. 
But when it came to dealing with the Baloch people, the Zial-ul-Haq regime was relatively 
better. The reasons for this are not discussed in the literature, but one can say that this calm 
continued during the 1990s. The reason is simple: there were no longer any military 
operations or state actions. Zia-ul-Haq had even reversed the policy of previous regimes 
and dropped the Hyderabad conspiracy case against Baloch and Pashtun leaders (Khan, 
1997). The situation became normal and he gave a general amnesty to those who had taken 
up arms against the state. According to Roedad, Khan (1997) declared that, had Zia-ul-Haq 
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followed the policies of confrontation of previous governments, the consequences would 
have been much more dangerous for the country of Pakistan. 
The 1973 conflict was also a reaction against government policies and it did not end until 
the Baloch were invited to negotiations (Janmahmad, 1989). During the period of Zia-ul-
Haq (1977–88) the conflict in Balochistan was pacified by the regime’s co-option policies, 
and similar policies were followed by the regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
until 1999. During these periods the whole of Balochistan remained relatively quiet and 
there was no armed resistance. 
 
2.6.4 The Fifth Phase of the Conflict: 2002 to the present day 
The fifth and on-going insurgency began in 2002 during the military rule of General 
Pervez Musharraf. According to the reports of Human Rights Watch (2010) and Bansal 
(2010), the struggle has now engulfed the whole of Balochistan since Musharraf began 
operations in 2006. In a military operation, a Baloch politician, Akbar Bugti, was killed 
and the problem became more severe. Before the assassination of Nawab Bugti, the 
conflict between the State and Balochistan had been a low-level insurgency in the Marri–
Bugti area. 
This insurgency is different in every respect from the previous one, as it has spread 
throughout Balochistan. The disappearances and extrajudicial killings continue in 
Balochistan through the abduction and murder of Baloch as well as non-Baloch activists, 
students, professionals, lawyers, teachers and politicians (see Human Rights Watch, 2010; 
International Voice for Baloch Missing Persons; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 
2011 and 2012; Balochwarna News, 2013). Baloch professors, politicians, intellectuals, 
63 
 
human rights activists and journalists have all been brutally gunned down during the fifth 
phase of the conflict, in which there is a new ‘killing-dumping’ policy, unlike in the 
previous ones. In previous conflicts there was no such strong evidence of the killing of 
doctors, students and teachers. In retaliation, a number of non-Baloch have been killed by 
the Baloch militant organisations such as the BLA and BLF (HRCP, 2011).   
According to Amnesty International (2011), however, the victims blame the country’s 
intelligence agencies for these hideous acts. National and international human rights 
organisations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) (2011), Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch (2010 and 2011) draw similar conclusions, blaming 
state institutions including the secret service agencies. The officials of Pakistan’s 
intelligence agencies, however, deny such allegations. To date, these intelligence agencies 
have held ‘foreign hands’ responsible for the chain of assassinations in Balochistan. The 
continued alienation and denial of economic and political rights by the state of Pakistan 
and the current political turmoil have led some of the Baloch to once again abandon hope 
and join various armed organisations. Many of these organisations such as the BLA and 
BLF are demanding independence. They are actively involved in armed struggle and 
guerrilla-type warfare against the state. On the other hand, the nationalists, who have been 
part of the mainstream Pakistani polity, have been changing their demand for self-
determination within the country. The past insurgencies were fought by the tribal chiefs in 
the specific areas whereas the current movement for the independence of Balochistan is led 
by the educated middle class along with federalist politicians, such as Ghulam Muhammad 
Baloch, (Balochistan National Movement), Late Nawab Akbar Bugti (Jamoori Watan 
Party) and Hyrbyar Marri (Baloch Haq Tawar). 
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Thus, there is a long-established pattern of suppression and even killing of Baloch leaders 
who resist the Pakistani state’s control. Since 1948, relations between the centre of the 
country and the province of Balochistan are not cordial. Whether Baloch people remain 
engaged in the struggle for the right to self-determination or for provincial autonomy is a 
question of debate due to the various different stances to be found within Balochistan. One 
thing is clear: the hostilities that have occurred in Balochistan can be considered a reaction 
to government policies. Many Baloch think that, during the 64 years of the Pakistan-
Baloch relationship, Balochistan has been pushed down the road of complete alienation 
through exploitation, deprivation, and military operations.  
Balochistan has been repressed and successive Pakistani regimes have occasionally 
admitted their excesses against Balochistan but have done little to amend them. For 
instance, the fighting continued after the Baloch leaders were arrested and hanged. The 
tension was only transformed into peace when the state freed the leaders from jail. The first 
phase of the conflict was a reaction to state policies, as has been discussed by many writers 
mentioned above. The fighting only stopped when the government offered to release the 
Baloch leaders and resolve all issues amicably. The case was similar to the second 
rebellion of Nauroz Khan, when the government of Pakistan decided to impose its ‘one 
unit’ policy to counter the majority in Eastern Pakistan, in order to ensure Punjabi 
domination and control over the government of Pakistan (Ahmed, 1996).  
The Baloch had resisted the policies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (the Prime Minister of 
Pakistan) for the fourth time during his regime (Janmahmad, 1989). As discussed above, 
during the third phase of the conflict the entire leadership of the NAP was in jail. The 
political policies of the NAP were adopted but they were then dissolved due to lack of trust 
between the federal government of Pakistan and the province of Balochistan (Kutty, 2009).  
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When Pakistan finds itself at a political crossroads the military takes charge (Pervez 
Musharraf, 1999–2008), and the recent democratic regime (2008 to the present day) has 
coincided with the country having to face the fifth phase of the insurgency. This on-going 
phase of conflict can also be seen as a reaction to the military operations and the ‘kill and 
dump’ policies of the state. An example is that of Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in a 
military operation at the age of 79. He had led his tribe since 1946, before the 
independence of Pakistan (Matheson, 1997). He had served as provincial governor, chief 
minister and as a member of the National Assembly since the 1970s. 
Baloch society is partially tribal, where tribal chiefs (Sardars) exercise the power of 
control over their tribes (Baluch, 1987; Matheson, 1997). Many Baloch nationalists and 
tribal leaders have remained part of the Pakistani political process. One example is the 
current government of the Baloch nationalist parties, such as the National Party and the 
Balochistan National Party (Mengal) who contested the election in 2013. They are part of 
both the provincial and federal governments. They share the fundamental belief that the 
federal government has not given the province its fair share of the region’s mineral wealth 
since its creation. Nevertheless, they believe in the democratic process. Additionally, many 
of the activists, including both ethnic Baloch and non–Baloch, take a sympathetic approach 
to the Baloch political movement and perceive that separation from the state of Pakistan 
may not be possible. They demand, therefore, equal political, economic and social rights 
for the Baloch within the state of Pakistan. In other words they require a greater share of 
political and economic rights and complete ownership of the natural resources in their 
province. They disapprove of the violent struggle and instead prefer to pursue a soft brand 
of nationalism that asks for maximum provincial autonomy within the orbit of the 
Constitution of Pakistan. 
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In this context I have presented the historical and political nature of the conflict, which 
included five phases. However, the question of Balochistan can be seen from many other 
viewpoints such as the economic nature of the conflict, which includes Baloch grievances 
and the exploitation of natural resources. The geopolitical and international factors of this 
conflict will now be examined. 
 
2.7 Factors behind the Conflict in Balochistan  
Examining the nature and causes of conflict in Balochistan reveals a great deal of 
similarity with other conflicts taking place around the world. For example, major causes of 
the eruption of such conflicts are mentioned by scholars such as Tilly (1999), Napoleoni 
(2004) and Stewart (2010). These causes are inequality, discrimination, resentment, the 
perception of inequality, socio-economic factors, marginalisation, and the lack of freedom, 
democracy and the rule of law. Similar factors caused the conflict in Balochistan, as they 
do in other conflict-ridden regions. The Balochistan conflict is also driven by geopolitical 
factors which may be similar to those in other regions or countries. Therefore, it seems 
pertinent to outline both the socio-economic and geopolitical factors that have caused 
conflict in Balochistan, which will be discussed further in this chapter.  
 
2.7.1 The Grievances of the Baloch  
As noted, if greed can be perceived as ‘taking advantage of economic opportunities’, then 
grievance would mean the ‘motivation’ of a group to fight against injustice (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004). The concept of identity (culture, religion and ethnicity) also plays an 
important role in group formation and in the perception of the group’s position in society 
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(Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009). Conflicts can be influenced by identity, such as the 
mobilisation of a great number of people with a common feeling of belonging to a group 
(Stewart, 2008). 
Researchers have challenged the validity of the ‘greed’ theory analysis of conflict and have 
mainly cited cases of ethnic, religious and economic grievances, as well as government 
ineptitude and an inclination on the part of rebels to alter these conditions, as reasons to 
support their view (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2003; Sambanis, 2001; Stewart, 2010 and 
1998).  
In this sense, the greed of the Pakistani state and the grievances of the Baloch people 
resulted in a conflict which is mainly multidimensional, related to systematic economic 
exploitation and political and historical discrimination. The Baloch have a fear of losing 
their language and territory. These economic, socio-political and cultural grievances 
among the most deprived groups of the Baloch have provoked conflict over the last six 
decades. The Baloch grievances are now causing them to reassert their ethno-nationalist 
identity, thereby posing a challenge to the concept of Pakistani nationalism.  
According to Bansal (2010), Baloch grievances started within the federation when the 
federal government concentrated all power, including political and socio-economic power, 
in its hands.
23
 The Baloch people in this milieu feel that the federal government’s 
behaviour towards them is totally exploitative (Barakzai, 2009). As a result, a new wave of 
insurgency erupted once again in 2002, differing from the ones in 1948–52, 1958–60, 
1962–69 and 1973–77 only in the scale of the violence and the geographical spread of the 
insurgency. However, the causes, issues, demands and the goal continue to be the same. 
                                                 
23
 Pakistan came into existence as a federation in which all administrative and financial powers are 
distributed on the basis of the Constitution, but it has failed to implement a true spirit of federalism or allow 
provincial autonomy, which is guaranteed in the Constitution. 
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It is crucial to mention that, without the accountability that comes through sustained mass 
political participation, the State will fail to provide solutions to basic grievances such as 
provincial autonomy, control over natural resources, educational access and basic needs of 
the province (Balochistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2003; Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Funds, 2013). As a result of the State policies, Balochistan is the poorest 
province and is entirely dependent on the federal government for the transferral of its own 
resources through the National Finance Commission (NFC) Awards on the basis of 
population.
24
 According to Tariq (2010: 30), “Balochistan also produces more than 40 
percent of Pakistan’s primary energy, consisting of coal, oil, natural gas and other 
electricity”. However, it receives only a handful for its own consumption in return. The 
result is that popular grievances against the military and political establishment are finding 
a violent outlet in various militant groups such as the BLA (Hasnat, 2011: 99). With an 
abundance of resources, there are elements of resistance that might actually validate the 
state colonial policies in Balochistan. My own sense is that the Balochistan conflict is 
essentially grievance-based, as well as being due to the greed of the state, as argued above. 
Bansal (2010) and Barakzai (2009) maintain that, of all the nationalist movements, the 
biggest threat to Pakistan at present is posed by the Baloch revolts. They argue that over 
the last six and half decades the Baloch have always been out of the mainstream of 
Pakistani politics, which has caused them to drift away from the main Pakistani society 
while other small nationalities have been assimilated into Pakistani society.
25
 This has 
created a trend of frequent outbreaks of violence in the region.  
                                                 
24
The NFC is the mechanism through which the central government distributes resources among provinces 
on the basis of population. Balochistan receives only 5% of these resources. Nationalist leaders in 
Balochistan feel very dissatisfied with this state of affairs because it constitutes 44 % of the total national 
territory and is unable to provide public service deliveries across the province. 
25
 There is a provincial government set up in the capital of Balochistan with its elected head of government 
known as the Chief Minister. The Governor is nominated by the President of the country. Many of the 
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2.7.2 Natural Resources  
According to the Balochistan Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2003), Baloch anger is 
rooted in the exploitation of their natural resources by the federal government. They 
wonder why, despite the territory’s vast natural wealth, the people of Balochistan live in 
abject poverty. Balochistan is desperately poor, although Balochistan provides one third of 
Pakistan's natural gas, only a handful of towns are connected to the supply grid (Wirsing, 
2008). According to Grare (2006), Balochistan has failed to benefit from its own natural 
gas deposits. “The first deposits were discovered in Sui in 1953” (Grare, 2006: 5). 
Currently, over 70 per cent of Balochistan is without electricity, gas and other basic 
facilities (Baloch, 2007).  
The classic example, described by Bugti (1996: 13), is the Sui Gas where natural gas was 
discovered in 1953 and remained the main source of energy in Pakistan. Since the Sui oil 
and gas field was discovered some 400km southeast of Quetta, it has created considerable 
resentment. The natural gas was first pumped to Punjab in the 1960s, 20 years before it 
reached Quetta, the capital of the province. By 1984 only the capital city of Balochistan, 
Quetta, and a few other towns were receiving gas, according to Bugti (1996: 13), while the 
rest of the province has remained without gas and electricity (Baloch, 2007; Wirsing, 
2008). According to the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP), Pakistan is currently 
exploring for 50 minerals, of which approximately 40 are from Balochistan.  
At Reko Diq, 70 miles from the Afghan border, a Canadian-Chilean mining 
consortium has struck gold, big-time.
26
 The Tethyan Company has discovered 4bn 
                                                                                                                                                    
nationalist leaders claim that they are not true representatives of the Baloch people. According to one rough 
estimate, only 12 % of the population cast their vote in the election.  
26
The matter of gold and copper resources of Riko Diq, in the Chagi hills, has ended up before Pakistan’s 
Supreme Court. They are estimated to be among the three largest gold and copper deposits in the world 
according to GSP. It is important to mention that the Balochistan provincial government refused to issue 




tonnes of mineable ore that will produce an estimated 200,000 tonnes of copper and 
250,000 ounces of gold per year, making it one of the largest such mines in the 
world (The Guardian, 2011a). 
 
This development scheme is presently being slowed down by a dispute, but it indicates the 
potential of Balochistan’s natural resources, such as platinum, iron ore, zinc and coal 
(Mines and Mineral Development Department Government of Balochistan). GSP 
discovered the most important resource deposits which are now being exploited, such as 
Saindak copper-gold deposits, Reko-Diq copper-gold deposits, Duddar lead-zinc deposits, 
and Dilband iron ore deposits (GSP, 2008; Baloch, 2007). Many writers argue that the 
Baloch revolt is about seeking control over their own natural resources, and this is the main 
cause of the insurgency. In the desire to take control of their resources, the Baloch have 
initiated a guerrilla-style struggle against the Pakistani state (Hasnat, 2011). 
According to the Mines and Mineral Development Department, Government of 
Balochistan, coalmining in Balochistan probably started in 1872 in Khost Region District 
Sibi, while chromite has been mined in Muslimbagh since 1902. Vast areas of Balochistan 
have been covered by Canadian mapping in 1952 with the help of aerial photography; 
however, large areas still remained unmapped, such as Barkhan region. Exploration/large-
scale mining activities for metallic minerals such as copper and gold started in the 1990s 
with the launch of the Saindak Copper-Gold Project. Developments of other large projects 
such as the Duddar Lead Zinc Project and Reko-Diq Copper Gold Project are under way.  
In pursuance of the National Mineral Policy 1995 and the enactment of friendly investment 
mining rules in 2002, many multinational Exploration and Mining Companies have 
become involved in exploration/exploitation, e.g. B.H.P Billiton, Tetheyan Copper 
Company, (Berack Gold, Antafagusta), MCC, Lake Resources NL, MRDL, Benway. If 
these resources are properly explored, evaluated and developed, the mineral sector might 
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play an important role in the economic development of the province and the country as 
well. Exploration activities are in progress with the collaboration of foreign investors. 
Unfortunately, however, all the mining activities are currently being carried out by private 
as well as public sector and foreign investors without the consent of the Baloch people. 
Further, the Mines and Mineral Development Department, Government of Balochistan, 
mentions: 
More than 50 important metallic and non metallic minerals have been discovered in 
the province. Metallic minerals are Chromite, Copper, Gold, Silver, Iron, Lead, 
Zinc, Manganese and Antimony whereas the non metallic include Barite, Fluorite, 
Calcite, Magnesite, gypsum, pumice, quartz, asbestos etc. Coal and Dimension 
stone such as Marble, both Onyx and Ordinary, Granite, Gabbro Basalt and Dunite 
are also available in large quantities. 
 
Other resources of Balochistan are similarly being misappropriated by the federal 
government of Pakistan. For instance, the Port of Gwadar was handed over to the 
Singapore government on a 40-year lease without any involvement of Balochistan’s 
provincial government.  
The Baluch have had only a small role in the construction of Gwadar port, a project 
entirely under the control of the central government. The project will benefit the 
people of Baluchistan only if a massive effort is undertaken to train and recruit 
local residents and if the port is linked with the rest of Baluchistan, which is 
certainly not the case at the present time (Grare, 2006: 6). 
 
Likewise, Reko-diq gold and copper project, which is the largest gold and copper project in 
the country, with estimated deposits of millions of tons, is being handed over to an 
overseas consortium by the federal government of Pakistan. In a similar fashion, while 
bypassing the Balochistan government, the Saindak copper and gold project situated in the 
northeast of Balochistan is operated by a Chinese company, which deals directly with the 
federal government. This is thought to be the prime reason for the sense of deprivation that 
has pushed the Baloch into violent conflict with the state of Pakistan.  
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2.7.3 Geopolitical and International Factors of the Conflict  
Harrison (1981: 1-2) posits that Balochistan has been a source of constant conflict and 
insurgency for decades due to its geopolitical position, with its port city of Gwadar on the 
Arabian sea. He also states:  
[A]n area slightly larger than France - the Baluch homeland commands more than 
900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, including the northern shores of the Strait 
of Hormuz, through which oil tankers bound for the West and Japan must pass on 
their way out of the Persian Gulf (Harrison, 1981: 1-2). 
 
The port city of Gwadar is located on the coastline of the Arabian Sea, close to the border 
with Iran.
27
 The expectation was that Gwadar port would become a regional hub for 
commercial and industrial activities and connect the Central Asian Republics (CARs) to 
the rest of the world, where the vast oil and gas reserves of the CARs would be exploited 
and transported around the world via Gwadar port (Grare, 2006). Gwadar is located near an 
important shipping lane and was built by the ‘China Harbour Engineering Company 
Group’. “The Chinese government invested heavily in this project, up to $200m, some say, 
so that landlocked western China could benefit from access to the sea” (The Guardian, 
2011b). 
Although the port has been completed, it is not yet operational, for many reasons. Scholars 
such as Grare (2006: 6) believe that “[t]he Baluch in Gwadar fear that they will become a 
minority in their own land”. Instead of the port being handed over to the Balochistan 
provincial government, it was leased out to Singapore for 40 years by the federal 
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Gwadar deep-sea port is situated in Balochistan. It is in the north of the Arabian Sea and close to the 




government. Finally, in 2013 Gwadar Port was taken from the Singapore authority and 
handed over to the Chinese government. This Port employed Chinese nationals and non-
Baloch from other provinces of Pakistan, which resulted in marginalisation and 
resentment, as mentioned by Grare. “Of the approximately six hundred persons employed 
in the construction of the first phase of the project, only one hundred, essentially daily-
wage workers, were Baluch. There has also been only one road, which joins Gwadar to 
Karachi, opening the port to the rest of the country” (Grare, 2006: 6). 
Gwadar, in spite of having an immense resource base and potential sea route to Central and 
South Asia, has descended into poverty and economic stagnation. This is largely because 
the province is being marginalised by the federal government. It is treated merely as a 
strategically important region with resource reserves (see Bizenjo, 2006; Bugti, 1996: 13). 
The aforementioned authors argue that the geo-strategic location of Gwadar, with its warm 
water (the Arabian Sea), and the NATO supply line through Balochistan to Afghanistan for 
the ‘War against Terrorism’ have created a sense of insecurity among the Baloch, which 
has resulted in conflict. Many scholars argue for the geopolitical importance of 
Balochistan, which is attracting the interest of the international community, primarily 
because it has a strategic location. 
Balochistan has been an over-sensitive region for the international community due to its 
location and the vastness of its territory and borders. There is a Taliban presence on its 
border with Afghanistan, which is about 800 miles long. Besides, a report published in The 
Guardian, entitled Pakistan’s secret dirty war, states:  
Balochistan has long been an edgy place. Its vast, empty deserts and long borders 
are a magnet for provocateurs of every stripe. Taliban fighters slip back and forth 
along the 800-mile Afghan border; Iranian dissidents hide inside the 570-mile 
frontier with Iran. Drug criminals cross the border from Helmand, the world's 
largest source of heroin, on their way to Iran or lonely beaches on the Arabian Sea. 
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Wealthy Arab sheikhs fly into remote airstrips on hunting expeditions for the 
houbara bustard, a bird they believe improves their lovemaking. At Shamsi, a 
secretive airbase in a remote valley in the centre of the province, CIA operatives 
launch drones that attack Islamists in the tribal belt (The Guardian, 2011a). 
 
All these factors are responsible for the importance of Balochistan on the one hand and its 
vulnerability on the other. To sum up, it might simply be said that there is a dire conflict 
not only for resource-related and geo-strategic reasons but also for various other reasons as 
mentioned above. 
Due to its location at the crossroads, the problem of Balochistan has been treated as a 
foreign conspiracy by the state of Pakistan (Bansal, 2006 and 2010). It is naturally an 
attractive location for regional powers who try to access central Asian riches through its 
land (Bizenjo, 2006). At the regional level, India and China have always been part of the 
equation for economic and geopolitical reasons. According to Wirsing (2008), Grare 
(2006) and Baloch (2007), there are compelling reasons for urgent action by either country 
or the Baloch people due to their various interests. For example, the Baloch public 
response to India is different from the rest of Pakistan. The Baloch see India as a likely 
supporter, while the government of Pakistan supports China due to strategic and mutual 
interests. Both countries are regional economic and military powers as well as engaging in 
their own hostilities among themselves.
28
 Another report published by The Guardian, 
entitled Gwadar: Pakistan’s new Great Game, states: 
It appears that there is a long-term plan to eventually connect the Karakoram 
highway with Gwadar. This is upsetting the other emerging superpower of the 
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United States and British intelligence broadly agree, according to recent discussions, that India sees 
Balochistan as a payback for Pakistani meddling in Kashmir (see Daily Dawn, 2012, BBC, 2012) and cited 
by Rehman Malik in-camera briefing to the parliament). Rehman Malik is a politician and former member of 
the Upper House (the Senate) of Pakistan. He was the Interior Minister of Pakistan under the administration 
of the previous Peoples Party. The state believes that Baloch separatists and nationalists are being supported 




region, India, who does not want China's security establishment to have safe 
passage to the Arabian Sea. The fear they have been articulating is that Gwadar 
might become a naval outpost for the Chinese (The Guardian, 2011b). 
 
The stance of the state of Pakistan on the Balochistan conflict is different from that of the 
Baloch nationalist leadership. The Pakistani State sees it as a problem of the Sardars. 
According to this representation by Pakistani historians, only a few Sardars are supported 
by foreign countries (particularly Israel and India) in their attempts to break up Pakistan. 
The official approach in Balochistan is that ‘everything is alright’ and only a few hundred 
miscreants and Sardars, supported by foreign hands, have to be dealt with. By eliminating 
these few Sardars and their supporters, they argue, Balochistan will return to normality. 
Their preferred approach, like all occupying forces, is simply to eliminate them. One might 
argue that the problem of Balochistan is not the issue of a few Sardars but a 
multidimensional conflict that includes socio-economic, political and historical grievances 
that need to be addressed.  
In order to crush the insurgency, the government of Pakistan launched five army 
operations, in 1948, the 1960s, the 1970s and 2002. According to Bansal (2006), Baloch 
(2007), International Crises Group (2007) and Cohen (2005), the situation became worse 
when the previous dictatorial regime of Pakistan decided to wage a large-scale army 
operation to oppress both the nationalist and separatist leadership of Balochistan. This 
military adventure not only further alienated the Baloch masses from Pakistan but also 
squeezed the role of those Baloch political leaders who still believed in a democratic and 
political solution and the distribution of natural resources on the basis of constitutional 
division.  
There are, however, many hurdles to conflict resolution, such as the role of the military and 
the state secret agencies. For example, the ‘kill and dump’ policy aimed at the Baloch 
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people has created further resentment among the Baloch against the state of Pakistan. A 
report published by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that, 
since 2000, some 198 cases of enforced disappearance have occurred in Balochistan. Of 
these 198 people, 46 have been traced, 57 have been found dead (their corpses found in 
various part of the province) and the rest are still missing. Various Baloch websites and 
nationalist leaders claim that the true number of missing persons in Balochistan is actually 
more than 18,000. Qadeer Baloch, vice president of the International Voice for Baloch 
Missing Persons (IVBMP), claims that as many as 18,000 people, including 150 women, 
have disappeared in Balochistan since 2001, and 900 mutilated bodies have been found in 
different parts of the volatile province so far (Khan, 2014). 
For the state and its institutions, including the judiciary, the excesses inflicted on the 
Baloch people do not register as crimes against humanity. Had these been considered 
abnormal and abhorrent, someone or something would have stirred, but as far as Baloch 
are concerned the state and its institutions are silent. No institution has redressed the 
grievances of the Baloch because they all seem to want the status quo to be maintained at 
all costs, even if that cost is the lives of thousands of people. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
When there is extreme oppression, discrimination and violation of human rights, the 
reaction provoked can also be extreme. As mentioned before, many writers argue that the 
demarcation of Baloch land has divided the 700-year-old sovereign nation of Baloch into 
Iran and Afghanistan. The remaining part of Balochistan, however, stayed under British 
control and was annexed by Pakistan on March 27, 1948. They claim that the conflict in 
Balochistan is historical and political. This chapter has clearly illustrated that the conflict 
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in Balochistan has been on-going since the very beginning of the existence of Pakistan, and 
it has multiple causes. Whatever the reason for the conflict, Balochistan became part of 
Pakistan under controversial circumstances, but no serious attempt has been made to solve 
the problems of the Baloch people.  
Since the creation of Pakistan there have been many false commitments and promises by 
both federal and provincial government officials but they have all been in vain due to the 
insincere attitude of the state policy-makers. However, this is no simple matter.  As a result 
of the mayhem in Balochistan, people have been suffering due to poverty, lack of 
education, lack of development, and poor health and nutrition facilities for many decades. 
In the same way, every newly elected government apologises to the Baloch people for their 
wrongdoings but continues to rule with the same suppressive policies. Thus, I would argue 
here that the Baloch people’s grievances and the nature of the Pakistani State have resulted 









This chapter provides a critical discussion of scholarly literature on education and conflict 
in order to help analyse the case-study of the Balochistan conflict in Pakistan. Scholars 
have approached education and conflict relationships in different ways. Broadly speaking, 
there are different ways in which the role of education is seen in academic literature. The 
dominant view is that education is about care. The functionalist theorists such as Emile 
Durkheim (1956, 1962 and 1977), Talcott Parsons (1959), Kingsley Davies and Wilbert 
Moore (1945), and Michael Young (1961) adopt this view. The functionalist perspective 
emphasises the positive aspects of education such as skills, learning, behaviour and 
attitude, and the provision of a sense of solidarity.  
There is an alternative view; the conflict perspective on the role of education reaches a 
contrary conclusion. According to the conflict perspective, education is about mode of 
control (Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, 1976; Randall Collins, 1979; Pierre Bourdieu, 
1977). The purpose of education is to maintain inequality by keeping power in the hands of 
those who are influential in society. Criticising the functionalists, this school maintains that 
the education system and policies mould the lower classes into obedient followers.  
The third argument is that conflict has a clearly detrimental effect on education. Moreover, 
education, as one of the contributors to human development, is also affected by conflict. 
Looking specifically at education and conflict, the bulk of the literature discusses how 
conflict can be detrimental to education. I will return to this issue later in the chapter.  
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Few scholars have looked at how education affects conflict. Within this theme, the 
dominant view is that education reduces conflict. Paulson and Rappleye (2007) and the 
World Bank (2005) claim that education is instrumental in pacifying a conflict. Similarly, 
the World Bank suggests that there is a fundamental role for education in conflict 
resolution, wherein the former provides recommendations and helps to reform society. 
Likewise, other scholars including French (2005), Bhaskaran (2003), Novelli and Cardozo 
(2008), and Tawil (2001) argue that education enables communities and nations to resolve 
their internal socio-economic and political conflicts through dialogue and in various other 
constructive ways. According to these authors, the right kind of education can provide an 
undisputable solution to all human, social and economic problems. The ‘right kind of 
education’ refers to a high-quality education that ensures excellence, measurable learning, 
literacy, and the learning of the essential skills of life (Leach and Dunne, 2007). 
Nevertheless, even those who believe in the pacifying role of education do not necessarily 
assert that there is a direct causal relationship between formal education and conflict 
resolution. That is, education itself may not be a neutral actor in the resolution of conflict; 
it can affect conflict through various channels, which are discussed later in the chapter.   
However, an opposing view is that education actually exacerbates conflict. Challenging the 
above view, one can say that education may generate conflict if it is used as a weapon of 
cultural repression through school textbooks that promote intolerance (Bush and Saltarelli, 
2000; Davies, 2004). Davies (2004) holds this opinion and consequently argues that it is 
the structure of the education system itself that, by promoting certain ideologies, will 
ultimately enhance inequalities and therefore have the potential to fuel conflict. Similarly, 
based on various case-studies on the structure of the education system, such as the one on 
Sierra Leone, Gallagher (2005) also argues that education provokes conflict. For example, 
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children learn how to count using photos of guns; they learn about war tactics and 
landmines, and the content of the teaching contains religious messages and words of hatred 
(see also Davies, 2005b).  
In order for us to gain a deeper understanding of education and conflict, further 
examination is necessary. We need to arrive at some understanding of how education and 
conflicts are usually understood within academic scholarship. First, concepts and 
approaches such as ‘functionalist’ and ‘conflict’ perspectives are critically reviewed in this 
chapter for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the politics of education. In the 
remainder of this chapter I will discuss the ‘functionalist’ and ‘conflict’ perspectives on the 
role of education in order to explore the politics of education, highlighting the key areas 
where education may prove effective by focusing on both conflict resolution and conflict 
generation. Second, I will provide an overview of the literature on the relation between 
education and conflict. This chapter also describes the tendency in both scholarship and 
policy-making to see education as a potential tool for the reduction of conflict. Third, this 
chapter focuses on these writings, examining how they may be problematic, by giving an 
alternative scholarly view on how education foments conflict. Fourth, in the 
conceptualisation of various trains of thought on education and conflict, this chapter will 
follow another argument: that viewing education as human development and a 
fundamental right will help to resolve conflict if the state provides appropriate education. 
Finally, this chapter ends by discussing ‘grievance’ with regard to education in 
Balochistan. Some believe that the state doesn’t care and only wants to control the people. 





3.2 The Role of Education  
This part provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives on the role of 
education: the functionalist perspective and the conflict perspective. According to 
functionalism, the role of education, particularly in schools, is to maintain the prevailing 
social order. The functionalists’ view of the role of education is split into the following 
parts: socialisation, skills provision, and role allocation. The conflict approach, in contrast, 
describes the role of education as being to serve the interests of a particular class. 
According to later arguments, schools serve the interests and ideas of the dominant classes 
in society (see the next section). Before delving into a theoretical discussion on the role of 
education, it is important to describe very briefly the scholarly literature on the philosophy 
and idea of education in Western civilisation from the ancient era to the modern one. 
 
3.2.1 The Idea of Education in Western Civilisation  
The scholarly growth and development of education is not straightforward. Modern 
education in Western civilisation evolved during the Ancient Greek, Renaissance, 
Reformation Movement, and later Enlightenment periods. This gradual development 
continued through the early seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and, later, in the modern 
world. Consequently, the advanced doctrine of education has undergone numerous phases 
of change. 
The idea of education in Western civilisation had emerged in ancient Greece. The most 
important Greek philosophers were Socrates (470/469–399 BC), Plato (428/427–348/347 
BCE) and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), all world-renowned philosophers. The thought and 
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ideas of these great philosophers on education have influenced nations from ancient times 
to the modern world. 
Plato was born in 428/427 BC to a wealthy family in Athens. He pursued a career in 
philosophy as a student of Socrates. After the death of Socrates, to continue his philosophy 
Plato established a school of philosophy in Athens, around 387 BC. Plato’s ideas on 
education emerged in his famous and widely-read book the ‘Republic’. The work focused 
on the importance of education for the evolving society. This seminal work is a 
compilation of dialogues dealing with the essence of education in greater detail. Plato 
believed that education was the key factor in creating and sustaining the Republic 
(Rusholme, 1975: 2). Plato believed that the main purpose of education was to recognise 
the good that prepared human beings for better lives in the state (see Lawton and Gordon, 
2002). 
Scholars have described the established learning Academy of Plato as the first European 
university and learning institution. According to Rusholme (1975), in Plato’s idea of an 
education system children first learn reading, writing and counting at the age of six when 
they go to school. His education system is based on learning, dialogue, motivation and 
interest. His idea of learning consisted of facts, skills, physical discipline, music and arts, 
which he considered the highest form of endeavours in society. 
Plato’s state or Polis is basically an educational community. The survival of the Polis was 
based on education that enabled its citizens to accomplish rational thinking and decision-
making. It is to be noted that the objective and purposes of education were not meant to be 
individual personal interests; rather, education should serve the interests of the state 
(Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 17). Thus, the state should be the guarantor of the pleasure of 
its people for as long as they allow it to be the embodiment of justice. 
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Plato attached greater importance to the subject of education. For Plato, “education is a 
basic component of life” (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16). Plato saw education as a nursery 
that played a vital role in the education of man, helping to build his moral character and 
state of mind (Rusholme, 1975: 2). In his view, nursery education played an important role 
in building moral character in the Polis. “A good society was one in which all individuals 
played a useful part” (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16). Thus, proper training at nursery 
level plays an important role in creating the best rulers. 
Plato’s Republic was a kind of Utopian recipe for a stable, just society in which the 
citizens could enjoy a ‘good life’. Plato’s central idea was that his ideal society 
would have three levels of citizens: the workers or men of bronze; the warriors or 
men of silver; and the guardians or philosopher-leaders, the men of gold. Each of 
these three groups would be carefully educated and trained specifically for their 
future roles in society (Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 16).   
 
As a young man, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), a Greek philosopher, joined Plato’s academy in 
Athens. He is one of the founding figures of Western philosophy (Hummel, 1999: 1). The 
writings of this great thinker have largely been lost; only one third of the original works 
have survived for the modern world to contemplate the significance of education. A 
number of disciplines are saturated with his philosophy such as, politics, ethics, poetry, 
psychology, metaphysics, philosophy and education (Hummel, 1999: 1). It is believed that 
Aristotle contributed to every field to explore the complete domain of knowledge.  
Aristotle devoted his life to teaching, learning and spreading educational thoughts in 
society. Libraries and museums were established to preserve knowledge and to proliferate 
education. The Lyceum (his School) was his great achievement. According to Hummel 
(1999: 2), the Lyceum “was a type of university where research was pursued as an 
extension of higher education”. Research, the philosophy of education, and politics are his 
most important contributions. Moreover, Aristotle laid the foundations of knowledge and 
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methods of teaching with the principal aim of education. The intellectual and moral virtues 
were emphasised in his teachings on the correct actions. The Aristotelian viewpoint 
counted education as a powerful force in every sphere of social life (Curren, 2000). 
Man alone lives by reason, for he alone possesses rationality. In his case, therefore, 
nature, habit and the rational principle must be brought into harmony with one 
another; for man is often led by reason to act contrary to habit and nature, if reason 
persuades him that he ought to do so. We have already determined what natures 
will be most pliable in the legislator’s hand. All else is the work of education; some 
things are learned by habit and others by instruction. Hence certain attributes are 
necessary in order to achieve happiness, the full development of the human being. 
One must be fortunate enough to possess from birth certain natural gifts, both 
physical and moral (a healthy and beautiful body, a certain facility, intelligence and 
a natural disposition towards virtue). But these are insufficient. It is only through 
education that potential happiness can become truly accessible. Education is the 
touchstone of Aristotelian ethics. The virtues, wisdom and happiness are acquired 
through education. The art of living is something to be learned. Aristotle’s ethics 
are based on such concepts as happiness, the mean, leisure and wisdom, which we 
also encounter in his theory of education (Hummel, 1999: 3). 
 
From the remaining fragments of Aristotle’s treatise on educational philosophy, it can be 
argued that he studied and debated human nature as an important force demonstrated in 
education. The principal function of education was to produce virtuous and good citizens 
for the Polis.  
Despite the philosophical, political and intellectual contributions of ancient Greek scholars, 
the Church and religious class had an immense impact on society in Western civilisation. 
The middle ages witnessed the dominance of the priesthood in the life of the masses. 
Eventually, this led the Orthodox Church, the nobility, and the ruling class to play a 
powerful and supreme role in social affairs. This supremacy brought the layman and the 
weaker classes under the suppression of the religious elite.  
The debate over “the idea of original sin”, according to Manuel (1965: 4), was still 
prevalent as a subject of concern during medieval times. The religious class’s influence 
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was not limited to certain spheres of society; in fact, the nature of truth, scientific 
knowledge and educational thoughts were controlled by the religious institutions. In this 
regard, Manuel (1965: 4) states that, “crucial for the traditional theology of all Christian 
sects, whether Protestant or Roman Catholics, had been the belief that man after the Fall 
was naturally corrupt, and that from the time of Adam this corruption had been passed on 
through every successive generation”.  
The religious domination and debate over the good and bad nature of human beings 





 centuries, known as the Enlightenment or Age of Reason. The beginning 
of this intellectual and educational revolution was aimed at curbing the rampant repression 
that had spread to every aspect of human life. Evidently, the forerunners of the Age of 
Enlightenment found societal redemption in education. The wide dispersion of educational 
philosophy brought awareness and produced great scholars. Most leading philosophers of 
this period, particularly Voltaire, Rousseau, Hume, Morelly and Helvetius, according to 
Karimzadi (2015a: 18) “offered a diametrically opposite description of human nature to 
that of the prevailing time and religion”. 
Instead of the belief that by nature man was evil, Voltaire and Rousseau, Hume, 
Morelly, and Helvetius all held the conviction that man was by nature good, or at 
least neutral. If he was naturally good then the good in him should be allowed to 
express itself; if he was neutral then could easily be persuaded to the good by 
education (Manuel, 1965: 5).  
 
They believed that the “human race is not wicked by nature” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 18). The 
philosophers emphasised that the human being is essentially kind and compassionate. “If 
human beings are naturally good then the good in them should be allowed to develop and 
grow. If they are neutral then they can nurtured and educated to become good. So the 
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human race by its nature is said to be good or capable of being good” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 
18).  
Despite overt religious conformity and even nominal acceptance of the doctrine of 
original sin, many came to regard man as by nature good, or at least capable of 
becoming good. Given a proper environment he would be gentle, loving and 
unwarlike. He had a natural benevolence and a natural sympathy for other men 
(Manuel, 1965: 5).  
 
Karimzadi (2015a: 18) writes “[I]f people are ruled by reason and are allowed to live freely 
without the intrusion of outside irrational influences, they will create societies that are 
good and harmonious”. But what are the causes of peoples’ greed, viciousness and 
brutality? He continues “[T]hese characteristics are described as not being innate. John 
Locke (1632–1704) described the brain of the newly born child as a clean slate which is 
empty of any facts” (Karimzadi, 2015a: 19).   
John Locke, the influential English philosopher and Enlightenment thinker, had influenced 
scholars such as Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Locke’s idea of ‘consciousness’ 
explains that a child’s mind is a ‘blank slate’ or Tabula Rasa. His idea suggests that human 
beings are born without innate ideas (Gianoutsos, 2006: 1). Common knowledge and 
education can be inculcated to people through interactions in society via shared 
experiences and a sense of perceptions (see Baldwin, 1913: 180). Thus, “In attempting to 
combat Descartes’ theory of innate ideas, Locke apparently takes the opposite extreme in 
his philosophy and holds that knowledge is entirely the product of experience, for the mind 
at birth is an ‘empty tablet’” (Baldwin, 1913: 180). 
Locke’s doctrine on education holds that ideas develop through experience, sensation and 
reflection (Rickless, 2014: 67). In an essay, ‘Human Understanding’, he debates 
‘Sensation’ because this is a tool through which senses are conveyed as perceptions in the 
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mind, while ‘Reflection’ makes the mind work with perceptions to generate ideas. His 
original belief saw the mind as a Blank Tablet of experience, but he never claimed that all 
human minds are similar. In his contribution ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’ 
(1963), he mentions that some minds have greater intellectual potential than others. 
However, the philosopher’s idea of Empiricism is based on focused learning that is 
achieved with experience.  
In Jean Jacques Rousseau’s (1712–78) ‘state of nature’, human beings are regarded as pure 
and innocent (MacIntyre, 1998: 183–84). Rousseau was an eighteenth-century philosopher, 
writer and intellectual who wrote a discourse on inequality and a historical account of the 
development of the human race. He distinguished between natural man (man formed by 
nature) and social man (man shaped by society), arguing that a good education should 
develop the nature of man. Rousseau discovered that mankind has several forms of nature. 
According to him, man had originally lived in a pure state of nature (see Lawton and 
Gordon, 2002: 94). 
Rousseau describes the education of children not in a school but at home, protected 
from the corrupting influences of society. It provides us with one of Rousseau’s 
fundamental articles of faith: that children are born naturally good, but become 
infected by the evils of society unless measures are taken to keep the child away 
from them (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 94).   
 
Rousseau’s philosophy revolves around the nature and the child themes, which have also 
influenced the field of education greatly. Among his writings, Emile and On Education 
have had a great impact on political, social and educational thought. Rousseau’s Emile 
(1762) sheds light on the nature of education and the nature of human beings. It established 
a profound influence on the Enlightenment era and has influenced contemporary political 
thought and the idea of education. Emile describes an attempt to educate a simple and pure 
child for life and work (see Lawton and Gordon, 2002: 95). Rousseau’s aim was to show 
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how natural education, unlike the artificial and formal education of society, enables Emile 
to become social, moral and rational while remaining true to his original nature. Because 
Emile is educated to be a man, not a priest or a soldier, he will be able to do whatever he 
wants.  
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), tutor to the father of ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ Adam 
Smith, wrote in A system of Moral Philosophy (1755) that people are born with sympathy 
and fellow-feelings. Like many other Scottish philosophers, Hutcheson had an important 
role in eighteenth-century writers’ debate concerning the moral sense. Consequently, the 
natural goodness of the human race and the ‘moral sense’ school beliefs emerged from his 
pen. 
Claude Adrien Helvetius, another French philosopher, presented an argument against both 
the ‘moral sense’ school, as presented by Hutcheson, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s belief 
in the natural goodness of man (Manuel, 1965: 76). According to Helvetius, “man in the 
cradle is neither good nor evil” (see Manuel, 1965: 76). Helvetius’ Essays on the Mind, 
and Its Several Faculties, published in 1759, proposed that all men are equal. They 
naturally have the same understanding and the same level of learning. However, the 
differences between men are due not to innate characteristics but to the education system. 
In this regard, the distribution of educational facilities matters. Therefore, it is education 
that shapes the child’s mind.  
Helvetius is really an adherent of the “clean slate” doctrine in John Lock’s sense: 
all of man’s capacities and his principles of morality are exclusively the result of 
training and experience, and if an appropriate system of education were devised, 
men, motivated by self-interest alone, could be conditioned to will the good of 
society (Manuel, 1965: 76).    
“The good can be achieved only through an education of a particular kind, and if this 
education is to be available to more than a random selection of mankind, it will have to be 
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institutionalised” (MacIntyre, 1998: 53). If human beings are good by nature, then it is the 
environment that will make them good or bad. Humans have inherent abilities and 
potentials for developing. Hence, education is not about creating moral or personal 
character but about seeing society develop successfully. Men’s “misfortunes, therefore, lie 
in the conditions in which they live. The clue to their well-being was in education and in 
social, political and economic reforms. By introducing an appropriate system of education 
and reforms, people would be guided to behave in accordance with their natural goodness” 
(Karimzadi, 2015a: 19).  
Helvetius influenced writers of the utilitarian school of thought, such as Jeremy Bentham. 
The utilitarian school, including Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), J. S. Mill and others, based 
their analysis on this principle. The utilitarian psychology was one of the important 
contributions of James Mill (1773–1836). Mill’s theory of the association of ideas, 
according to Lawton and Gordon (2002: 116), had contributed to the field of educational 
development in the Western world. His emphasis was on “the intellectual processes of a 
child rather than the emotional and was too mechanistic an approach” (Lawton and 
Gordon, 2002: 116). 
A vast body of literature exists on the philosophy and idea of education. Many scholars 
contributed to this subject, including Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), Friedrich 
Froebel (1782–1852), Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), Immanuel Kant (1724- 
1804), John Dewey (1859–1952) and Paulo Freire (1921–1997). The viewpoints of others 
in education are quite significant in society. The aim of education, according to Kant, “is a 
moral and socially better world which leads to the perfectibility of man” (see Lawton and 
Gordon, 2002: 134).  
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Education was seen as a means of achieving different goals in different societies, as is 
evident from the vast philosophical debate on the idea of education. Moreover, socialist 
writers have also considered education very helpful both in terms of improving the 
wellbeing of the masses and in terms of educating the working class to realise its historical 
role and its rights. This thesis neither intervenes directly in the history of the philosophy of 
education nor includes it in its scope. However, it has been worthwhile discussing the 
contributions of these scholars to corroborate the inferences made in the field of education.   
 
3.2.2 The Functionalist Perspective   
A functionalist’s perspective on education emphasises the positive aspects of education, 
such as skills, learning, behaviour, attitude and providing a sense of solidarity. According 
to functionalists such as Durkheim (1956 and 1977)
29
, Parsons (1959), and Davies and 
Moore (1945), the main role of education is to ensure the acquisition of basic knowledge. 
It does this by teaching such skills to children as will be required for their employment on 
leaving school. The education system also has a key role to play in socialising the 
population into accepting society, its norms and its values. Functionalist theorists such as 
Durkheim (1956), Parsons (1959), Davies and Moore (1945), and Young (1961) all have 
the same opinion on the role of education, arguing that it teaches solidarity, integrity and 
social values, which must be functional. They declare that providing education is the way 
to maintain competition, equality, opportunity and skills for improving the economy and 
the norms and values of society by creating social solidarity for young people. It provides 
                                                 
29
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), was a French sociologist and his original works were published in the 
French language. The works of the writer used in this thesis have been edited or translated into English by 
other scholars. His major contributions to academic writing on education were Education and Sociology 
(1956), Moral Education (1962), and The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977). 
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jobs for them in accordance with their talents by using examinations and qualifications, a 
system known as ‘meritocracy’.  
The French sociologist David Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) was the founder of 
functionalism. In his opinion, the structure and level of education is not the same in every 
society. Education is an important force in the creation of moral unity, social cohesion and 
harmony in all societies (Durkheim, 1956). For Durkheim, moral values were the 
foundation of society.  
Durkheim’s argument states that education is the main agent of primary socialisation. He 
says that “education is socialization . . . of the young generation” (Durkheim, 1956: 28). 
Education integrates people into society by teaching them the consensus of its values and 
helps them to feel they belong to the same society. Education transfers culture, common 
beliefs and values while school maintains the cooperation, integration, rules and 
instructions, and principles of society. According to Durkheim (1956), school is a vehicle 
for transmitting norms and values, and for maintaining the consensus on these matters. The 
functionalist theorists view education, its role and its function as something without which 
a society cannot function (see Durkheim, 1956). According to functionalists, society and 
education are related to each other. Sadovnik states:  
Functionalists view society as a kind of machine, where one part articulates with 
another to produce the dynamic energy required to make society work. Most 
important, functionalism stresses the processes that maintain social order by 
stressing consensus and agreement. Although functionalists understand that change 
is inevitable, they underscore the evolutionary nature of change. Further, although 
they acknowledge that conflict between groups exists, functionalists argue that 
without a common bond to unite groups, society will disintegrate. Thus, 
functionalists examine the social processes necessary to the establishment and 
maintenance of social order (2007: 3). 
Functionalists such as Durkheim feared that ‘traditional rituals’ were declining in society 
(see Durkheim, 1893/1947; 1915/1954). He believed that this may have been happening 
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because of the transition from ‘traditional to modern societies’. Sadovnik notes that, for 
Durkheim,  
[T]he processes of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization led to the 
breakdown of traditional rituals and methods of social control, which in turn led to 
the breakdown of social solidarity and cohesion. In Suicide (1897/1951), he 
demonstrated empirically how the breakdown in the traditional community resulted 
in the decline of collective conscience and the rise of individualism. Such a 
breakdown led to what Durkheim called anomie, the condition of normlessness in 
individuals and society (2007: 4). 
 
Durkheim knew that urbanisation and modernisation would affect social cohesion and 
control over people. He was greatly concerned about the disintegration of society and 
wanted a kind of education and schooling system that might serve as a binding force to 
maintain its integrity in order to control it. He wanted a schooling system that could 
connect individuals with one another politically, socially and mentally. He states: 
Education is the influence exercised by adult generations on those that are not yet 
ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain 
number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by 
both the political society as a whole and the especial milieu for which he is 
specifically destined (Durkheim, 1956: 71). 
 
Functionalists see school as a vital part of the organic analogy: a society is like a body; if 
one organ fails the body will die. They have linked this to the idea of the ‘human body 
analogy’ (Urry, 2000). They believe that, without education, society will fail to function. 
Education helps in maintaining a functional society. Functionalism became popular in the 
mid-twentieth century through the work of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), who was known 
as a modern functionalist. Parsons believed that  
[E]ducation was a vital part of a modern society, a society that differed 
considerably from all previous societies. From this perspective, schooling performs 
important functions in the development and maintenance of a modern, democratic 
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society, especially with regard to equality of opportunity for all citizens (Sadvonik, 
2007: 5). 
 
Parsons (1959) talks about the idea of role allocation. According to him, education sorts 
people into their most suitable roles for society based on talents and skills, determined 
through the use of exams and qualifications. As a result, many people will become doctors, 
nurses, pilots and engineers as well as holding other prestigious positions. Functionalists 
argue that schools prepare children for different roles in society. Furthermore, rewards are 
given to motivate people to aim for the top. This encourages competition according to 
abilities, creating upper, middle and lower band classes.  
This idea of role allocation is also linked with the idea of meritocracy. Functionalists such 
as Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore (1945) see education as working according to 
‘meritocratic principles’. ‘Meritocracy’ is the way in which someone is rewarded 
according to his or her ability and achievements. It is a political philosophy which states 
that power should be given to people according to their abilities and merit. The concept of 
‘meritocracy’ is an old one, having been first coined in 1961 by British sociologist and 
politician Michael Young (see Young, 1961; Kamolnick, 2005; Best, 2005). According to 
Young (1961), meritocracy is the system through which every individual should have 
equal opportunities. To achieve goals, effort and ability are required. Thus, one’s job is 
based on the skills and abilities one demonstrates during one’s education. If someone puts 
more effort into their education they will gain more rewards, whereas the opposite applies 
to those who make less effort. Young’s essay describes the governments that were focusing 
on intelligence, overlooking the deficiencies and failure of education systems on the one 
hand and using the brilliant members of their societies appropriately on the other (Young, 
1961: 13).  
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Davis and Moore (1945) see the function of schools as ‘based on merit, not one’s status’. 
They argued:  
[T]hat inequality was functional and necessary in all societies, as it ensured that the 
most talented individuals would fill the functionally most important positions. 
Nonetheless, modern democratic societies differ from previous, traditional agrarian 
societies because they are meritocratic; that is, talent and hard work should 
determine the allocation of individuals to positions, rather than accidents of birth. 
Thus, in modern societies education becomes the key institution in a meritocratic 
selection process (see Sadvonik, 2007: 5). 
 
Parsons (1959) considers that education imparts the importance of competition, parity and 
individuality. He agrees with Durkheim’s view that school is like a bridge between 
childhood, adulthood, family and society. It transmits the values of high achievement 
because it is meritocratic. Functionalism is a structural perspective, identifying multi-
functional institutions such as the mass media, family, religion, the state and education (see 
Durkheim, 1954; 1956). As mentioned above, scholars in this field of study argue that 
education is a functioning social institution in society. In their opinion, the education 
system plays a key role in socialising young people into accepting society’s norms and 
values. Education teaches us to have a sense of belonging. It helps us to become integrated 
into society. Functionalist theory remained a prominent perspective in the field of 
education until the 1960s. Since then, however, this perspective has had to face significant 
criticism from conflict theorists. Scholars in this field (the conflict perspective) argue that 
schools function in the interests of dominant groups rather than for everyone. According to 
them, functionalists are confused about the role of education. Schools ought to have been 





3.2.3 The Conflict Perspective 
The conflict perspective is the opposite of the functionalist approach. It is another 
important perspective on the role of education. The founder of this perspective is Karl 
Marx (1818–1883). Marx did not write much about education itself, but the conflict 
perspective is known as the Marxist perspective on education (see Ballantine and Spade, 
2007: 12). He was nonetheless the initial intellectual articulator of the conflict school in the 
sociology of education. 
Proponents of this perspective have challenged functionalism. They argue that the 
relationship between schools, jobs and skills is problematic (see Hurn, 1993). Hurn argues 
that this relationship is less rational and is exaggerated by the functionalists. Furthermore, 
he says that the role of school is itself problematic in providing equality and equal 
opportunities to students (Hurn, 1985).  
The conflict paradigm offers a very different interpretation of schooling in its 
relationship to society. Like the functional paradigm, the conflict paradigm sees 
schools and society as closely linked- and, I shall argue, too closely linked-but it 
stresses the links between schools and the demands of elites rather than the needs of 
the whole society (Hurn, 1985: 61). 
 
From a conflict perspective, schools are similar to social battlefields, for various reasons. 
According to the Marxist perspective, education transfers the ideology of the ruling class. 
Other Marxists also argue that the culture to which Durkheim refers is in fact the culture of 
the bourgeois, or the rich. This is a vital point, since no schools or colleges seek to transmit 
working-class norms and values, or ways of thinking or speaking. According to this theory, 
the purpose of education is to maintain inequality and to gain even more power for those 
who are already influential in society (Ballantine and Spade, 2007). Moreover, Collins 
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(1971) argues that higher education is a weapon and tool to maintain the status of the elite 
class. The ruling class often uses education for these purposes.  
Durkheim is criticised for assuming that there was a shared culture for all young people. 
Today, however, we have different cultures associated with different classes. We have 
different ethnic and religious cultures that may not identify with or wish to accept the 
culture transmitted by the education system. Functionalists also assume there are equal 
opportunities for all pupils, whereas there is evidence that the working class and minority 
groups do not enjoy the same level of opportunities. 
Tumin (1953), an American sociologist who challenges Davis and Moore’s (1945) 
hypothesis of social stratification, maintains that only the rewarding jobs with good 
positions and salaries are considered important. His argument on social stratification is 
based on the idea of ‘functional necessity’. According to Tumin (1953), Davis and Moore 
only present a positive role of education for society. Dennis Hume Wrong is an American 
sociologist who wrote many books and essays and a famous critique of Talcott Parson’s 
functionalist views. For Wrong (1976), pupils and students are only puppets, and they are 
supposed to accept the norms and values as well as regulations of the school. They cannot 
reject them.  
With regard to meritocracy, the most important critics of the functionalist view of 
education are the conflict theorists, who regard meritocracy as a myth because there is no 
clear definition of ‘merit’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1976). Davis and Moore’s and Parsons’ 
view of ‘meritocratic’ education has been criticised by Bowles and Gintis, who argue that 
class background matters a great deal. How can one define ‘merit’ and ‘standard’? Which 
merit and for whom? According to Bowles and Gintis (1976), it is a myth that education is 
based on merit. Rather, it is based on social status, class, gender, sex and unequal 
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economic conditions of the people. We are guided towards success in the way that merit 
discriminates and discourages pupils. Merit is based on stereotyping and assumptions. 
Conflict theorists argue that the criteria for obtaining good grades are inadequate for 
judging people’s capabilities. Many people do not achieve good grades but are still 
successful in the world.  
For instance, Bowles and Gintis, like other conflict theorists, also criticise the functionalist 
view. In Schooling in Capitalist America (1976), they talk about the unfairness and 
hierarchical structure of the schooling system. According to them, students are expected to 
obey their teachers and follow the rules of the school. In terms of rewards, pupils learn 
how to be punctual and obedient. They oppose the idea that education brings people 
together. In their view, education creates a divide because of these hierarchies. According 
to Samuels (1996: 3) 
Bowles and Gintis further argued that the educational system fundamentally 
stratifies students according to their future positions in the workplace hierarchy, 
through the ‘correspondence principle’. Schools do not just teach more or less; they 
teach different things to different people. In working-class school, students are 
rewarded for rote learning and following the rules, while in the schools of 
professional/managerial families, students are rewarded for creativity and 
independent thought. 
 
Some of the criticism of Durkheim is not always entirely fair because what he said was an 
accurate account at the time of writing, namely the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. Many 
have criticised his perspective on education, claiming that the classification of role 
allocation is not actually competent and that, historically, schools only reflect a majority 
class view (see Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Collins, 1979). “Bowels and Gintis present 
evidence that education produces compliant, disciplined workers; historically, it has been 
imposed on workers from above” (Collins, 1979: 10). An example of this can be found in 
the US, where African-American history was only recently inserted into the curriculum. In 
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this context, the curriculum, textbooks and education policies have served to control the 
population and make obedient citizens of them. However, functionalists are mistaken in 
their structural beliefs that students accept the norms and values and learn to be modern 
citizens. Many reject the values of the schools and the instructions of the teachers.  
“[E]ducation is increasingly used by dominant groups to secure more advantageous places 
in the occupational and social structure for themselves and their children” (Sadovnik, 
2007: 7). As mentioned above, one might argue that the functionalist perspective is highly 
idealistic and sees only the positive aspects of social institutions. Education’s role and 
values are not about the consensus. Students are trained to accept failure. This creates 
inequalities based on race, gender and the economic status of the upper (ruling) class.  For 
example, if one has money one can gain entrance to a good school and thus obtain a better 
education. Hence, the elite can provide a good education for their children. According to 
Marxists, there are no equal opportunities for pupils. Unlike the functionalists, Marxists 
maintain that the education system turns the working class into obedient citizens who 
accept the dominant political establishment. 
 
3.3 Education and Conflict Nexus 
The ‘education and conflict’ nexus is addressed through different perspectives. The 
question in this chapter is: how does education relate to conflict? However, education and 
conflict scholars are mostly interested in how conflict affects education. This is the 
dominant approach. This chapter will deal with both approaches to education and conflict. 
According to many writers, conflict is detrimental to education. The impact of conflict on 
education is immense and multidimensional (see Seitz, 2004; Tomlinson and Benefield, 
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2005). Effects have included damage to infrastructure, the division of education systems, 
and traumatic and long-term psychological effects on children (Davies, 2004). UNICEF 
and World Bank statistics show that during the 1990s six million children were badly 
wounded and disabled during conflicts, and two million children died (Bush and Saltarelli, 
2000: 8; Paulson and Rappleye, 2007: 342; Seitz, 2004). According to UNESCO (2004), 
half of the 104 million out-of-school children live in conflict zones. School infrastructure is 
often seriously damaged by conflict as well. Another report from UNESCO (2010) states 
that armed conflict has affected thirty countries, 80% of the conflict areas being in Africa 
and Asia. The destruction of educational infrastructure represents one of the most serious 
human development setbacks for countries in conflict regions. One example of this is the 
situation in Uganda, which has been engaged in conflict since 1962. As a result of the 
conflict between the state and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Northern Uganda, the 
infrastructure for education, health and agriculture has all been destroyed.  
The UNDP (2005) report describes how the majority of primary schools were closed or 
destroyed during Mozambique’s civil conflict, which started in 1976. The Oxfam 
Education Report maintains that the majority of countries affected by conflicts are in 
Africa. These countries have a much lower school attendance, enrolment rates being less 
than 50 per cent (see Watkins, 2000). According to UNICEF (2005), 63% of the primary 
schools in the Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Lira districts of Northern Uganda remain closed 
due to forced displacement and conflict. 
A report published by the UNDP (2005) highlights the fact that conflict-zone countries 
spend a much smaller percentage of their annual budgets on education than countries that 
are not in conflict. According to this report, the lion’s share of their budgets is being spent 
on weapons and military equipment. Indeed, education has never been these governments’ 
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top priority. Additionally, parents are reluctant to send their children to school for fear of 
violence. “The ratio of girls to boys enrolled in primary schools was 0.83 for 18 low-
income countries that were in conflict at some point since 2000 and for which data were 
available. The ratio for low-income countries not in conflict was 0.9” (UNDP, 2005: 159). 
Children who are poor are deprived of education due to conflict in conflict-ridden 
countries, compared to wealthier children and those living in developed countries. Thus, 
conflict harms the functioning of education systems and often leads to extensive damage to 
the schools and the education infrastructure itself (Seitz, 2004). In this case, one might 
consider the examples of Afghanistan, Palestine, Syria and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) 
region in Pakistan. According to official data, more than 758 schools in KPK province of 
Pakistan had been destroyed between 2009 and 2011 by militants (Conflict Monitoring 
Center, 2013). The majority of schools were completely destroyed by militants’ attacks and 
many others were partially damaged by military operations. For the reasons elaborated on 
above, there is increasing agreement in the literature that reaching the educational 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Education for All (EFA) seems to be a 
distant dream.  
This trend in ever-increasing conflicts can be interpreted in a variety of ways. As the 
UNDP (2005: 153) and Novelli and Cardozo (2008) mention,  in 1991 there were 51 
conflicts taking place globally in which more and more people were dying. For instance, 
the Rwandan genocide left 1 million people dead and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
lost 7% of its population, while in Sudan 2 million people died. Most of the dead were 
civilians (see UNDP, 2005: 153). Furthermore, the twentieth century was one of the 
bloodiest centuries in human history due to numerous wars between countries. The Cold 
War, a confrontation between the two superpowers, was also on-going. Today these fears 
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have given way to fear of local and regional wars fought predominantly in poor countries. 
In this regard, one might argue that violent conflict erupts for many reasons. Poor human 
development indicators are among these reasons.  
There is a direct relationship between education and conflict. In this relationship, education 
is a victim of conflict. The above discussion demonstrates that conflict has a considerable 
impact on education.
30
 Education in turn can influence situations of conflict - by 
contributing to peace and conflict resolution - as can be seen in the writings of several 
researchers (see Harber, 2004; Davies, 2005b; Smith, 2005: 367). However, this argument 
is challenged by an alternative view stating that education exacerbates conflict as well.  
 
3.4 Dominant Scholarly View: Education is Helpful in Reducing Conflict 
Education can be used as a means of reducing conflict (see Novelli and Cardozo, 2008: 6; 
Tawil, 2001; UNDP, 2005 and 2010). Many scholars believe that education can provide an 
arena for change. It makes students aware of the potential for change and, through new 
knowledge, can highlight potential avenues through which collective agencies might be 
built to alter the power relations that underlie conflict, as mentioned in the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and Global Campaign for Education (GCE) documents 
(2011). The positive notion of education is that it may provide ‘education for peace’ 
programmes, social cohesion and socio-economic empowerment (see Brown, 1991: 1; 
Tawil, 2001). This is a crucial point, as it is believed that education is the key to 
eliminating conflict and achieving peace.  
                                                 
30Details of conflicts’ impact on education can be found across the literature. These are the established 
arguments built up by various scholars; however, the relationship between education and conflict is dealt 
with from a different angle vis-à-vis how education affects conflict.  
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The right kind of education is needed to redress the imbalances of these societies through 
the process of education. The right kind of education is education that provides quality and 
job-oriented skills. It is therefore crucial to acknowledge the role that education plays in 
supplying skills and knowledge, and in facilitating understanding, as this may be able to 
provide the foundations for resolving conflict (Chege, 2007). Bhaskaran (2003) contends 
that depth of knowledge, awareness, and the creation of a new educational outlook are the 
best ways to deal with violent conflicts. Likewise, French (2005) underscores the 
importance of education in conflict resolution. He remarks that education sharpens human 
understanding of the consequences of conflict. Smith (2005: 376) agrees with other 
scholars who believe in the two facets of education. He acknowledges that education is 
part of the problem as well as the solution in the reduction of violent conflict. This 
provides the basis for arguing for a ‘right’ kind of education or high-quality education that 
takes into account the nature of the values and needs of the community. Thus, it is 
pertinent to emphasise that educational attainment through the creation of cognisance and 
consciousness has a lot to contribute to conflict resolution. Therefore, it is necessary for the 
attainment of lasting peace.  
The powerful role that education might potentially play is clearly demonstrated in the 
literature. Education is described as the ‘peace dividend’ since it is “a critical element in 
ensuring lasting and sustainable peace” (Save the Children, 2008: 5). In this regard, 
education provides hope, protection and belief in the possibility of a better future. The 
MDG and Education-For-All Declaration have both placed education at the centre of 
efforts to achieve human development. In evaluating the link between conflict and 
education, Davies (2005a) indicates that these declarations seem to be based upon the 
assumption that education is benign and thus promotes greater peace-building and conflict 
resolution. According to her, it is important to know what type and ethos of education 
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should be promoted. Education for peace is vital in order to resolve the conflicts we have 
encountered (Davies, 2005a and b). 
Save the Children (2008)
31
 highlights the role of schools in providing a safe environment 
and an opportunity for children to explore ‘difference’ in a non-confrontational context. 
This is an essential function of schools. They educate children to confront differences in a 
constructive and co-operative manner. In this regard, education can be seen as a tool to 
promote social cohesion and reduce violence (Tawil and Harley, 2004; Salmi, 2000: 14). 
Social cohesion is the interplay between horizontal and vertical relationships. According to 
Smith and Vaux 
In practice societies with strong social cohesion exhibit strong horizontal ties 
between members of groups based on kinship, ethnicity and religion; high levels of 
involvement and commitment to community associations and networks that bridge 
across differences in kinship; and high levels of interaction between civil society 
and government (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 45). 
  
Education can establish the teaching and practice of respecting human rights. This might 
be achieved through the experience of the normality of learning from teachers as well as 
from fellow pupils (Save the Children, 2008: 12). Through this process, people will pay 
greater attention to human rights (Salmi, 2000). 
The role of education can be seen as that of a facilitator for greater reconciliation, as Save 
the Children (2008: 12) advocate, after a peace agreement has been signed. The agreement 
states that schools should serve as a model for reconciliation, paving the way for the 
reintegration of ex-combatants and the displaced, and for wider conflict-transformation 
through personal relationships. Smith and Vaux (2003) express caution about the concept 
of reconciliation, as it is a potentially contentious issue. They draw attention to the fact that 
                                                 
31
 Save the Children is an international non-governmental organisation that ensures that children’s rights are 
protected in developing countries. 
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each conflict is different. For this reason, those affected by conflict will have different 
perceptions of what might realistically be expected with regard to a commitment to 
reconciliation. Tawil (2000: 3), referring to UNICEF (1999) on peace education, argues 
that it is  
[T]he process of promoting the knowledge, skills, attitudes and values needed to 
bring about behaviour changes that will enable children, youth and adults to 
prevent conflict and violence, both overt and structural; to resolve conflict 
peacefully; and to create the conditions conducive to peace, whether at an 
intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, national or international level (UNICEF, 
1999: i).  
This definition highlights three components of peace education. These are: a) conflict 
prevention, b) conflict resolution, and c) creating conditions for peace. The effect of 
education on peace is clear in the case of Afghanistan, where approximately 60% of 
Afghani children returned to the classroom (Paulson and Rappleye, 2007: 341). Similarly, 
in conflict zones such as Sierra Leone and Liberia an environment was created which 
allowed thousands of child soldiers to return to formal education (Paulson and Rappleye, 
2007: 341).  
The crucial role of education in the reduction of conflict is to maintain peace-building and 
social cohesion, as stated by Tawil and Harley (2004), and Chehimi, (2012). This being the 
case, education will then provide economic opportunity and development to all members 
of society. Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 23) advocate a move from peace education to peace-
building education. They argue that peace-building education 
[W]ould be a bottom-up rather than top down process driven by war-torn 
communities themselves, founded on their experiences and capacities. It would be 
firmly rooted in immediate realities, not in abstract ideas or theories. It would be 
applied, immediate, and relevant, which means that it cannot be restricted to the 




The shift from peace education to the peace-building education promoted by these authors 
is perceived as the next step in the evolution of peace education. They criticise peace 
education for being a narrow method, too heavily dependent on training workshops. The 
objective of peace-building education is to initiate or support an educational process that 
allows students to articulate, accommodate and accept differences between and within 
groups, particularly (although not exclusively) in regions characterised by latent violence.  
The main factors distinguishing ‘peace-building’ education from ‘peace education’ include 
the notion that peace-building is a process, not an immediate outcome. In addition, peace-
building is a long-term rather than a short-term process. It relies on local rather than 
external inputs. Finally, it seeks to create opportunities rather than more threats (Bush and 
Saltarelli, 2000: 27).  
The literature on education, conflict, and conflict resolution clearly states that curriculum 
and curriculum policy, pedagogical practice and the structure and process of educational 
delivery through textbooks are important in peace-building (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). 
These elements intricately influence one another. A number of case-studies, especially on 
Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Northern Uganda and Pakistan, for instance, state that 
desegregation reforms in school, the curriculum, textbooks, pedagogy and structure are not 
by themselves sufficient for peace (see Aziz, 1993a; Jalal, 1995). The curriculum is 
important in the formation and transmission of identity, in encouraging a sense of 
belonging, citizenship and shared history. According to Bush and Saltarelli (2000: 12), 
history is crucial for developing a curriculum and removing hate material.  
In this context, the historical narratives included in the educational curricula that are based 
on hatred, bigotry and religious intolerance will threaten peace. This process of historical 
bias through the curriculum is described as ‘chosen glories’ by Volkan (1997). According 
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to Volkan, these selective narratives bring feelings of loss, vengeance and hatred that 
disrupt inter-group peace. Most scholars agree that the curriculum should contain 
appropriate material in order to ensure a tolerant atmosphere, and it must be acceptable to 
all ethnic groups. This encouragement of religious tolerance in every segment of society 
will help to bring the various groups together. Thus one may say that narratives may also 
bring peace and that these should perhaps be based on historical truth, positive criticism, 
cooperation and the promotion of a common vision for the future. The curriculum must not 
be biased against any member of society. 
Therefore, curriculum, textbooks, content materials and concepts of pedagogy play a key 
part in the empowerment of students to meet this challenge. Over the last decade, scholars 
have increasingly focused their attention on supporting educational institution-building and 
educational policy development in countries emerging from conflict and war and those 
experiencing chronic conflict. Davies (2004) suggests some areas that will need to be 
addressed in the curriculum to ‘settle down’ conflict.  For example, there must be tolerance 
and a positive relationship between the various ethnicities and their cultures of learning. 
Their differing uses of language need to be appreciated in the content of the curriculum 
and the textbooks. In this way, education can be better designed to help resolve conflict.  
Scholars argue that education might resolve conflict in various ways. This also prompts us 
to ask how education might contribute to conflict resolution when most of the marginalised 
groups never receive any education, or at least education of any quality. 
 
3.5 The Alternative View: Education that Exacerbates Conflict  
The relationship between education and conflict has been analysed extensively by many 
authors, including Bush and Saltarelli (2000), Davies (2005a and b), Rose and Greeley 
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(2006a and b), Seitz (2004), and Smith (2005). The arguments of these writers can be seen 
in the context of the changing geopolitical situation that emerged in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. There is a consensus among scholars such as 
Davies (2006) and Smith (2005) that more research is needed for an understanding of the 
relationship between education and the on-going unstable situations of conflict among 
marginalised groups. 
In this regard, the majority of writers express the view that there is no sign that conflict 
will be rooted out through education alone in the near future due to the changing global 
context in which conflict and security issues have become a worldwide concern (see 
Novelli and Cardozo, 2008; Smith, 2005; Davies, 2004: 357; Tawil, 2001). For most 
experts, ‘the changing global context’ refers to the military conflicts, for example, in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and there is increasing concern over the violent conflicts and 
challenging emergencies that have dominated the first decade of this century (Novelli and 
Cardozo, 2008). Thus it must be acknowledged, if we are to consider the extent to which 
education can help in resolving conflict, that formal education itself is not a neutral actor 
(Greaney, 2006), and that it does indeed have the potential to reinforce violence.  
Davies (2004, 2005b and 2006) demonstrates the many ways in which school systems can 
reproduce social and gender inequalities. Thus, they will increase tension, which may act 
as a catalyst for war. In some countries the school system itself contributes, along with 
other factors, to the promotion of xenophobia and racism towards ethnic groups and 
religious minorities. This can sow the seeds of conflict. Here we need to emphasise that 
education (for example, schools) forms part of the wider society in which it functions. The 
structure of schooling often contributes to the generation of conflict. Schooling, according 
to Davies (2004), has the potential for fuelling social conflict in that it can deepen 
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inequalities and promote false ideologies. She distinguishes three main ‘roots of conflict’ 
in which education plays a role. Firstly, it may reproduce economic and class distinctions 
through the exclusion of already marginalised groups. Secondly, schools may exacerbate 
existing violent tendencies and gender inequality. Finally, education may transmit or 
reinforce certain essentialist identities based on ethnicity, religion, tribalism and 
nationalism (Davies, 2004).  
Bush and Saltarelli (2000) believe that there are two facets of education: positive and 
negative. As discussed above, the positive notion of education, for Bush and Saltarelli 
(2000), is that it reduces conflict, while the negative facet of education is that it can breed 
conflict. For these authors the negative facet of education is its propensity to exacerbate 
conflict. In this context, the uneven distribution of education creates or preserves privilege 
when it is used as a weapon for cultural repression and employs textbooks that promote 
intolerance (Tawil, 2001).  
Pakistan may serve as an illustration of the radical indoctrination of schoolchildren, carried 
out by government-run schools and Madrasa
32
 or Mosques (Aziz, 1993a). Winthrop and 
Graff (2010) argue that for decades these state-sponsored institutions have produced a 
radicalised creed that is much inclined to encourage religious violence. According to a 
study by a US government commission report on international religious freedom (2011), 
the government of Pakistan announced the reform of the curriculum in order to change the 
problematic content of their system, but this has not yet been done.
33
 The report finds that 
                                                 
32
 The term ‘Madrasa’ usually refers to the specifically Islamic institutions devoted to the teaching of Islamic 
literature. The country has a class-based education structure and runs different types of systems in parallel. 
One of the types is madrasa which are networked with mosques and various religious groups/parties. The 
madrasa graduates with weak or no modern skills are not absorbed by the jobs market (both public and 
private). Therefore, the majority of them will become Ulema- known as religious teachers in madrasa.  
33
The study reviewed more than 100 textbooks, from grades 1-10, in Pakistan’s four provinces. Researchers 
visited 37 public schools, interviewing 277 students and teachers, and 19 madrasa, where 226 students and 
teachers were interviewed. According to this study children are ordered to read a carefully selected collection 
of falsehoods and memorise them.  
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there has been a systematic negative portrayal of minorities, particularly Hindus and, to a 
lesser extent, Christians.  
Pakistani primary and secondary schools continue to use textbooks that foster 
prejudice and intolerance of religious minorities, especially Hindus and Christians. 
Fifth-grade students read official textbooks claiming that “Hindus and Muslims are 
not one nation but two different nations. The Hindus could never become sincere in 
their dealings with the Muslims.” Hindu beliefs and practices are contrasted 
negatively with those of Islam. Bangladesh’s struggle for independence from 
Pakistan is blamed in part on the influence of Hindus in the education sector of the 
former East Pakistan. Such references are not restricted to Islamic studies textbooks 
but take place in both early elementary and more advanced social studies texts used 
by all public school students, including non-Muslims. Moreover, the textbooks 
contain stories, biographies, and poems with an Islamic religious character (Annual 
Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2011: 
118). 
 
Fatah (2008) maintains that, from a young age, Muslim children are taught to pray for the 
downfall of other religions. According to him, Pakistani textbooks support this attitude, 
which considers non-Muslims enemies. This argument is clear when the state supports this 
type of education.
34
 In Pakistan, school performance across the country is very poor 
(Winthrop and Graff, 2010). The recognition of qualifications (diplomas and certificates) 
of these parallel educational systems is accepted in nationwide education and will remain a 
risk factor for conflict.   
Through social exclusion, violence and indoctrination, schools can serve as powerful 
weapons in the production of conflict (Tawil, 2001). One example of this relationship is 
pointed out by the UNDP, which highlights how school exclusion because of poverty in 
Sierra Leone contributed to the phenomenon of young people joining the rebel armies. 
                                                 
34
Another report, by the Hindu American Foundation (HAF), entitled Teaching Hatred: A Glimpse into 
Pakistan’s Education System, mentions that “Several studies on Pakistan’s education system have found 
inherent biases towards minorities in government approved textbooks. For example, a study managed by two 
British Pakistanis indicated that social science and history textbooks contained “disturbing” themes such as 
“Pakistan is for Muslims alone,” “[t]he world is collectively scheming against Pakistan and Islam,” and 
“Muslims are urged to fight Jihad against the infidels.” The study also said that textbooks portrayed 
Hinduism as an inherently iniquitous religion: devoid of equality” (HAF : 1).  
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According to a DFID-commissioned report (see Smith and Vaux, 2003: 9), 82% ‘of the 
reported 113 million children’ not going to school were not doing so because of social 
exclusion. Although these figures vary, millions of children worldwide do not attend 
school due to conflict. 
There are many ways in which education is complicit with and has even contributed to the 
exacerbation of conflict, such as the phenomenon of child soldiers and their military 
training. This may constitute direct preparation for the perpetration of violence (Davies, 
2004). Some schools have become bases for the rebel militants. An example of this is Gulu 
High School in Northern Uganda, where the school infrastructure either hosted militants or 
served as a training place for them. Training for war is not restricted to military schools. 
There are training programmes for ‘defence’ at ordinary schools.  
In this regard, Kosovo is a good example. According to Davies (2004), ‘at the end of the 
conflict in 1999’ a Serbian school was discovered with textbooks containing diagrams that 
served ‘as military training aids’. Children were given instructions on how to use mines 
and booby traps, how to determine and attack a tank’s weak points and how to set mines. 
These types of education and study are not confined to one country. They are common in 
most of the low-income countries. Similar instructions were found in Albania and, later, in 
Serbo-Croatia. Davies argues that the implication of this is that both Serb and ‘Albanian 
children had been taught bomb-making techniques’ at different stages of their schooling 
(Davies, 2004). “The ‘defence’ curriculum was deeply ingrained in both sides” (Davies, 
2004: 110). It is thus clear that education is often used to prepare children for conflict.  
Indeed, school education may lead to the desensitisation of children towards violence. This 
abject misuse of education is common in schools (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). There are 
many schools where violence is a matter of routine - among students, and also between 
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students and teachers. One explanation is that the school may find itself within a broader 
culture of social violence. Pakistan provides a classic example of schools operating in a 
culture of violence. According to Aziz (1993a), textbooks in Pakistani schools foster 
prejudice against religious minorities. Most teachers are of the view that non-Muslims are 
‘enemies of Islam’. He argues that what is being taught in the country’s schools and 
colleges is nationalist mythology. Social studies textbooks are nothing but vehicles of 
political indoctrination.
35
 This phenomenon has been clearly demonstrated in the study 
conducted by the Centre for Universal Education (Winthrop and Graff, 2010). In this 
study, according to the authors, there are many facets of state militancy.
36
 The main thrust 
of their argument, however, is that the Madrasa education system is not the only cause of 
violence in Pakistan. There are other causes including failure to provide education, lack of 
standard curricula, and an inequitable education system, thereby accelerating the conflict.  
The curriculum and the textbooks that are used constitute other ways in which education 
has contributed to the exacerbation of conflict. This has been explained in a recent report 
on Pakistan as mentioned earlier, and also by Aziz (1993a) and Fatah (2008). According to 
Elie (2000), both the curricula and the textbooks are directly or indirectly encouraging 
violence. Elie gives as an example the portrayal of the Arab-Israeli conflict in educational 
textbooks. A study was conducted by the Institute for Monitoring, Peace and Cultural 
Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT– SE) in 2012, entitled Peace, Tolerance and the 
Palestinian "Other" in Israeli Textbooks. The study focuses on the textbooks approved by 
the Education Ministry of the Israeli government. This report describes the nature of the 
                                                 
35
Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, ex-president of Pakistan, who wanted Islamists to support his rule, started the process of 
Islamisation in education curricula and textbooks.  
36
 An example in Pakistan occurred on October 9, 2012, when Malala Yousufzai, a fourteen-year-old girl, 
was gunned down by the Tahrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Taliban are mostly the product of the state madrasa 
education system) for voicing her views on equality for women, and for fighting for educational rights for 
girls in a very conflict-sensitive region. According to a BBC report, more than 500 schools (the majority of 
girls’ schools) were attacked and destroyed by the Taliban in the Federally Administered Area (FATA) and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province of Pakistan.     
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Israeli education system’s attitude to the Palestinian people. According to this report, 
Israeli textbooks were used:  
[A]s a tool to advance the collective ethnocentric Zionist narrative as well as 
hostility, stereotypes and prejudice aimed against Palestinians, stating that the 
Israeli educational curriculum has damaged its students’ attitude towards 
Palestinians and an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (IMPACT-SE, 2012: 2).  
Manipulation and bias can occur in their contents through the addition or omission of key 
facts, especially in subjects such as history and social sciences. In this case, powerful 
forces act rationally to promote their own interests through educational textbooks on 
history, religion, and nationalistic curricula which serve favoured ideologies.   
Davies (2004: 118) points out that many of these textbooks are overtly nationalistic and 
depict the ‘enemy’ as being ‘evil’. Equally, some simply fail to represent reality. In 
addition, discussions of peace are sometimes side-lined in favour of legitimising military 
activity. Promotion of violence is entrenched by downplaying its real horrors (Davies 
2004: 118-119). Thus, we might argue that a population sharing common characteristics, 
i.e. religion, tradition, culture and language, is being manipulated through textbooks, which 
may eventually lead to discrimination and violent conflict, as discussed earlier.   
The use of physical punishment is another means by which schools have contributed to 
exacerbating conflict. Davies maintains that corporal punishment is violence and that this 
is one of the ways in which schools nurture a specific type of intra-state conflict. This on-
going practice violates the UN Convention on the Rights of Children. This kind of 
punishment is now illegal in many countries. Nevertheless, it still occurs in the form of 
beatings, torture, sexual violence, corporal punishment and other illegal acts.  
Some scholars focus primarily on the links between education and ethnicity. In real life, 
drawing attention to ethnicity appears to be a way of manipulating an idea to fit an 
113 
 
ideology that is often used in the teaching of history, social studies and geography. 
“Ethnicity has been variously conceptualised as a sense of ethnic identity consisting of the 
subjective, symbolic or emblematic use by a group of people of any aspect of culture in 
order to create internal cohesion and differentiate themselves from other groups” (Brinks, 
1991, cited in Okuku, 2002: 8). For many writers, education has impaired inter-group 
cohesion under conditions of ethnic tension in several ways.  
Firstly, there have been numerous historical cases where certain “ethnic groups–and more 
broadly, social groups–have been denied access to educational resources, and therefore, 
excluded from full participation in the economic and social life of the country” (see 
Chakraborty and Ghosh, 2013: 131). Consequently, the restriction of access to education 
should be seen as an indicator of declining relationships between groups. In this regard, the 
limitation of access to education might serve as an early warning mechanism for the 
impending exacerbation of tensions.  
Bush and Saltarelli (2000) identify the fact that, on average, privileged ethnic groups 
usually attain a higher level of education than subordinate national groups. This is not 
always the case as some minorities, who are neither dominant nor marginalised, rise up the 
social ladder through education. This might be attributed to factors such as a privileged 
background, which enhances the likelihood of the attainment of a higher educational 
standard. In addition, dominant social groups may influence the education structure to 
ensure their privilege.  
Secondly, dominant social or ethnic groups may control the political process through 
which schools are structured (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000). It is argued that the education 
system has a powerful influence on people’s identities, through both its content and its 
structure (Johnson and Stewart, 2007: 247). According to the latter’s paper, the education 
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system is designed to divide society by fuelling differences and promoting the superiority 
of one ethnic group over another. “The structure may similarly unite or divide, providing 
for schools which young people from all groups in a society attend, to be educated 
together, or segregating ethnicities” (Johnson and Stewart, 2007: 247).  
Thus, it is argued, various means of repression may be used through education in order to 
subjugate the culture, language and history of particular ethnic groups or nations. In 
addition to this, the imposition of a certain language and the suppression of others can 
serve as cultural repression. Therefore, suppressing a language by excluding it from the 
school curriculum will deprive an ethnic group of the knowledge and understanding of 
their culture, history and social norms. This brings us to the question of the choice of 
language in the education system (Annamalai, 1998: 32). Language is important in terms 
of rights, but the state’s imposition of a language generates conflict. Whatever may be the 
case, there is a potential danger of conflict when the interests of the state and those of the 
people clash. Despite the fact that a relationship might exist between human and 
educational conflicts, as suggested by the writers discussed above, another group of 
scholars with the same strength of argument takes an optimistic view of the relationship.   
Literature on education as a tool for conflict resolution and the functionalist perspective on 
the role of education make similar arguments in many ways. Both believe in the positive 
role of education that could provide an arena of change for conflict resolution. For 
example, literature on conflict resolution looks at the structure of the school, socio-
economic development, employment, type of education, skills, knowledge, and social 
cohesion. In a similar way, the functionalists also have a positive perspective on the role 
and purpose of education. Functionalists argue that education provides jobs, skills, merit, 
norms and values, training, social cohesion and integrity to the people.  
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In contrast to functionalism, this research has challenged the role of education as a 
facilitator of conflict resolution for the case-study of Balochistan. However, an alternative 
argument has developed that is supported by conflict theorists, particularly regarding the 
politics of education and conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan. In Pakistan the current 
education policy discourse has found it ‘hard to reach’ the Baloch people, who are 
considered ‘beyond the mainstream’ and a ‘marginalised’ ethnic group. The Baloch people 
(particularly students) take a critical look at analysis and discourses of marginalisation in 
terms of educational policies and development in order to respond to the perceived 
problems of exclusion. They also address questions of equity, inclusion, the 
implementation of policy and the ‘delivery’ of education.  
Bearing in mind all of the above, this chapter has not set out to reject one or the other of 
these perspectives but has sought to learn from both of them from different angles. Theory 
seeks to explain how the world works. However, there are some related issues; for 
instance, if knowledge is power, then how might people be empowered? In this idea one 
might say that social groups are competitive with one another. If we are privileged, then 
we inevitably wish to protect that privilege. Many powerful people and groups are part of 
this struggle. Thus, we see minority groups in conflict with dominant groups. Education 
forms part of these power politics, as mentioned by the Marxists or conflict theorists. They 
argue that education teaches the norms and values of the powerful ruling elites. These 
norms and values will be transmitted through various tools, such as the control of 
educational policies, textbooks and the provision of education. In this context, I am 
referring to the politics of power presented in the Pakistani state school textbooks and the 
country’s educational policies that have been in place since its existence. The term ‘politics 
of education’ was deployed because education has been used as an arena for political 




The distinction in this work refers to the tension between ‘care’ and ‘control’. This is also a 
phrase that features in educational literature, often in the form of education as either 
‘empowerment’ or as a ‘weapon’ or means of repression. The functionalist theorists 
broadly describe the ‘care’ part of education. According to them, educational institutions, 
particularly schools, provide life-learning skills and enable pupils to achieve their goals. 
However, this perspective has been challenged by the conflict theorists, who maintain that 
education is not always positive. It is designed to control the students. The idea of equal 
opportunities for education is merely a myth to impose the ideas of the upper class.   
It is the balance between these two forces, ‘care’ and ‘control’, which concerns us. How 
that balance might be studied in a real situation such as Balochistan is the actual challenge. 
I am keen to keep the Baloch conflict centre stage because 'conflict' is simply an intensive 
crisis of power and is thus better studied as an expression of power relations than as 
conflict. This is why the phrase 'politics of education' is used in the title of this thesis: the 
study is indeed about power politics (here very conflicting) in educational policy, and it 
serves as an example allowing us to see which interests are informing the creation of 
policy in terms of the fundamental balance of care and control that education embodies. 
It is thought that education and conflict have a reverse causality; that is, education may 
help to redress conflict but, at the same time, conflict may have a damaging effect on 
education. Education, in particular, faces a deepening crisis in many countries facing 
economic hardship on the one hand and political repression and social/ethnic conflict on 
the other. 
The literature discussed in this chapter also emphasises the relationship between education 
and conflict, which has received considerable attention, not only in public discourses but 
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also in a great deal of academic research. The literature is devoted to exploring the various 
dimensions of this relationship. Education can play a major role in resolving conflict. This 
is because socio-economic outcomes such as economic growth, the development of human 
capital, democratisation and the promotion of tolerance through provision of high-quality 
education all play a part in resolving conflict. For instance, countries that have high 
literacy rates, in contrast to those with low incomes and poor levels of literacy, are less 
prone to conflict. In this case, I agree with the assertion that there is a connection between 
education and conflict. Education can be employed as ‘an instrument for providing the 
knowledge and skills necessary for economic development’. Moreover, education is used 
as a means of transmitting social and cultural values, as many scholars have argued.  
On the other hand, it may also generate new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones. 
Education is used as a ‘political tool for ideological development’. This chapter has noted 
how education often contributes to the promotion of conflict. Theorising about various 
concepts regarding education and conflict, this chapter follows the main argument that 
education is very important and a fundamental right but has failed to resolve conflict in 




The State of Education in Balochistan: Failure to Care  
 
4.1 Introduction  
Every man, woman and child has the right to an education. This is a fundamental human 
right entitlement. The right to education is set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the 
Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Article 25A of the Constitution of Pakistan states: “The 
State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to 
sixteen years in such manner as may be determined by law” (The Constitution of Pakistan 
1973: 15). It is the social, moral and constitutional responsibility of the state to provide 
education for all children of school-going age without any discrimination on the basis of 
colour, creed, cast, gender or ethnic background. Pakistan is a signatory to various 
international commitments and declarations, such as the Dakar Convention (DC) of the 
Education for All (EFA) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These conventions 
make it obligatory for Pakistan to ensure that education is accessible to every child of 
school-going age.  
In this chapter, I argue that in spite of the written pledges and claimed intentions of the 
reforms, the ‘paternalistic’ role of the education system has not been realised. Instead, the 
system has tended to exacerbate existing antagonism, embedded as it is within a system 
that seeks to assert the exceptionalism of the Pakistani nation. The state has failed to fulfil 
its responsibility for the provision of education in terms of ‘care’ and the paternalism 
function in Balochistan, as I demonstrate in this chapter. 
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In the light of these international commitments and the dire need of the people for 
education, the Government of Pakistan has prepared numerous educational policies and a 
National Plan of Action on Education. The national educational policy of Pakistan has 
been framed in the perspective of modern trends in education: training and the emerging 
requirements of the national integrity and socio-economic development of society (see 
NEP, 1998–2010; Rahman, 2004). These policies can be analysed by looking at the 
educational policy documents that various governments have churned out periodically, the 
majority of whose stated goals have not been achieved (NEP, 1998–2010: 1). Pakistani 
educational policies professed a commitment to universal primary education by 2015 under 
the DFA, but this has remained elusive due to the region’s slow and declining net primary 
enrolment ratio (UNDP, 2010). There are many reasons for this, one of which may be that 
education is being used as a tool to promote the ideology of the state of Pakistan. 
According to Ahmed (2013), Pakistan has always searched for its identity through its 
education policy and distorted its history based on religion, on the pretext that the majority 
of its population is Muslim by faith. 
Examining the literacy rate at provincial level, the data show that “Punjab leads with 60 
percent literacy followed by Sindh with 59 percent, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 50 percent 
and Balochistan with 41 percent” (ESP, 2011–12: 138). In urban areas of the country 
literacy remains much higher than in rural areas. Economic Survey of Pakistan (ESP) states 
that the literacy rate also remains higher for men than for women. As in many other 
developing countries, the situation regarding the education sector in Pakistan has not been 
very encouraging due to poverty, ideological conflict, the Madrasa (Mosque) culture and 
religious, anti-West, pro–war feelings against India perpetuated in the textbooks, along 





 A particularly pernicious relationship between state power and schools is 
manifested through the way in which education is enforced by the state of Pakistan, which 
practices a process of segregation that serves to maintain inequality.  
This chapter explores the state of education in Pakistan generally and in Balochistan in 
particular, and the causes of the persistent backwardness of educational infrastructure, its 
type, quality, quantity and the other factors overall in the province. Many scholars and 
government policy–makers (their details are given below in this chapter) believe that 
Balochistan has one of the worst scenarios in the country, facing challenges such as 
poverty and a lack of quality and quantity of education. In Balochistan, education should 
be given the utmost priority as it is far from satisfactory from the perspective of either the 
provincial or national governments. The reasons for the lack of standard education in 
Balochistan become obvious when one looks at the education infrastructure, the law and 
order situation, and the lack of facilities. This situation, in turn, exposes the lack of interest 
shown by the government.   
Statistics and interviews with respondents show that the restricted access and the quality of 
the education, syllabus and curriculum are other symptoms of politics within education, 
indirectly elicited by the State. Similar issues prevalent in Balochistan today – poverty, 
feudalism, political violence, discrimination and injustice - represent the state of education 
which perpetuates conflict in the province. There are not enough teachers in Balochistan, 
and there are very few schools. Many regions of Balochistan are without government 
schools.  
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It should be made clear that this chapter will draw comparisons with other provinces of Pakistan in terms 
of education facilities and statistics but, as a whole, this study is specific to the province of Balochistan. I 
appreciate the benefits of comparison as, without this, there is a risk of losing details and empirical depth in 
the case-study approach. Thus, I have decided to remain focused on Balochistan only. If I include other 




This chapter also includes critical analysis of the statistics and the interviews given by 
various participants, and poses these questions: Has the state succeeded in its goal of 
providing education to the Baloch? Or has the state failed in its duty of care to provide 
high-quality education to the people of Balochistan? To answer these questions this 
research highlights various educational issues. Firstly, the history of the state educational 
policies and developments since 1947 is discussed. Secondly, a profile of the condition of 
education in Balochistan is outlined. Thirdly, this chapter identifies and compares the 
education infrastructure in Balochistan with other provinces in Pakistan. Fourthly, the 
causes of the decline in standards of education in Balochistan are examined. Finally, the 
role of student politics, formal education and student activism in educational institutions 
such as schools, colleges and universities is examined.   
 
4.2 Brief History and Development of Education Policy in Pakistan 
The history of the educational development in Pakistan is generally considered as 
comprising the following milestones: the All Pakistan Education Conference 1947; the 
Education Conference in 1951; the National Commission on Education in 1958; the 
Commission on Students’ Problems and Welfare 1966; the Educational Policy 1969; the 
Educational Policy 1972; the new National Educational Policy 1978/79; and the National 
Educational Policy 1998–2010. The most important of these periods are discussed below.  
After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, an all-Pakistan Educational Conference was 
organised to discuss the existing education system. The conference was presided over by 
Fazal-ur-Rehman. An important element of education that was emphasised at the 
conference was the spiritual element, as it subsequently formed the determining basis of 
the country. Behram Imtiaz (his fictitious name) held that the spiritual element had been 
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the foundation of the country, which is based on strict Islamic ideology. Behram Imtiaz is 
an educationalist and Director one of the School and English Language Centre in 
Balochistan. In 2013, he was working in an administrative post when I interviewed him. 
According to him, at the conference it was emphasised that, without the implementation of 
religious ideology, the aims and objectives of Pakistan could not be fulfilled. The first 
educational conference document was a brief outline that remained as a preamble for the 
coming educational policies. Thus, educational development had been under the influence 
of religious-ideological factors since the birth of the country. In subsequent years a number 
of attempts were made to promote education through the implementation of various 
policies and planning. 
In 1958 the first Martial Law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan. In the same 
year the government had appointed a Commission on National Education to study 
educational policies and the educational system, and to make suggestions for the future 
plan. The Commission was formed under the chairmanship of S. M. Sharif and was also 
known as the Sharif Commission. There were ten other members of the Commission in 
addition to the chairman. Prof. Dr. Gishkori (his fictitious name), maintains that the 
Commission was under pressure to set out certain policies which would better express the 
ideology of the country through the education system. Dr. Gishkori has served as 
Chairman one of the Department at the University of Balochistan (UOB). At the time of 
my interview, he was also serving at one of the institutions in Balochistan.  
Similarly, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, (his fictitious name), a medical doctor by profession, has 
been working in various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Those NGOs mainly 
deal with the education sector in the province. Dr. Hafeez was also actively involved in the 
Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) politics during his student life. During an interview 
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with him in 2013, he stated that the ideology means that Pakistan was the first country in 
the world to come into existence in the name of religion, i.e. Islam. In the Pakistani 
worldview, all the ‘Muslim majority’ areas were obliged to unite in order to establish 
Pakistan. These factors justified the creation of Pakistan as a unique political entity 
because it came into being on the basis of the religious demand of the ‘Two-Nation 
Theory’. The Commission recognised the importance of education for a nation and its 
socio-economic, as well as political, development. It also emphasised the importance of 
primary universal education for all. This Commission had prepared a comprehensive 
report. One of the central themes of the report was that education must be productive and 
be regarded as an investment in human resources that were vital for the country’s 




After the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) came to 
power. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (a martial law administrator who later became prime minister), 
had announced a Commission for Educational Policies, as mentioned by Dr. Kaleem Ullah 
Bareach, Chairman of the History Department of UOB, during his interview in 2013. 
According to Dr. Bareach, a prominent federal education secretary, Abdul Hafeez 
Peerzada, was nominated head of the Commission and was responsible for making new 
policies and reforms. In 1972, the PM of Pakistan announced the new educational policy 
under which all educational institutions (at various levels including elite schools) were 
nationalised and became government domain. According to government claims, many 
sections of society remained deprived educationally in urban areas, due to high educational 
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 In 1969 the military government of Ayub Khan ended but was followed by another military regime led by 
General Yahya Khan. He came to power as a result of the second Martial Law in Pakistan. This military 
government also established a committee under the supervision of Air Martial Noor Khan. This committee 





costs and elite policies. The government therefore wanted to balance the educational 
opportunities for all sections of society through nationalisation of the education system. 
Education was made free and universal as well as compulsory (up to the 10
th
 class) for all 
children. According to this educational policy, the target of universal primary education for 
boys had to be achieved by 1979 and for girls by 1984.  
In 1978 a third Martial law was imposed in Pakistan. In 1979 an educational policy was 
introduced, commonly known as the new educational policy. It changed the direction of 
education through the implementation of General Zia-ul-Haq’s ‘Islamisation’ policy. In 
1979 a programme of Islamisation included the reform of both the textbooks and the 
education policy. The highest priority was given to the revision of the curricula with a view 
to reorganising the entire content around Islamic doctrines in order to refashion society 
according to Islamic tenets.  
Prof. Dr. Gishkori mentions that the educational policy’s aim was the ‘Islamisation’ of 
Pakistani society. He claims that the aim of these education policies was to develop the 
spirit of the Muslim nation, which would ensure the adoption of Islamic rules and 
commands. It has been the purpose of education since the 1980s to create an obedient 
class, as stated by Dr. Shazawar Ali (his fictitious name) during my interviews in 2013. Dr. 
Shazawar Ali is a prominent author who has written many books on Balochi literature and 
history. At the time of the interview in 2013, he was serving in one of the institutions in 
Balochistan. He says that this was the avowed goal from the very beginning. Similarly, 
Additional Secretary in Secondary Education, Government of Balochistan, Rashid Razaq 
has stressed that the purpose of education is to create ‘responsible citizens’. An interview 
with Rashid Razaq, a government official, took place in the capital city of Balochistan, 
Quetta, in 2013. It should be mentioned here that a separate chapter has been written on the 
125 
 
politics of representation. The argument on controlling citizens through the process of 
Islamisation and imposing ideologies is discussed there.  
Thus, the nationalisation policy of the previous government had been reversed. Under this 
new system the government encouraged the privatisation of educational institutions at all 
levels, including primary, secondary and higher educational levels. The nationalised 
institutions once again became the property of their owners. Zia-ul-Haq’s system of 
Islamisation remained unchallenged even by the subsequent civilian governments. 
In 1998 the Prime Minster (PM) of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, asked the Ministry of 
Education to formulate a national education policy that would lead the nation into the next 
century. The Ministry embarked upon a comprehensive process of consultation with 
educationalists, scholars, subject specialists, leaders of public opinion and representatives 
of NGOs to design an initial draft. In January 1998 the main features of the policy were 
received by the cabinet. The cabinet had appointed a sub-committee of Minsters from 
various departments. Finally, on 21
st
 February 1998, the PM of Pakistan, in a national 
convention on education, announced the salient features of the policy. 
Like previous attempts, the performance of the 1998 educational policies has been 
deficient in several key aspects stated by Behram Imtiaz. Most crucially, it has been 
inadequate in areas such as access and in quality and equity of educational opportunities in 
the face of international challenges. Qaisar Jamali, Provincial Coordinator UNESCO, 
argues during an interview with the researcher that the main challenges are posed by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Dakar Framework of Action (DFA), Education 
for All (EFA), the goals and challenges triggered by globalisation, and the nation’s quest to 
become a knowledge-based society. The review of the national education policy 2009 was 
undertaken because of deficiencies and international commitments. It came after extensive 
126 
 
consultation amongst the public, private and civil society sectors. The review, like 
subsequent policies, adopted a religious scheme in the education system expressed by Dr. 
Shazawar Ali. Interviews with numerous people including the majority of educationalists, 
historians and experts mentioned above agreed on the salient features on which the 
Pakistani education policies are based. 
According to the Chairman of the Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary 
Education (BBISE), Balochistan, Professor Saadullah Khan Tokhai, the main objectives of 
the policies are as follows: 1) protection of Pakistan’s ideology; 2) promotion of religious 
education; 3) development of the spirit of a Muslim nation and Pakistani nationalism; 4) 
national language (Urdu) as a medium of instruction; 5) minimisation of the effects of 
English education; 6) protection of Islamic codes and a way of life; 7) free education for 
every citizen at grass-roots level; 8) attaining an acceptable level of literacy by the 
universalisation of primary education; and  9) ensuring quality and higher education across 
the country. An interview was conducted with Saadullah Khan Tokhai in his office in 
Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013. 
He mentions that the educational policies, despite the good intentions, remained 
unsuccessful for various reasons such as military interference, the reversal of the 
nationalisation of education on the basis of political revenge, the indoctrination of children 
with religious ideologies in educational textbooks, language crises in the educational 
system, and lack of proper funding for education. Similarly, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Dr. 
Hafeez Baloch maintain that the policies are closely tied to the ideology of the state and 





4.3 The State Education: A Comparative Analysis   
Pakistan’s educational performance has been dire throughout its history, despite its 
declaration of ‘education for all’ in the very first year of its creation (1947). But allocation 
of state resources for education has been its lowest priority, according to Dr. Abdul Rafiq. 
An interview was conducted with Dr. Abdul Rafiq, (his fictitious name), an academic and 
educationist, who talked about the government’s minimal interest in the education sector in 
Baloch, as mentioned later in this thesis.  
As Table 1 shows, there is also a wide variation in literacy between provinces. In 2008–09, 
the overall literacy rate for Punjab Province stood at 59%, in Balochistan province it was 
45%. The literacy rate has increased sharply in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Sindh 
(see Ahmed, 2013: 89). In Sindh, according to Ahmed, “the literacy has increased from 
51% in 1989-99 to 59% in 2008-09. Similarly, in KP it increased from 37% in 1998-99 to 
50% in 2008-09. Female literacy rate particularly in two of the four provinces - KP and 
Balochistan - has remained dismally low with only 31% in the former and 23% in the 
latter, which probably would be one of the lowest rates in World over” (Ahmed, 2013: 89). 
However, according to Qaisar Jamali, only 16% of females are literate in Balochistan. 
According to Table 1, the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of children, including females, in 
the country as a whole has increased. However, compared to other provinces the 
Balochistan GER for both males and females paints a truly miserable picture. Similarly, 
Table 1 also highlights the Net Enrolment Rate (NER). NER is about the measurement of 
school attendance. On this measure, Punjab shows a better growth rate of 22 percent 
between the periods 1998–99 and 2008–09, “while, Balochistan could increase its NER by 







Table 1: Literacy Rate 10 and above, GER and NER trends, GPI in Pakistan and Provinces 
Region/Province Literacy rate (10 years and above) GER* primary (5-9) 
Pakistan 
Years 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Male 59 58 65 65 67 69 69 80 83 94 94 99 97 99 
Female 31 32 40 42 42 45 45 61 61 77 80 81 83 83 
Both 45 45 53 54 55 56 57 71 72 86 87 91 91 91 
Rural      44 44 45 49 48     79 80 83 85 82 
Urban     71 71 72 71 74     104 104 106 106 106 
GPI         0.63 0.64 0.65         0.82 0.86 0.83 
Punjab 
Male 57 57 65 66 67 70 69 82 84 100 98 106 102 102 
Female 34 36 44 47 48 48 50 68 69 89 89 95 92 92 
Both 46 47 55 56 58 59 59 75 76 95 94 100 97 97 
GPI         0.72 0.69 0.61         0.9 0.9 0.9 
Sindh 
Male 65 60 68 67 67 69 71 75 76 84 88 88 87 93 
Female 35 31 41 42 42 42 45 54 51 65 71 68 72 75 
Both 51 46 56 55 55 56 59 64 63 75 80 79 80 84 
GPI         0.63 0.61 0.63         0.77 0.83 0.77 
KP 
Male 56 57 64 64 67 68 69 84 97 93 93 96 94 102 
Female 20 20 26 30 28 33 31 54 56 65 70 67 71 70 
Both 37 38 45 46 47 49 50 70 77 80 83 82 83 87 
GPI         0.42 0.49 0.45         0.45 0.7 0.75 
Balochistan  
Male 54 53 52 54 58 66 62 79 77 83 79 62 89 88 
Female 16 15 19 20 22 23 23 46 44 49 50 52 59 54 
Both 36 36 37 38 42 46 45 64 62 67 65 72 75 75 
GPI**         0.38 0.35 0.37         0.58 0.67 0.55 











Region/Province NER** Primary (5-9) 
Pakistan 
Years 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
Male 47 46 56 56 60 59 61 
Female 37 38 48 48 51 52 54 
Both 42 42 52 53 56 55 57 
Rural    48 47 52 51 53 
Urban   64 65 66 66 68 
GPI     0.85 0.88 0.87 
Punjab 
Male 47 47 60 60 64 62 64 
Female 40 43 55 53 59 59 60 
Both 44 45 58 57 62 61 62 
GPI     0.92 0.95 0.94 
Sindh 
Male 47 46 53 54 56 55 57 
Female 35 34 42 47 43 46 49 
Both 41 40 48 50 50 51 54 
GPI     0.77 0.84 0.8 
KP 
Male 47 48 53 54 56 55 58 
Female 30 33 40 42 41 41 45 
Both 39 41 47 49 49 49 52 
GPI     0.73 0.75 0.64 
Balochistan 
Male 44 39 44 39 49 47 51 
Female 28 24 29 27 32 35 36 
Both 36 32 37 34 41 41 44 
GPI**     0.65 0.74 0.64 
 
SOURCE:  AHMED, MANZOOR (2013) FISCAL DECENTRALISATION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY REDUCTION: THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE FROM PAKISTAN 
 
*GER is Gross Enrolment rate, ** NER is Net Enrolment Rate and *** GPI is Gender parity Index 
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Another deteriorating trend indicated by these data (see Table 1) is the rural-urban literacy 
gap. Moreover, the differentiation is not confined to geographical areas but also includes 
the genders, as shown in Table 1 below. Ahmed (2013) states: 
One of the main reasons for low literacy rate in Pakistan is due to the lack of 
attention to its female education. The latter has not only remained dismally low, but 
it also left a negative consequence on overall education in the country. From the 
Gender Parity Index (GPI), which is the ratio of female to male enrolment rate, one 
can easily judge the gender parity in Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013: 92).   
 
Efforts have been made to combat illiteracy but they lack continuity and are unsuited to 
local circumstances and the needs of society (Education for All Plan Balochistan 2011-
2015). Problems exist at both provincial and federal levels, such as lack of uniformity in 
the social structure in different provinces in the country. Of all the problems, the gender 
gap is the most crucial. This gender gap exists because there are very few schools, and 
they cover vast distances. It is not very safe for females to travel such long distances to go 
to school. However, young boys are often sent to live with other families to obtain an 
education, which is not the case with girls. This gender gap in Balochistan in particular is 
due to male domination, social pressures, the family system and inequalities in 
educational institutions to the disadvantage of girls. 
 
4.4 The State of Education in Balochistan Province  
Education is one of the most important sectors in any country, as are health, economics and 
politics. A prosperous and developed society undoubtedly considers education its major 
pillar. It demands extensive planning and efficient resource allocation along with an 
effective implementation strategy, as mentioned by a government official Nizam-ud-Din 
Mengal. Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, an Additional Director of Education (Schools), 
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Balochistan, claims during an interview in 2013 that education in Balochistan is lagging 
behind at various levels, primarily due to the central government’s policy towards 
Balochistan. Like other parts of the country, the education sector in Balochistan demands 
special attention and careful and consistent planning. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 
documents in its 2009–10 report that educational conditions in Balochistan are worse than 
in any other part of the country, and the Baloch are also lagging behind in terms of literacy 
rate. These unequal divides on the basis of gender and area suggest that a substantial 
portion of the population has not been given the opportunity of obtaining education and is 
thus not fully active in the process of development.  
In Balochistan the current state of education is extremely poor, and it has therefore failed 
to produce the human resources that the province requires to run its public and private 
sectors. The state-run education system is functioning beyond its capacity in order to run 
schools in far-flung areas, as argued by Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. The education policy of 
Pakistan, as far as Balochistan is concerned, does not take into account the poor 
infrastructure, hard-to-access territory and scattered population of the province, as 
highlighted during an interview with Rashid Razaq  in 2013. 
Qaisar Jamali opines that the government’s education policy pertaining to Balochistan has 
become a “top-down” approach, in which the central government barely considers the local 
demands and ground realities. He further states that education, along with other social 
sectors of Balochistan, has become the scapegoat for the difficult political relationship 
between the province and the centre. It is worth mentioning here that one of the previous 
education policies defined a primary school as consisting of two rooms with five teachers. 
According to him, the major problems in Balochistan’s education are as follows: 1) high 
dropout rate in primary, middle and secondary schools; 2) insufficient and low-quality 
132 
 
books; 3) lack of efficient monitoring of schools; 4) shortage of trained teachers; 5) 
shelterless and overcrowded schools; 6) lack of teachers’ accommodation facilities; and 7) 
shortage of girls’ schools. Some of the important issues are explored below. 
 
4.4.1 Types and Levels of Formal Education in Balochistan 
Formal education in Balochistan has five levels: Primary education (grades I– V); Middle 
education (VI–VIII); High school education (IX–X, leading to the secondary school 
certificate); Higher Secondary / Inter Colleges (XI–XII, leading to a higher secondary 
school certificate); Degree Colleges education (XIII–XIV) and University education 
programmes leading to graduate and advanced degree classes (XV onwards).  
According to the Balochistan Board Chairman, Saadullah Tokhai, there are various types 
and media of education in Balochistan. These include the government-run Urdu-medium 
schools, English-medium private schools, military schools, and religious schools known as 
Madrasa (Mosque). This term Madrasa literally refers to study or learning. But this term 
has acquired strict religious connotations in Pakistan. An Islamic religious school generally 
offers subjects of religious study. For instance, a person who memorises the entire Quran 
is called a Hafiz, and an Alam is a course enabling the candidate to become a religious 
scholar. In Balochistan, according to Qaisar Jamali, provincial coordinator for education 
(UNESCO), the Madrasas are providing 8% of the country’s education. Private schools 
cover 7% of education while 3 to 4% of the education is being provided by military 
schools and cadet colleges. The remaining 81% of the education provision is public sector 
education, which comes under the domain of the education department of Balochistan. The 
majority of students are in the government sector education system.    
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Besides Madrasas and state-run schools, Balochistan also has a rapidly increasing number 
of privately-run English-medium schools in cities, towns and even some villages (Ahmed, 
2013: 93). Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch was the ex-Chairman of the Baloch Student 
Organisation (BSO) during his student life. At the time of his interview he was working as 
a Director General (DG) of Special Education, Government of Balochistan. He stated that 
the province has also inherited a fair number of elite schools and colleges from the British 
Empire, which were built during British rule by Christian missionaries and the British 
Indian government. These institutions were purposely built to educate the aristocracy and 
train personnel for the civic and military establishment of British India. After the British 
departure from the subcontinent, these institutions’ standards remained intact, but they 
only serve members of the Establishment. 
The type of education Balochistan provides is a huge problem for the majority of students, 
who are in publicly funded government schools. Very few schools, mostly situated in 
Quetta, are English-medium schools with high standards of teaching and pedagogy. These 
schools charge very high fees that are affordable only by the ruling elite of Balochistan, the 
majority of these being non-Baloch, as mentioned by Atiq-ur-Rehman during an interview. 
I interviewed Mr. Rehman in Quetta (the capital of Balochistan) in 2013, where he was 
working in the capacity of Senior Coordinator Strategic Planning and Institutional 
Development Officer (USAID), Balochistan. He told me that another category includes 
those schools in which both English and Urdu are used as media of instruction. The third 
category of schools consists of those where Urdu is the exclusive medium, and a very large 
majority of these are public sector or government-run schools. Despite various media and 
categories of education, in Balochistan, Balochi is not a medium for schools in the 
province and it is not being taught as an optional or compulsory language therein. In 
government schools, untrained and poorly qualified or unqualified teachers are appointed 
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on a political basis or through the bribing of educational authorities, which must surely 
hamper the quality of education in the public sector of Balochistan in particular. 
 
4.4.2 Numbers of Government Schools and Teachers  
The Education Department of the Government of Balochistan puts the overall number of 
boys’ primary schools for the year 2010 at 13,692, of which 7,530 were boys’ middle 
schools and 11,522 were boys’ high schools. For girls there were 5,993 primary schools, 
4,440 middle schools, and 5,158 high schools. Clearly, there were far fewer schools for 
girls. Tables 2 and 2a below show the number of schools by district, gender and level for 
boys and girls.   
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Table 2:  Government Schools by District and Gender Level 
District Boys primary Boys middle Boys high Girls primary Girls middle Girls high 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2010 2009 2008 2007 2010 2009 2008 2007 2010 2009 2008 2007 2010 2009 2008 2007 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Awaran 262 261 256 248 148 151 151 148 296 282 281 281 82 83 75 74 32 36 36 36 36 30 30 30 
Barkhan 509 505 491 478 161 159 172 171 251 249 245 242 231 229 239 222 51 50 46 40 44 43 43 43 
Chaghi 215 201 196 193 136 148 148 144 184 175 174 171 100 104 88 85 121 98 96 94 67 55 54 53 
Derabugti 476 462 427 451 515 524 481 468 508 485 479 463 89 78 74 69 45 51 51 43 54 37 37 36 
Gwadar 221 223 198 198 131 123 114 113 321 309 302 299 141 134 105 104 51 84 74 56 157 117 116 114 
Harnai 155 145 145 135 41 55 52 51 134 123 122 120 88 91 111 109 43 74 36 32 30 25 23 22 
Jaferabad 940 919 889 884 419 397 392 391 682 667 667 660 429 397 393 384 170 165 162 161 174 170 165 155 
Jhalmagsi 271 273 269 257 259 232 226 211 214 210 207 204 142 108 107 108 56 56 56 55 58 56 53 50 
Kachhi 603 578 577 570 240 238 235 248 404 402 398 392 142 125 123 115 83 81 78 78 139 135 130 131 
Kalat 423 400 399 390 227 220 218 217 378 371 370 370 280 232 255 239 187 180 127 105 135 131 112 104 
Kech 717 632 628 622 554 513 509 488 1022 1012 1001 977 526 478 465 460 423 400 389 375 245 242 230 221 
Kharan 192 172 172 169 181 190 188 185 209 196 195 195 59 63 62 65 57 69 68 64 64 40 38 37 
Khuzdar 763 682 682 687 217 221 219 208 426 396 389 379 296 264 301 283 269 244 152 122 76 72 71 69 
Killaabdullah 561 560 548 539 180 181 174 167 473 429 422 431 97 94 89 85 86 84 82 77 102 99 98 98 
Killaaifullah 647 631 629 570 247 244 234 233 332 311 303 296 211 203 196 181 85 81 78 65 120 107 103 96 
Kohlu 364 339 326 322 159 162 156 155 217 198 193 190 91 89 83 76 68 85 82 75 51 22 21 21 
Lasbela 621 585 569 565 396 409 405 378 464 424 419 395 244 226 229 193 182 190 161 130 186 128 121 95 
Loralai 674 662 653 644 428 420 413 409 325 315 303 302 284 281 269 264 153 156 155 150 143 142 133 128 
Mastung 375 363 344 339 273 264 258 255 256 249 244 238 187 168 168 161 111 143 139 135 215 161 158 152 
Musakhel 254 236 233 232 84 100 96 96 196 162 161 159 103 98 96 89 21 27 27 23 72 60 60 58 
Naseer abad 468 435 432 397 205 205 203 201 282 278 281 268 188 178 169 162 71 73 72 67 23 22 21 20 
Nushki 214 165 165 165 195 193 189 188 346 341 340 338 139 133 131 127 198 219 219 208 283 229 228 223 
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Panjgur 308 293 292 291 266 276 267 269 447 381 379 374 275 266 244 252 200 143 136 105 225 207 183 202 
Pishin 954 929 927 880 620 602 569 533 655 618 599 569 393 382 431 454 483 442 349 261 174 167 160 154 
Quetta 1153 1043 1052 1044 543 572 564 559 1368 1164 1145 1105 680 673 668 690 713 693 682 642 1798 1489 1466 1440 
Sherani 188 169 162 165 93 88 86 79 60 34 34 35 24 16 16 12                 
Sibi 329 315 301 295 198 177 176 172 390 385 383 366 192 183 184 162 178 216 199 170 299 232 227 222 
Washuk 172 151 131 122 95 90 88 85 135 110 110 108 42 42 34 33 43 44 44 44 30 17 13 12 
Zhob 419 385 370 365 183 188 178 186 347 315 306 290 144 136 164 142 124 115 70 62 97 76 74 80 
Ziarat 244 241 231 228 136 147 146 146 251 223 219 215 94 93 97 94 96 96 95 95 61 59 56 53 
Grand total 13692 12955 12694 12445 7530 7489 7307 7154 11522 10764 10671 10432 5993 5647 5666 5494 4400 4395 3961 3570 5158 4370 4224 4119 




Table 2a: Number of Schools by District and Gender Level 
As Per School Census (2007– 2008) 
District Male Female Total 
Primary Middle High Total Primary Middle High Total 
Awaran 248 148 281 677 74 36 30 140 817 
Barkhan 478 171 242 891 222 40 43 305 1196 
Chaghi 193 144 171 508 85 94 53 232 740 
Derabugti 451 468 463 1382 69 43 36 148 1530 
Gwadar 198 113 299 610 104 56 114 274 884 
Harnai 135 51 120 306 109 32 22 163 469 
Jaferabad 884 391 660 1935 384 161 155 700 2635 
Jhalmagsi 257 211 204 672 108 55 50 213 885 
Kachhi 570 248 392 1210 115 78 131 324 1534 
Kalat 390 217 370 977 239 105 104 448 1425 
Kech 622 488 977 2087 460 375 221 1056 3143 
Kharan 169 185 195 549 65 64 37 166 715 
Khuzdar 687 208 379 1274 283 122 69 474 1748 
Killaabdullah 539 167 431 1137 85 77 98 260 1397 
Killasaifullah 570 233 296 1099 181 65 96 342 1441 
Kohlu 322 155 190 667 76 75 21 172 839 
Lasbela 565 378 395 1338 193 130 95 418 1756 
Loralai 644 409 302 1355 264 150 128 542 1897 
Mastung 339 255 238 832 161 135 152 448 1280 
Musakhel 232 96 159 487 89 23 58 170 657 
Naseer abad 397 201 268 866 162 67 20 249 1115 
Nushki 165 188 338 691 127 208 223 558 1249 
Panjgur 291 269 374 934 252 105 202 559 1493 
Pishin 880 533 569 1982 454 261 154 869 2851 
Quetta 1044 559 1105 2708 690 642 1440 2772 5480 
Sherani 165 79 35 279 12   12 291 
Sibi 295 172 366 833 162 170 222 554 1387 
Washuk 122 85 108 315 33 44 12 89 404 
Zhob 365 186 290 841 142 62 80 284 1125 
Ziarat 228 146 215 589 94 95 53 242 831 
Grand total 12445 7154 10432 30031 5494 3570 4119 13183 43214 
Source: Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), 




One of the reasons for the often poor quality of teaching is the shortage of schools, trained 
teachers and subject specialists. In interviews with the educationalists and policy-makers, 
the majority of them agreed about the shortage of teachers and schools in the province. 
Rashid Razaq describes many problems, but the inadequate number of teachers and the 
presence of only one schoolteacher in many schools are perhaps at the top of the list. 
Table 3, below, shows the number of government teachers by district, gender and level in 
Balochistan (School Census, 2009–10). According to this census the total number of 
teachers available for primary, middle, high and high secondary schools for boys was 
31,258 and for girls it was 14,412. The total number of teachers for both girls and boys, as 
shown in Table 3 below, is 45,670. 
Table 3: Number of Teachers in Government Schools by District and Gender 
Level 
As Per School Census (2009 – 2010) 
DISTRICT 
Male Female Total 
primary middle high Hig. 
sec: 
total primary middle high total 
Awaran 261 151 282   694 83 36 30 149 843 
Barkhan 505 159 249   913 229 50 43 322 1235 
Chaghi 201 148 175   524 104 98 55 257 781 
Derabugti 462 524 485   1471 78 51 37 166 1637 
Gwadar 223 123 309 50 655 134 84 117 335 990 
Harnai 145 55 123   323 91 74 25 190 513 
Jaferabad 919 397 667   1983 397 165 170 732 2715 
Jhalmagsi 273 232 210   715 108 56 56 220 935 
Kachhi 578 238 402   1218 125 81 135 341 1559 
Kalat 400 220 371   991 232 180 131 543 1534 
Kech 632 513 1012   2157 478 400 242 1120 3277 
Kharan 172 190 196   558 63 69 40 172 730 
Khuzdar 682 221 396   1299 264 244 72 580 1879 
Killaabdullah 560 181 429   1170 94 84 99 277 1447 
Killasaifullah 631 244 311   1186 203 81 107 391 1577 
Kohlu 339 162 198   699 89 85 22 196 895 
Lasbela 585 409 424   1418 226 190 128 544 1962 
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Loralai 662 420 315   1397 281 156 142 579 1976 
Mastung 363 264 249   876 168 143 161 472 1348 
Musakhel 236 100 162   498 98 27 60 185 683 
Naseer abad 435 205 278   918 178 73 22 273 1191 
Nushki 165 193 341   699 133 219 229 581 1280 
Panjgur 293 276 381   950 266 143 207 616 1566 
Pishin 929 602 618   2149 382 442 167 991 3140 
Quetta 1043 572 1164   2779 673 693 1489 2855 5634 
Sherani 169 88 34   291 16     16 307 
Sibi 315 177 385   877 183 216 232 631 1508 
Washuk 151 90 110   351 42 44 17 103 454 
Zhob 385 188 315   888 136 115 76 327 1215 
Ziarat 241 147 223   611 93 96 59 248 859 
Grand total 12955 7489 10764 50 31258 5647 4395 4370 14412 45670 
Source: Balochistan Education Management Information System (BEMIS), 
Education Department, Government of Balochistan 
 
According to the Government of Balochistan (2012), Balochistan province faces a very 
grave problem in the shortage of teachers. The dearth of teachers is not only in terms of 
quantity but also in terms of professionally qualified and trained teachers. Balochistan 
covers a huge geographical area with low population density compared with other 
provinces of Pakistan. People who inhabit far-flung areas do not have access to education. 
There is a severe dearth of schools and teachers in rural areas, especially for females (GoB, 
2012: 3).  
However, as the above Table shows, the number of teachers was increased due to pressure 
and international commitments to education, but the gap between the demand and supply 
of teachers and the existing gender gap in the teaching workforce are still critical. This gap, 
according to Aziz Bugti, is due to many factors such as funding and conscious policy as 
well as the negligence of the state, all of which are discussed later in this chapter. Professor 
Aziz Bugti is the former Chairman, Department of Political Sciences, UoB and also served 
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in the education department, Government of Balochistan, as a Director. The interview with 
Aziz Bugti was conducted in written form due to his advanced age and disability in 2013. 
Schools, colleges and universities, including one medical college and one engineering 
university, are functioning in Balochistan, for both males and females. But they are 
insufficient to accommodate the increasing population of young people in the province 
even though it is the least populous province in Pakistan, bordering Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and Iran. I interviewed the Inspector General of the Frontier Core (IG FC), Major General 
Zia Ullah Khan (Retd), in Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013. He stated that Balochistan is a 
frontier area on the crossroads between the Indian subcontinent, central Asia and Iranian 
territory. On the one hand, due to the widespread remote areas and poor or absent 
infrastructure, a sizeable portion of the population has no access to basic education. On the 
other hand, extreme poverty makes it difficult for parents to send their children, especially 
girls, to the cities both within and beyond Balochistan to gain an education. 
The above statistics were provided by the various government departments; however, I 
have reservations about the record-keeping process of the education department of the 
government of Balochistan. The data and statistics may not be accurate because there are 
many ghost schools in Balochistan. The ghost schools exist only in official records. In 
reality they do not exist. The records of a number of schools are to be found in government 
offices but they are in fact bogus. In fact, the evidence provided by my own research 
interviews contradicts these official records in various significant ways. Furthermore, the 
former education minister of Balochistan disclosed results of a survey conducted by the 




In Balochistan there is a clear-cut division of theory and practice in terms of educational 
statistics. As mentioned by the Director of Education (schools), Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, in 
his interview in 2013, the record-keeping system is antiquated and incorrect. The following 
chart, made in the light of fieldwork interviews, provides a view of education indicators of 
Balochistan. This also differs from some of the statistics provided in official records. I 
have met and interviewed many education policy-makers and other relevant professionals 
during my fieldwork. These figures and statistics are from my field interviews and note-
taking with various educational and political figures. They are markedly different from the 















429784       
Girls 





60 Male 11 Female 
21 Male 7 Female 
468 Male 196 Female 
Source: Various interviews and discussions with Education Department Members, 
Controllers of Examination, Balochistan Board, Educationists, Policy-Makers, Officers and 
Students in 2013.  
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According to the above chart, there are more than 12,000 government schools in 
Balochistan, with boys’ schools in greater abundance than girls’ schools. Likewise, the 
number of students studying in these government schools is 642,488 boys and 429,784 
girls. Over 50,000 teachers are employed in these government schools: 33,958 male 
teachers and 16,693 female teachers. Of 71 principals, 60 are male and 11 are female. Of 
664 headmasters, 468 are male and 196 are female. Similarly, of 28 Vice Principals, 21 are 
male and 7 are female. Government statistics do not tally with my interview data as there 
are differences (either more or less) in the number of schools and teachers. For example, 
the official records of the government of Balochistan show that there are more teachers and 
schools but a few figures from my interview statistics show that there are fewer than 
indicated in the official records. 
In addition, the issues of accommodation/logistics for teachers, accessibility, medium of 
instruction and conventional examination/assessment are considered as little hindrance to 
the provision of high-quality education for children. The quality of education in 
Balochistan can be seen in the figures for the number of government schools in Tables 2 
and 2a, and in the number of government teachers in Table 3. In this context the majority 
of scholars, such as Dr. Abdul Rafiq, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, believe 
that the quality and quantity of teachers and schools, as well as other problems, are directly 
affected by allocation of funding. 
 
4.4.3 The Education Budget of the Province 
One government official, Nizam-ud-Din Mengal, states that in Pakistan the total budget for 
education is only 2% of GDP. This is claimed by the government. Unlike Pakistan, many 
countries in the region are spending 5% to 6 % of their GDP on education. Without 
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mentioning the names of these countries, he claims that the total budget being spent in 
Balochistan is 1.5 % of the province’s GDP. The education budget in the Public Sector 
Development Programme (PSDP) in 2005–06 was 16.92%, which then decreased 
considerably to no more than 5.96% by 2012–13 (PSDP, 2013). 
 
Source: Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) Balochistan 
The meagre budget allocated to education is barely enough for quality improvements such 
as teacher training, curriculum development, supervision and monitoring. In this situation 
the expansion of education has remained a dream. A very high portion of the education 
budget is spent on incumbent and recurrent heads, consisting mainly of their high salaries, 
in contrast to the inadequate amount spent on quality improvements. 
This demonstrates the lack of priority given to education in Balochistan by the 
government. According to Prof. Dr. Gishkori, education has always been a dream of the 
people of Balochistan, which clearly shows that education in the province has never been 





















management, governance and coordination. If identified actions were taken in the ‘real’ 
spirit, the majority of the issues would be solved, such as the provision of furniture, the 
construction of additional classrooms and provision of basic facilities including electricity 
and drinking water. There is a strong need for cohesive planning and the provision of 
adequate financial resources in order to obtain the optimum results from these schools. 
Delays in construction/repair work usually negatively affect enrolment, increase the drop-
out rate and reduce the overall quality of education, besides demotivating the teachers who, 
despite all these difficulties, are performing their duties honestly and efficiently.  
According to Ahmed (2013: 92), a critical look at the education budget in Balochistan 
shows that education has been neglected under both dictatorial regimes and civilian 
governments. Similarly, another government official, Munir Ahmed Nodazai, Controller of 
the only Textbook Board, Balochistan Board, Quetta, says that even today female 
education is the worst of its kind, on which point there is a common consensus. He 
believes that the government’s dismal policies and the culture of the Baloch society have 
been a continuing impediment to the education of females. The Baloch women have been 
part of the semi-tribal and semi-feudal society in Balochistan for centuries. The successive 
provincial as well as federal governments have not taken any substantive measures to 
encourage female education in the province. Consequently, the Baloch cultural traditions 
have greatly discouraged the spread of education in the tribal areas. 
Furthermore, Mr. Nodazai mentioned during his interview with the researcher that the 
equalisation of education levels reduces local disparities. However, in the case of 
Balochistan–Pakistan, the unequal allocation of educational resources has created a sense 
of deprivation and resentment among the Baloch people. Under these circumstances, one 
could say that the educational institutions have simply become degree-awarding 
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institutions without providing due quality of education and qualifications. As a result, the 
young generation feel resentment and have been pushed into joining various political 
organisations. 
 
4.4.4 Scattered Population   
The government claims that, there are so many challenges, little can be done for education 
in Balochistan. For example, according to the official stance, Balochistan’s topographical 
structure/location, its vast mountainous areas and great expanse of territory, its deep 
valleys with sparse populations, and its tribal structure have all remained hurdles to be 
surmounted (GoB, 2012: 18). Balochistan is the largest province in Pakistan in terms of 
land area. It is the smallest in terms of population and is lacking massive inputs of capital 
and technical expertise, communication, and transportation networks. 
According to Rashid Razaq, the challenges are much greater than those in other provinces 
due to its geographical spread and pollution density. The province lags far behind other 
provinces of Pakistan in terms of economic growth (with $410 GDP per capita, the lowest 
in Pakistan), education and development (GoB, 2012: 18–19). With limited human and 
financial resources, the Education Department in Balochistan is faced with multiple 
challenges in providing access to education in widely-spread and far-flung areas. The 
situation with girls’ education is particularly challenging in rural areas. During the process 
of consultation in the remote areas carried out by the government of Balochistan, a range 
of issues emerged. Among these difficulties are a shortage of schools, especially for girls, a 
shortage of trained teachers, including subject and teaching method specialists, a shortage 




There are many difficulties with and challenges to current rates of literacy in Balochistan 
for the above-mentioned reasons. The situation of primary, secondary and higher education 
presents a dismal picture. Until the year 2000 there was only one university in the 
province, the University of Balochistan (UoB), which is situated in the capital city of the 
province, Quetta, access to which is not easy for the majority of Baloch-populated areas 
mentioned by Dr. Abdul Rafiq. I interviewed him in Quetta, Balochistan, during my field 
trip. He argues that trained human power in Balochistan is deficient, especially in the fields 
of education, medicine, engineering, and other professions. To fill this gap, the government 
decided to establish schools, colleges and universities in the province.  
From 2000 to 2015, seven universities, the University of Balochistan (UoB), Lasbela 
University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences (LUAWMS), Balochistan 
University of Information Technology, Engineering and Management Science 
(BUITMES), Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University (SBK), Balochistan University of 
Engineering and Technology Khuzdar (BUETK), University of Turbat (UoT), and 
University of Loralai (UoL), have been established. Nevertheless, the total number of 
universities (including those run privately) in the province are seven, compared to a total of 
135 degree-awarding institutes (DAIs) in Pakistan as a whole. Out of seven universities, 
three are located in Quetta. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, the president of Academic and Staff 
Associations, University of Balochistan (UOB) and the president of the Federation of all 
Pakistan Universities Academic and Staff Associations (FPASS), claimed that if we 
calculate this on the basis of population rather than territory, the number of universities per 
province is still disproportionately low in Balochistan Province. 
The educational policies in Pakistan did not produce the desired outcomes and 
performances in Balochistan. The policies remained deficient in several key aspects such 
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as quality and equity of educational opportunities in the province. Secondly, due to its 
existing situation regarding education, Balochistan province cannot fulfil all its 
international commitments, such as MDGs, EFA and the DFA, to become a knowledge 
society (see NEP, 2009: 1). According to various interviews, Balochistan province is 
lagging far behind in attempts to achieve these international commitments. Universal 
access to basic education and the achievement of primary education is one of the most 
important goals of the MDG. 
Although the government claims to care about the provision of education in Balochistan, 
much needs to be done to improve education in the province. Pakistan Education Task 
Force’s Action Plan for Balochistan, the Provincial EFA Plan for Balochistan 2010–2015 
and Government of Balochistan reports claim the following:  
1) it has the lowest enrolment rates in Pakistan;  
2) it has an overall literacy rate of 33.9%;  
3) it has a wide gender gap (almost double) between literacy rates for men (45%) 
and women (22%);  
4) the dropout rate of students at primary level is more than 50%;  
5) there are 12,000 public schools for 22,000 settlements; and  
6) there are more than 5,000 single-teacher schools in Balochistan.  
 
According to Government of Balochistan statistics, more than half the schools (57%) are 
without drinking water, 52% do not have electricity, 29% have no toilets, 9% do not even 
have a building, and 46% of schools have no boundary wall (GoB, 2012: 19). It has 
already been mentioned that there is a huge difference between government records and 
statistics and other national or international organisations’ figures. For example, the HRW 
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fact-finding report in 2010 present a different picture of the statistics compared to the 
government of Balochistan (see below).   
Balochistan’s education facilities are also the poorest in the country according to the HRW 
fact–finding report in 2010, which finds that the highest percentage of primary school 
buildings are rated as either needing “major repair” (36% compared to a national average 
of 11%), or “dangerous” (12% compared to a national average of 11%). Only 15% of 
primary schools are rated as “satisfactory”, compared to a national average of 36%. At 
least 4% of schools do not have buildings, 81% lack electricity, 34% have no drinking 
water, 72% are without a toilet and 66% are without a boundary wall (HRW, 2010: 13). 
Educational opportunities and facilities for the vast majority of children in Balochistan are 
very few, insufficient and sub-standard. According to survey data collected by the 
government of Pakistan’s statistical department, the Federal Bureau of Statistics in Human 
Rights Watch (2010): 
Only 32 percent of Balochistan’s population over age 10 has completed primary 
level education, the lowest proportion in the country, compared with a national 
average of 47 percent. Only 42 percent of the population older than 10 has ever 
attended school. In rural Balochistan a mere 8 percent of females over age 10 has 
completed primary school (HRW, 2010: 12).  
 
Many interviewees, such as Aziz Bugti and Abdul Rahman Buzdar, hold that the state of 
the education system is mainly responsible for shaping the socio-economic structure of 
Balochistan. Due to poor education the people in Balochistan do not have the skills 
required for jobs. Thus, limited and poor education is responsible for the socio-economic 
situation in Balochistan. This is one of the reasons why, according to Rashid Razaq, more 
than 50% of the people in the province do not have an opportunity to receive education. 
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One might say that the state policy is the cause of this, a point endorsed by various 
scholars.     
The people of Balochistan (including all ethnic groups) are dissatisfied with the existing 
limited education, according to various interviewees. They made the claim on the basis of 
the facts that the state of education in the province is poor and the number of students 
dropping out is increasing. Researchers and academics often blame and criticise both the 
provincial government of Balochistan and the federal government of Pakistan, holding 
them primarily responsible for this devastating condition of education in the province.  
Allegations of corruption became one of the ‘elements’ of policies. Atiq-ur-Rehman notes 
that these types of issues took on new dimensions and have politicised education. As a 
result the government expanded the number of institutions, and likewise, universities in 
particular, and funds began to pour in. These greater opportunities for funding and 
appointments through political influence increased the mass resentment. As a result, 
underprivileged social groups (including students) began to express their frustration. Many 
writers argue that this is in response to poverty and discrimination. The frustration of the 
people increased to such an extent that it compelled the federal government to announce 
the Balochistan Package, Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009 (see Rais, 2010). 
Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan means ‘the beginning of the right of Balochistan’. This 
package discussed many of the provincial issues related to federal government, such as 
administrative matters, resources issues, missing persons, constitutional reforms, political 
problems, dialogue and the problem of the exiled Baloch leaders (Haq, 2010). According 
to Haq (2010), this was the first time that the federal government had initiated a socio-
economic package for the people of Balochistan. Under this package the provincial 
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government appointed five thousand teachers from Balochistan. This was a good initiative 
taken by the government, but it was not implemented properly at all.   
In a country with wide social and economic gaps, reducing social inequity is one of the 
principal objectives of government policy. One obvious point considered essential by EFA 
(2011–2015: 11) is to “forging social cohesion and moving towards inclusive development 
to avoid inequity pitfalls that may cause serious upheavals”. This requires an impartial 
allocation of resources to remove the gender gap, disparities in the urban-rural division, 
and ethnic tensions at both provincial and federal levels. Developing and implementing 
education standards is a step towards improving the quality of education and is strongly 
advocated by the policy. Deriving optimum results from foreign investments in education 
is an important priority area. Education is undoubtedly very important for every human 
being. Despite occasional government claims, it is very obvious in this chapter that the 
state does not care about educating the people of Balochistan. The Education for All Plan 
Balochistan (2011–2015: 24–25) states:  
Education is a vital prerequisite for combating poverty, empowering women, 
protecting children from hazardous and exploitative labour, promoting human 
rights, protecting the environment, and influencing population growth. In 
Balochistan, about two thirds of the population (68%) 10 years and over have never 
been to school; 77% of the population 10 years and over have not completed 
primary school or higher. For all results, there are major differences between males 
and females, averaging 10-20% in favour of males. 
 
Education is not only a path towards economic development and social progress but is also 
the push factor towards human excellence and intellectual liberation. It is through 
education, fundamentally high-quality education, that the process of openness of heart, 
mind and soul takes root. A high-quality education is an indispensable solution to many of 
the human, social and economic problems. The future of Balochistan is inextricably linked 
to education. High-quality education is possible through motivated, skilled and competent 
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teachers. Hence, the dearth of education and increase in insurgency in Balochistan provides 
a good case for conducting an academic inquiry, which would not only aid an 
understanding of the Balochistan conflict and the role of education in resolving this 
conflict, but would also provide evidence that it is the form of education in Balochistan 
that is actually the lowest priority of the State, as has been explored in this chapter.   
In the light of these considerations, it can be argued that the policies for the wider 
participation in and better quality of education and, above all, universal education, have not 
been fulfilled in Balochistan. At the secondary and post-secondary levels, the system has 
failed to provide skills either for the labour market or for providing input to the tertiary 
system. Access and participation rates at this level of schooling in Balochistan are low and 
there is a clear need to expand the provision. At the same time, efforts should be made to 
cut the high dropout rates and induce more out-of-school youths to return to the school 
system, especially girls, whose participation is still very low. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, it is argued that in Balochistan the current state of education is extremely 
poor. It has failed to produce the human capital that the province requires to run its public 
and private sectors. The state education system is intentionally neglected and virtually 
ineffective. The state has failed in its ‘duty of care’ to provide education to the Baloch 
people in terms of quality, quantity, type and policy level. The education policy of Pakistan 
does not take into account the poor infrastructure, difficult terrain and scattered population 
of Balochistan. Neither does it promote the creativity and innovativeness that are essential 
for advancement in the area of human endeavours. The statistics and the experts’ views 
(primary research) show that the state has failed to provide even basic education to the 
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Baloch people. Thus, the responsibility of the state for the provision of education may be 




Representation of the Baloch in Pakistani Textbooks: Politics of Control  
“Pakistan is an Islamic Republic established in the name of Islam. We need a type of education that 
is in accordance with Islamic Ideology so that the students prepared in the educational Institutions 
should love this country wholeheartedly and should sacrifice their self-interest for its loyalty” 
(Textbook for Classes IX & X, Balochistan Board, 2012: 171).  
 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter the primary emphasis is on the politics of representation of the Baloch 
within education and, most specifically, on what notions of ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘history’ are being promoted through the State of Pakistan’s education system. The focus 
of the study here is on the textbooks. The Pakistani establishment propagates the idea that 
this state came into being in the name of religion (Islam), and that all nationalities have to 
surrender their respective identities and come under the flag of Islam. Therefore, it is every 
Pakistani’s prime duty to preserve the interests of Islam. In other words, Islam is to guard 
and protect Pakistan. Do the Baloch nationalists see these politics of silence and selective 
emphasis as contributing to the conflict? What versions of history and identity politics are 
being removed and excluded? How does Pakistani education, both at school and college 
level, exclude or include Baloch history and identity? These are some of the questions that 
are investigated in this chapter.  
In Pakistan, only officially published textbooks are taught in schools and colleges. During 
the military rule of Ayub Khan, Social and Pakistan Studies textbooks were issued for 
mandatory use in schools, colleges and professional engineering and medical institutions 
(Haqqani, 2005: 149; Saigol, 2005). Since the 1960s all students have been required to take 
courses called Pakistan Studies. The Social and Pakistan Studies curriculum and textbooks 
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in Pakistan portray the ‘Ideology of Pakistan’. These official texts praise military 
dictatorships, Arab invaders, religiosity and wars against India. According to Haqqani 
(2005: 149), Islamisation was accelerated in 1979 by President Zia-ul-Haq (the military 
ruler from 1978 to 1988) and included the reform of the textbooks, curriculum and 
education policy. During his rule, numerous changes were made to the educational texts in 
the name of Islamisation in order to portray ‘religious ideology’ (Aziz, 1993a). The aim of 
imposing the ideology of Pakistan on the population through Islamisation is to merge 
various regional entities into a single and centralised education system (Ahmed, 2013: 
243). According to Saigol (2005), this is done by relying heavily on the identity-forming 
subjects such as history (sense of time), civics (a sense of power), and geography (a sense 
of space). Collectively these are known as Social and Pakistan Studies.  
This chapter will argue inter alia that formal education in Balochistan is structured in such 
a way as to negate Baloch national aspirations. The formal education in Balochistan, 
particularly in government-run schools, is highly biased against the Baloch culture, history 
and social structure. This false representation of reality is an important contributory factor 
in the generation of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. The student 
organisations, being active in educational institutions, highlight the biased syllabus to 
support their arguments that the state has engineered the education syllabus in order to 
suppress the distinct identity of the Baloch people. This chapter examines how the 
textbooks of Balochistan have been conjured up and disseminated by the state education 
system.  
Firstly, an overview of the contents, history and development of the textbooks is provided. 
Secondly, the use of textbooks as a mode of control is explored. This part also explores the 
concepts of ‘Pakistan: the Fortress of Islam’, ‘the Ideology of Pakistan’, and ‘Islamising 
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the Pupils and Citizens through Education’. Thirdly, the chapter discusses ‘The Baloch and 
Balochistan: Its History, Language, and Culture in Textbooks’ including expert and official 
opinions on this subject.  
 
5.2 An Overview of the Contents, History and Development of the Textbooks 
The planning, preparation and publication of textbooks has been the responsibility of the 
Textbook Board since the 1960s. There is a Textbook Board in each province, and the 
primary, secondary and tertiary textbooks are prepared under the supervision of provincial 
education departments. According to Aziz (1993a: 1), the “textbooks are generally written 
by a team of authors, then corrected and supervised by another person or a group of 
persons, and finally edited by another individual”. He goes on to say: 
For the young student, the textbook is the most important book in his little world: 
he is forced to buy it, he carries it to the classroom every day, he has it open before 
him when the teacher is teaching, he is asked to learn portions of it by rote, and he 
is graded by the quantity of its contents that he can regurgitate (Aziz, 1993a: 1).  
 
The Ministry of Education Government of Pakistan checks the accuracy and contents of 
the manuscript, which is submitted to the National Review Committee (NRC). After 
publication, the provincial government’s education department will prescribe and 
implement the textbook as part of the studies. These textbooks for Social Studies and 
Pakistan Studies are the foundation of pre-university education because most of them are 
compulsory for any degree in the Pakistani education system. Textbooks in Pakistan first 
need to be approved by the Bureau of Curriculum (BoC) of the Ministry of Education in 
the country’s capital (Islamabad), after which they are published by the provincial textbook 
boards located in Jamshoro in Sindh, Quetta in Balochistan, Lahore in Punjab, and 
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Peshawar in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The process of textbook reform began with the 
introduction of Pakistan Studies and Islamiat (Islamic studies), which were made 
compulsory subjects in the national curriculum by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1971.  
In this chapter the Social Studies and Pakistan Studies textbooks are selected at school 
level to intermediate college level (grades 1–12) published by the Balochistan Textbook 
Board (the only Textbook Board in the Province). Meanwhile, the other Provinces’ 
textbooks - Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (in texts it is NWFP, the old name of 
the province) - are also used respectively (See Table 4 below). This selection of various 
textbooks provides a fair reflection of the representation present in the education system of 
Pakistan as a whole. In this research, ‘texts’ refers to the textbooks for subjects such as 
Social/Pakistan studies and history. These textbooks are the pre-university stages of 
instruction and are compulsory from class four onwards.   
Table 4:  Social and Pakistan Studies Textbooks examined by Class, Language, and 
Number 
Class Social and Pakistan Studies 
Textbooks written in Urdu  
Social and Pakistan  Studies 
Textbooks written in 
English 
1 - - 
2 - - 
3 - - 
4 2 2 
5 3 2 
6 2 3 
7 4 6 
8 2 4 
9 and 10 3 4 
11 and 12 1 2 
Others 4 6 
Total 17 23 




Many scholars believe that the contents and themes of the textbooks are similar in all four 
of the Pakistani provinces. These have the same agenda: the ‘politics of silence’ for the 
regional entities such as the Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun and the Baloch, and the ‘politics of 
negative representation’ for the other foreign nations. Representation in Pakistan’s 
education system is one of the instruments used for imparting knowledge to promote a 
selected ideology. To serve political aims, the educational curricula and textbooks are 
formulated in such a way as to represent other nations as conspirators and other religions 
as ‘the enemy’ (see Social Studies Textbooks for Classes VI, VII and VIII, 2012). The 
prevailing representation is reflected in the content of the textbooks, which is considered to 
be ‘officially appropriate’. Education is playing a crucial role in creating this culture of 
hatred in the education policy of the government at all levels of the state. The government 
schools’ prescribed texts are promoting hatred not only of India and the Hindus but also of 
the West and the non-Muslim countries. The culture of hatred and the distortion of history 
became part of the curriculum.  
The Muslims deviated from the Islamic way of life, therefore Hindu customs and 
superstitions crept into Muslim Society. When the Muslims got alienated from their 
religion, moral degradation and waywardness set in. They lost the spirit of Jihad 
and could not withstand the revolts and conspiracies of non-Muslim (Pakistan 
Studies Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 12).  
 
Indeed, the syllabus in school textbooks for subjects such as Pakistan Studies and Social 
Studies has been created in order to engender a patriotic and religious mindset and attitude. 
This culture of hatred is cultivated in children at an early age, and it influences the rest of 
their lives. This official approach forms part of the instruction through which the Social 
Studies textbooks are written. The instructions provided by the Bureau of Curricula are 
well defined and written, and they clearly portray Muslims as superior and non-Muslims as 
inferior (See Qureshi, 1992; Rabbani and Sayyid, 1995). A text for Social Studies Class 8 
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(2010: 88) justifies and maintains the superiority of Islamic religious philosophies, social 
customs and literature. It can be noted that the representations of nationalities other than 
Pakistani and of religions other than Islam are the same in nearly every textbook. For 
example, in the education system the religious groups presented as the permanent enemies 
of Pakistan include the Hindus, Christians, Jews and Sikhs, and the enemies within the 
country are regional ethnic minorities such as the Bengalis and the Ahmadis. Saigol (2005: 
1008) states that the ‘enemy within’ was the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In 
current educational texts this is forgotten history which is either ignored in the official 
textbooks or represented with excruciating pain.  
It was also perceived by the Pakistani leadership and policy-makers that keeping the 
ethnically and linguistically divided society united would not be possible without a strong 
sense of submission within the state of Pakistan. Therefore, they looked upon education as 
a decisive factor in the integration of the diverse society. During the era of President Ayub 
Khan, ‘History’ as a subject was abolished and replaced by Social Studies (Masharti-ulum 
in Urdu) for Classes 1–8 and ‘Pakistan Studies in English’ (Mutalah-e-Pakistan in Urdu 
medium) for Classes 9–12.39 
However, Ahmed (2013) is of opinion that the paranoid idea of one nation was challenged, 
although the leadership did not realise the complexities involved in it. Ultimately Bengal, 
which was part of Pakistan, was separated from Pakistan in 1971 and become Bangladesh. 
Thus, the idea behind the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ collapsed, at least for Bengal if not for the 
remainder of Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013). However, things changed rapidly after the 
separation of Bangladesh. There were two reasons for such change. Firstly, the separation 
of Bengal occurred mainly on the basis of ethnicity, coupled with other factors such as 
                                                 
39
These two syllabuses both comprised mainly descriptions of geography, history and civic matters. In a 
similar way, Arabic, Islamic education was made part of the syllabus. Apart from social sciences, the 
Quranic verses in Arabic were made part of the other subjects and were justified as such.   
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language crises. Secondly, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the PM of Pakistan, became aware that his 
power base around Pakistan was weakening. Country wide protest rose against his rule. He 
then used the Islamic card to prevent ethnic disunity and to gain the support of the right-
wing religious parties such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), and Jammat-e-Islami (JI). In 
this regard, under a second constitutional amendment, he declared the Ahmadi (a sect in 
Pakistan) to be a non-Muslim minority and introduced Friday as a public holiday. Such a 
move also brought the country closer to Saudi Arabia (Ahmed, 2013). This move by Z. A. 
Bhutto can be viewed as the first step towards the Islamisation of Pakistan after the 
secession of Bengal.    
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had provided space for the religious parties and, ironically, the same 
right-wing parties such as JUI and JI would turn against him later. The countrywide 
protests led by the religious parties under the banner of Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the 
Prophet) against the Z. A. Bhutto government and its alleged rigging of the 1977 elections 
brought General Zia-ul-Haq (a military dictator) into power in the same year. He relied 
heavily on the Islamist Parties, especially Jammat-i-Islami (JI). This was one of the most 
important eras in the history of the textbooks reforms of Pakistan. Two international events 
were critical in this process: the Iranian Revolution
40
 of February 1979 and the Russian 
Invasion of Afghanistan
41
 in December 1979 (Ahmed, 2013). During that time of the 
                                                 
40
The Iranian Revolution had instigated sectarian violence in Pakistan. Two regional powers, i.e. Saudi 
Arabia (an extreme Sunni Wahabi country) and Iran (an extreme Shiite state) had started pouring money into 
their respective ideological sects, Sunni and Shia respectively. In due course some seven principal sectarian 
parties emerged such as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (Pakistan’s Army of the Prophet Companions) 1984, 
Laskar-e-Jhangvi (Jhangvi Army) 1990, Lahkar-e-Taiba (The Army of the Pure) 1997, and Tehrik-i-
JafariaPkistan (Pakistan’s Shia movement) 1979, along with its militant offshoot, Sipah-e-Muhammad (Army 
of Muhammad) 1991. The former four were Sunni parties and the latter two were Shia parties. They 
remained actively involved in sectarian violence and were campaigning to safeguard the interests of their 
respective religious communities. However, Zia, being a staunch Sunni himself, took the side of the Sunni 
sects. 
41
 The Afghan war had brought the gift of Mujahideen (holy warriors) to Pakistan. In the 1980s the whole of 
Pakistan, especially Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, became a launching pad for the Mujahedeen supported by the US, 
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan’s ISI in order to eject the USSR from Afghanistan. Jihadi culture was introduced 
to radicalise Pakistanis in order to get them to fight against USSR forces in Afghanistan. For this purpose, 
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military regime of Zia-ul-Haq, all educational curriculums and textbooks were changed. 
Education was used as a strategy by the Zia-ul-Haq regime to create Mujahids (warriors) 
for the Afghan War in the 1980s. The regime also aimed to curb the Shiite (a sect in Islam) 
ideology after the Iranian Revolution and to promote Saudi Arabian Sunni Wahabism 
through education. Pakistani schoolchildren grew up learning about the specific ideology 
of Pakistan: ‘What is the meaning of Pakistan (Pakistan ka matlab kya)’?  Pakistan means 
“La Illaha Illalah … [T]here is no God, but God” (Prashad and Mir, 2012: viii). 
The state of education in Pakistan created a wider debate and concern among 
educationalists, in both national and international policy circles. Education has never been 
a priority for Pakistani governments. During the Zia-ul-Haq era this sector suffered the 
most. General Zia was convinced that the scholarship and rational thinking that might 
emerge from colleges and universities would present an insurmountable challenge to his 
dictatorial regime. Moreover, during his regime the public sector schools were used for his 
Islamisation process throughout society. The higher institutions (colleges and universities) 
were politicised, and this consequently turned them into a hotbed of conflict between 
hostile and highly indoctrinated rival student groups.  
 
5.3 Textbooks as a ‘Mode of Control’  
On the issue of education as a tool for controlling the citizenry, some Pakistani scholars 
such as Ahmed (2013), Rahman (2004), Jalal (1995), Hoodbhoy and Nayyar (1985), 
Nayyar and Salim (2004), Aziz (1993a), Haqqani (2005) and Saigol (2005) have produced 
some empirically valuable studies. Aziz (1993a: 188) writes: 
                                                                                                                                                    
thousands of madrasas (Islamic seminaries) were established around Pakistan. After the USSR forces had 
withdrawn from Afghanistan, these Jihadi puritans created problems. 
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The goal, it seems, is to produce a generation with the following traits: docility, 
inability to ask questions, capacity to indulge in pleasurable illusions, pride in 
wearing blinkers, willingness to accept guidance from above, alacrity to like and 
dislike things by order, tendency to ignore gaps in one’s knowledge, enjoyment of 
make-believe, faith in the high value of pretences. 
 
Among the core themes that all scholars have identified in their writings about the 
textbooks are Islamisation and the propagation of the ideology of Pakistan. These are 
commonly and repeatedly used in textbooks. For example, 1) Pakistan shall be known as 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and 2) Islam is the state religion of Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the state education system states that Muslims shall be enabled to order their 
lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teaching and 
requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah: “Pakistan is our 
homeland where we can freely promote Islamic civilisation and culture ... Pakistan is the 
fortress of Islam in the real sense of the world” (for Classes IX and X, 2012: 168). The 
central theme in all the textbooks I have examined for this research is that the creation of 
Pakistan is intended to render it free from infidels (Pakistan Studies Class 12, 2011: 106–
107). A Discourse Analysis (DA) can be employed to find the truth behind the text. 
Through DA, one might examine the hidden aims of the school textbooks in the state 
education system. The majority of textbooks mention the following: 
Firstly, the religion of Islam is presented as the sole basis for the creation of Pakistan. In 
Pakistani nationalism, all the ‘Muslim majority’ areas were obliged to unite in order to 
establish Pakistan. State nationalism is the basis of Pakistani ideology, which emphasises 
the Muslim nationhood and Muslim nationalism (see Textbook for Classes IX and X, 
2012).  
Secondly, in describing the creation of Pakistan the textbooks mention the animosity of 
Hindus towards Muslims in India. One text mentions that the Muslims were subjected to 
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such persecution as has only been seen a few times before in history, according to Social 
Studies for Class 8 (2010: 77). This textbook states, on Page 79, that the prejudice of the 
All Indian National Congress (AINC) and their anti-Muslim policy, the Muslim 
exploitation by Hindu landlords, the replacement of the Urdu Language by Hindi in 
schools, the permanent slavery of Muslims under Hindu domination and the adoption of 
Bande Matram as the national anthem finally provoked the movement that ended the 
Hindus’ supremacy through the creation of Pakistan. Further, this textbook states on Page 
78 that “this long and huge struggle is collectively known as the Pakistan Movement”. 
Thirdly, ‘Pakistan: the Fortress of Islam’ is narrated in every textbook. To Ahmed (2013: 
1), ‘Pakistan: the Fortress of Islam’ (Islam Ka Kila ۔۔ےھ ہعلق اک ملاسا ناتسکاپ) is a mere 
metaphor for a ‘Garrison State’. He argues in his new book Pakistan the Garrison state; 
Origin, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011) that  
[L]ack of clarity on national identity drove Pakistan towards a search for an Islamic 
identity that should also be democratic. However, over time, this acquired more and 
more dogmatic features and fundamentalist overtones. The convergence of such 
external and internal factors created the metaphor of Pakistan as a fortress of Islam 
(Ahmed, 2013: 1).  
 
The name ‘Pakistan’ literally means ‘Clean Land’. However, this is a contested term and 
sometimes it is rendered as ‘Land of the Pure’. These textbooks state that Pakistan had 
demanded not just a piece of land but a piece of land that will be Islamic, where every 
Muslim will be free from Hindu domination (see Pakistan Studies Class 12, 2011: 106– 
107). Almost all the Social and Pakistan Studies textbooks have traced the creation of 
Pakistan to the arrival of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. For example, a textbook for 
Social Studies Class 6 (2012: 70–71) includes a complete chapter entitled ‘The Coming of 
Muslims into South Asia’ (711–1707), which describes the territory in Sindh (now a 





 and his army set out to attack the subcontinent. The same textbook called this a 
Jihad (holy war) against non-Muslims. According to this textbook (Page 72), the conquest 
of Sindh has a great importance in the history of Islam because “Muslims for the first time 
got a foothold in South Asia”. The same chapter concludes with the creation of Pakistan 
since the Arab invasions in 712 A.D.  
For instance, one textbook describe how the freedom movement for the creation of a new 
homeland for the Muslims in South Asia was created in 1867, when Sir Sayyad Ahmed 
Khan “realized that Muslims and Hindus could no longer remain united” (Pakistan Studies 
Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 23). This textbook further describes:  
Sir Sayyad knew it well that if once the Hindu majority captured power in the sub-
continent, the Muslims would be reduced to great straits. That’s why he opposed 
every step taken to impose Hindus on the Muslims. He told the people that Hindus 
and Muslims were not one nation and their ideologies of life were so much 
diametrically opposed to each other that both could not co-exist. Sir Sayyad used 
the word “nation” and explained the two nation theory that became the basis of the 
establishment of Pakistan. In fact Sir Sayyad was ‘The Leader’ who laid foundation 
stone of Pakistan (Pakistan Studies Textbooks for Classes IX and X, 2012: 24).  
 
There are many contradictions and errors in the textbooks, as mentioned in this chapter. 
Another Pakistan Studies textbook for Class 10 (2011: 9–10) proposes a similar argument 
about the creation of Pakistan and Bin Qasim’s establishment of rule on the subcontinent. 
According to this (Page 17), to eliminate non-Muslim influences from Muslim society “the 
Muslims began a Jihad movement against the Sikhs”. This text also provides an example 
of Tehreek-e-Mujahideen (movement of holy warriors) which was carried out against the 
Sikhs by the Muslims.     
                                                 
42
Bin Qasim was an Umayyad General in the 8
th
 century who came from the Middle East and attacked Sindh 
in 712 A.D. He was an invader and a plunderer, but in Pakistan’s textbooks he is portrayed as a hero and 




A textbook for Pakistan Studies claims that Pakistan was established for the first time 
when the Arabs occupied Sindh under the command of Bin Qasim in 712 (see a textbook 
for Pakistan Studies by Zafar, 1988, and one for Pakistan Studies and Affairs by Dogar, 
1993). For Zafar (1988: 4-8), the country “came to be established for the first time when 
Arabs under Bin Qasim occupied Sindh and Multan”. The creation of a Muslim country 
was inevitable when Muslims set foot in India for the first time in the history of 
humankind. Similarly, textbooks further elaborate on the fact that the invasion and 
expansionism of Bin Qasim in Sindh had remained a building block for a Muslim 
homeland. Looking at it the other way around, these textbooks undoubtedly had an impact. 
Ahmed (2013: 244) and Nayyar and Salim (2004) claim that the State of Curricula and 
Textbooks in Pakistan justified the “Glorification of War and the Military”, especially 
highlighting jihad (holy war), shahadat (martyrdom), ghazi (victor in war) and shaheed 
(martyr).   
However, it is interesting to note that various other perceptions are also reflected in this 
debate about Bin Qasim’s arrival in Sindh and the subcontinent. Just as conquering Arabs 
were characterised as ruthless and barbaric, motivated by plunder and economic gain, the 
period of Qasim's rule has been called the darkest period in Sindh’s history because of the 
massive forced conversions of non-Muslims, the destruction of temples, slaughter, and 
genocide. Before the arrival of Arabs in Sindh, the people were mainly Hindu and 
Buddhist by faith. None of the texts discuss this side of the story.  
Under the direction of the Bureau of Curricula, the textbooks had to declare that the 
creation of Pakistan had been founded not on racial, linguistic or geographical factors but 
on the basis of ideology and religion, i.e. Islam. Therefore, students must know and 
appreciate the ideology of Pakistan and popularise it with slogans. On the other hand, 
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students needed to memorise and root the objectives and goal of the country’s creation as 
an Islamic State. The majority of Pakistan Studies textbooks are about Islam and its 
relationship with the ideology of Pakistan, and they are criticised by many Pakistani 
writers and scholars (see Aziz, 1993a and 1993b; Saigol, 2005). According to them, the 
ideological representation of the Pakistani State is not viable in the education system of a 
multi-ethnic country. 
For Jalal (1995: 6), the textbooks’ authors are “chasing Pakistan’s mirage in the Arabian 
desert bridge the temporal and spatial distance between the origins of Islam and Pakistan in 
an imaginative leap fired by an ideology of Muslim supremacy in the world and a 
geographical vision that is pan-Islamic in scope”. Jalal (1995: 8) even cites Justice 
Mohammad Munir, who argues that the claim “that the ‘term ideology was never used in 
the Pakistan movement days is absolutely wrong [sic]’”. According to her, the two-nation 
theory was the other name for the Pakistan Ideology and was an opinion that was projected 
in the texts. The Pakistan Ideology was invented by a particular ‘religio-political 
organisation’, the Jammat-e-Islami. This is a staunch religious party which states that those 
who do not believe in Islam cannot have equal rights of citizenship in an Islamic country.   
 
5.4 The Baloch and Balochistan: Its History, Culture and Language in the Textbooks  
As I have mentioned in my previous chapter on educational policies, since 1947 no serious 
attempt has been made to reform the educational textbooks. As in other provinces in the 
country, only the officially published textbooks are used in Balochistan’s schools and 
colleges. In Balochistan the current curriculum and the textbooks are highly obsessed with 
“national ideology”, which is alien to Baloch culture, history, language, social structure 
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and their legal rights. Many myths and facts have been merged in the texts and the 
curricula of the Balochistan education system.  
 
5.4.1 History of the Baloch and Balochistan 
To many historians, the textbooks in Balochistan consist of misinformation, hatred and 
bigotry, which were introduced to create false patriotic citizens, as argued by Shazawar 
Ali. In his view the official textbooks are inverted bigotry representing a constructed 
Pakistani nationalism that portrays the Baloch negatively or excludes them entirely from 
history. In Balochistan, the Textbook Board and developers of curricula consider it their 
duty to infuse Pakistan’s national spirit at school level to encourage students to become 
patriotic citizens. Textbooks in Balochistan are particularly prone to the omissions and 
errors that often characterise historical narratives designed for Social Studies classes. 
According to Dr. Shazawar Ali, the Baloch consider themselves a nation with thousands of 
years of history, having a distinct culture, language and territory.  
It is believed that the Baloch people, in terms of identity, are different from those in 
neighbouring countries. In educational texts, the Baloch and Balochistan culture, language, 
history and heroes are swept under the carpet (see the Social Studies textbooks, 
Balochistan Board for Classes V, VI, VII and VIII, 2012). Surprisingly, in the Social 
Studies textbooks for Class VII (2012), the word ‘Balochistan’ appears in the whole 
textbook only twice, on Pages 65 and 67. Similarly, in the Social Studies textbooks for 
Class VIII, (2012) the word ‘Balochistan’ appears only twice in the whole text, on Pages 
84 and 85. In Class IV, (2012) there are two pages (p 5 and 6) entitled ‘History of 
Balochistan’. The following is written: 
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Before the advent of the British, Balochistan was an independent state. It was ruled 
by the Khan of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan. The Khan of Kalat was killed in 1939 after 
the British occupation. Balochistan was divided into two parts by the British, i.e. 
the Kalat state and the British Balochistan (p. 5).  
 
It goes on to describe the question of Balochistan and its merger with Pakistan, mentioning 
that “Balochistan was a frontline region for the Pakistan freedom movement. Jinnah 
(Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan) visited Balochistan. The members of the 
Quetta Municipality and Shahi Jirga joined Pakistan” (p. 5). This is the only textbook from 
Classes 1–12 to contain a whole page on Balochistan, although the year and date 
mentioned are incorrect. It also excludes the personalities, language and culture of the 
Baloch people. The British occupied Kalat state in 1839 rather than 1939.  
With regard to the Baloch and Balochistan history in textbooks, I elicited diverse opinions 
from my respondents. Abdul Qayyum Babai remained in the education department of the 
Government of Balochistan in various capacities for a long time. He has been a District 
Education Officer, a Principal, and a Director of Schools, Government of Balochistan. At 
the time of the interview he was serving as Chairman of the Textbook Board Balochistan. 
The respondent replied to a question about the history of the Baloch and Balochistan. He 
states: “of course, some subjects in our education system are called national subjects. 
There is nothing about the Baloch people, their history, culture and language, but all these 
will be highlighted in history, geography and Pakistan studies”.   
However, in an interview with the Chairman of the Balochistan Board of Intermediate and 
Secondary Education (BBISE), Balochistan, Professor Saadullah Khan Tokhai, I asked the 
following question: “Do you think the Baloch people, along with their history and culture, 
have been adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the province”. His 
reply was simply, “No”. He suggests that our textbooks are irrelevant to our lives - 
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irrelevant in the sense that nothing is about us. Tokhai has served as a director of the 
Bureau of Curriculum (BoC) as well. He mentions that everything regarding textbooks and 
education policies is prepared by Islamabad (the capital of the federal government): “They 
prepare the curriculum and ask us for comment, but never include our feedback. Frankly 
speaking, we are puppets in the hands of Pakistan’s ruling elites”.    
According to Provincial Coordinator UNESCO, Qaisar Jamali, during an interview, the 
people of Balochistan have been ignored due to the centralised educational policies of 
Pakistan, because everything is determined by Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, while the 
local needs of the Baloch and Balochistan are ignored. Secondly, they are using top-to-
bottom approaches instead of working upwards from the bottom to the top, involving local 
stakeholders. They also ignore the need for basic planning. These policies have a negative 
impact on education in Balochistan, and particularly on that of the Baloch and their culture, 
language, history and heroes. Qaisar Jamali called this the politics of isolation. According 
to him, this is because of the distance between Islamabad and Balochistan. Smiling, he 
explained:  
I am not talking about distance in terms of geography or physical distance but 
distance in terms of mind and heart. This is one of the reasons people in 
Balochistan think that Islamabad has never given them educational opportunities in 
terms of policy-making, ignoring the Baloch personalities, history and culture in 
the educational curriculum, textbooks and syllabus. 
 
Ali Rehman (his fictitious name), better known by his literary name in Balochistan, and 
now as an academic in Literature and Linguistics in one of the institutions of Balochistan, 
used to be a teacher in public sector government schools prior to his current job. He says 
that, as a teacher, he taught those textbooks that are part of the education system, such as 
the history of Pakistan, its heroes and poets:  
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I was not satisfied with the teaching of the textbooks because the texts are either 
alienating the Baloch history or representing them negatively. My aim was to get 
rid of that from the education system, which hates other nations and their history. 
Now I am at the university here and I am teaching our writers, our people, our 
books and feeling relaxed.  
He further states: 
To me this is not an education that we are gaining in our formal state education system. 
Education in Pakistan doesn’t have any capacity, creativity to create an able person, a 
philosopher, scientist or literary person. Education means to know yourself first, your 
surroundings, and then others. Others to me mean other nations, religions, about 
countries, their, social, political and economic systems. Then, to contribute to human 
civilisation, culture through creativity. Education’s contribution should be for peace 
and prosperity for human beings and the betterment of society. However, Pakistani 
education destroyed the history of other people and other foreign nations such as India, 
Israel and the West. The Baloch as a nation is represented badly in the textbook. The 
killers of the Baloch people as a hero and the Baloch as a villain. This system of 
education reminds the Baloch people that they are third-class citizens, illiterate, 
backward, Sardar and Nawab. We want an education that creates human beings, not 
obedient citizens. Not a hate culture and hate-loving men. There are certain aims of the 
Pakistani education system. Therefore, this system is afraid of giving proper education 
to the Baloch people.  
 
Ali Rehman, during his interview, said that ignorant and illiterate people are producing the 
education syllabus and curriculum in Pakistan: Many reasons are involved, for example, 
either it is misrepresented deliberately or they are really ignorant people. For example, 
sometimes in social studies I used to ask myself, ‘Where am I?’ When I taught in schools I 
was not satisfied and searched for a place. The way they are analysing the Baloch people, 
to me, is a distortion of the Baloch history, a negation of the Baloch identity and a state of 
denial of Baloch existence. This is being done to create an Islamic Ideology Islami Nazria, 
or a Pakistani ideology.  
His argument is endorsed by another interviewee, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, (whose details and 
pseudo name are given in the previous chapter). According to him, the developers of the 
educational textbooks do not even know the essence of history. Policy-makers deliberately 
judge the Baloch as part of the Indus valley civilisation, although the Baloch have a 
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completely different civilisation and culture. Mehrgarh in Balochistan, according to him, is 
one example of a place that is considered to be older than the Indus valley civilisation 
located in Pakistan. Similarly, the Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X (2012) 
calls the symbols of the Indus civilisation ‘the historical legacy of Pakistani culture. It goes 
on: 
The excavations at the mounds of Harappa and Moenjodaro have brought to light a 
five-thousand-year old human civilisation. The recent excavations at Mehrgarh 
(District Kachhi, Balochistan) show that its remains are older than those of Harappa 
and Moenjodaro by about three thousand years (P. 166).  
 
 
5.4.2 Culture and Language of the Baloch   
Urdu is mentioned as a language in Balochistan (see Class V, 2012: 66). On the same page 
it is also stated that Balochi, Pashto, Brahui, Sariki, Sindhi, Persian and Punjabi are 
commonly spoken languages in Balochistan. In Balochistan the medium of 
education/instruction is not Balochi. “Balochi is neither an official language nor a language 
of education in any of the countries where it is spoken” (Jahani, 2010: 459). 
There is no official use of Balochi as a language of administration or education in 
Pakistan, even if voices have been raised in particular for introducing it as a 
language of education. The official support the language receives in Pakistan is that 
it is taught at the University of Balochistan in Quetta, that it has an official 
academy, the Balochi Academy, founded in 1961 and that it is used as a language 
for radio and TV transmissions. There is also a periodical, Ulus, published in 
Quetta by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (Jahani, 2005: 155). 
 
Urdu is implemented as a national language and English as an official language. In the 
Pakistan Studies Textbook Mutalah-e-Pakistan in Urdu Medium for Class X (2012: 157), 
it is mentioned that Urdu is the national language of Pakistan but there are some local 
languages too. About the Balochi language, it is written, “the Baloch are nomadic people 
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and due to this their language couldn’t flourish” (p. 157). Again, it states that “Balochi 
literature has progressed after the creation of Pakistan” (p. 157).    
With regard to local languages, a response was elicited from the Chairman of the Textbook 
Board in Balochistan, Abdul Qayyum Babai, in 2013. He replied to the question about the 
Balochi language as a medium of instruction by saying that there was no Balochi language 
either as a compulsory or optional subject in our schools’ education system. According to 
him, during 1980–8543 the local languages such as Balochi, Pashto and Brahui were 
adopted in primary education but were later withdrawn by the government. He is optimistic 
that they are assessing the mother tongues’ impact on education through a project. 
According to him, the project is in the pipeline with the help of UNICEF, and it is hoped 
that the local languages will be implemented in the education system. However, he 
acknowledged that “we are implementers, not policy-makers”. A question also remained 
unanswered: Why were the local languages withdrawn during 1980-85 and by whom? I 
tried to find the relevant government notification but was told by an official that it was 
done for no reason. The following reason is mentioned by Jahani:  
In the early 1990s measures were taken to introduce Balochi as a language of 
primary education in those areas of Pakistani Balochistan where it is spoken by a 
majority of the population. This experiment was not very successful, however, due 
to several reasons, including disagreement among the Baloch on orthographic 
issues and the lack of qualified teachers. What was perhaps more important was the 
speakers’ attitude towards Balochi, which many Baloch see as a ‘backward and 
rural’ language, knowledge of which offers no improvement in terms of social or 
economic status in today’s Pakistan. Likewise, people felt threatened by the fact 
that the Brahuis and the Baloch would be taught in different languages, even 
though as a result of their political alliance in the Khanate of Kalat, they strongly 
identify as one people (Jahani, 2005: 155). 
 
                                                 
43
According to Spooner, “Pakistan introduced Balochi-medium schooling under Benazir Bhutto’s 
government in the 1980s, most parents were more interested in their children gaining literacy in Urdu. 
However, since then, as nationalism has intensified in recent decades, Balochi-medium schooling has been 
included in the nationalist agenda (2013: 142). 
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The Chairman BBISE, Balochistan, Saadullah Khan Tokhai, argued that the languages of 
the people of Balochistan, including the Baloch, the Pashtun and others, are not part of the 
educational system. Our mother tongues are not included in textbooks. Our children are 
forced to learn Urdu and English at school while speaking their mother tongues at home. 
He mentions that there is a Sindhi language in the province of Sindh, and a Pashto 
language in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Therefore, why are our 
languages not being used in Balochistan? According to him, Punjab, being the ethnic 
majority province, has already adopted Urdu as a language. Being a dominant and ruling 
ethnic group, Punjabi have no fear of being dominated by other nations in Pakistan. Ali 
Rehman claims that the adherents of the Pakistan education system project the Balochi 
language as a broken wing of the Persian language.  
The Pakistan Studies Textbook Mutalah-e-Pakistan in Urdu Medium for Class X (2012: 
153-54) talks about ‘local or regional cultures’. It claims that in Pakistan there is no 
difference in terms of culture and traditions because we are all Muslims and have a similar 
way of life, although there are a few variations such as the hospitality of the Baloch people 
(p. 153). They are tribal people who have respect and dignity for their elders (p. 154). 
Another textbook says that “the Baloch people are an embodiment of self-respect, courage 
and self-sacrifice in spite of their backwardness” (Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes 
IX and X, 2012).   
The Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X (2012) describes Pakistani culture. 
According to this textbook, “the people of Pakistan inherited the great culture that was 
developed during the one thousand years of Muslim rule over the subcontinent. With this 
distinct culture we maintained our own identity, in spite of living with Hindus for one 
thousand years” (p. 159–60). It further mentions that the outstanding aspects of Pakistan 
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culture are religion and religious festivals, such as Eid-ul-fitr and Eid-ul-Azha (p. 160). 
“The folk literature of our provinces reflects Islamic ideas and values” (Pakistan Studies 
Textbook for Classes IX and X, 2012: 162). On the question of national literature, it states: 
“Urdu holds a unique place in our national literature and no other language can rival it, the 
reason being that the Urdu language possesses a vast, rich and multi-faceted literature that 
fully reflects our Pakistani culture and civilization” (p. 162). 
Urdu is declared a national language. As for Balochi, it states: “Balochi is spoken in 
Balochistan and Iranian and Afghani Balochistan as well as in some parts of the Punjab 
and Sindh. Balochi poetry is replete with Islamic mystical and moral themes like 
truthfulness, hospitality, justice, equity, and self-sacrifice” (p. 164). Further, “The cultural 
heritage of a Pakistani Muslim is, more or less, reflected in every regional language”.  
The discourse analysis of the educational textbooks shows that the Baloch and their 
culture, language and history are not part of these textbooks. In this regard the majority of 
respondents, including policy-makers, are of the view that textbooks in Balochistan are a 
narrative of silence, deception and misinformation.   
The question of the Baloch and their representation is considered a political matter and is 
avoided by respondents such as the Additional Secretary in the Secondary Education 
Department, Government of Balochistan, Rashid Razzaq, and the Managing Director of the 
Education Foundation, Balochistan, Dr. D. K. Riaz Baloch. However, responding to this 
same question, Talat Abbas (Deputy Focal Person Capacity Development Education 
Department of Balochistan) acknowledged the following: 
I must admit that the previous policies were not addressing this factor, but new 
curricula, including early childhood education, focus on the mother tongues. These 
are also concentrated on promoting local culture, as well as regional languages. I 
am hopeful that these will be addressed in the horizon of education. Since 1947 the 
policies have not been up to the mark; textbooks are not quality textbooks. The 
175 
 
teacher training programmes are not effective. But now we are trying to address all 
these problems.  
 
His argument was considered persuasive by the Additional Director of Education (Schools) 
Balochistan, Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. In an interview, a government official, Nizam-ud-Din 
Mengal, argues that federal government is responsible for preparing our curriculum and 
that nothing is in our hands. Further, he believes that it is the right time to address the 
genuine grievances of the people of Balochistan and their desire for an inclusive education 
that represents their language, culture and heroes in the educational system. 
Concerning the Baloch representation in the textbooks, a similar kind of response is given 
by interviewees such as Nasreen Ayaz Baloch, a female Lecturer in the Education 
Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, Zarina Rashid, a female Lecturer in 
the Education Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, Sadia Rasheed, a 
female Lecturer in the Education Department SBK Women’s University of Balochistan, 
Aamir Naeem, Professional Development Specialist USAID, Teacher Education Project, 
Munir Ahmed Nodazai, Controller of Balochistan Board Quetta, and Dr. Kaleem Ullah 
Bareach, Chairman of the History Department, University of Balochistan. All of them 
argue that the purpose of education and the politics of power, curricula and textbooks is to 
Islamise society.  
Then, a very important question might be asked: Why are the Baloch people and their 
history and culture not adequately and fairly represented in the education system? One 
might say that education is a site of political struggle. It has not been used as an instrument 
for capacity-building. For these purposes, religion and the national identity are used in the 
textbooks to control the people as one nation. According to the textbook for Classes IX and 
X, education should be provided according to the ideological foundation of the country 
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(see Balochistan Board, 2012: 214). This means that the state uses history as a political and 
ideological tool. It is believed that the ideology of Pakistan emerged after the immense 
Muslim struggle on the subcontinent. Therefore, an official version of the narration of 
history is that the state aims to enforce national ideology as a law of the state. It is written 
in a way that serves only the vested interests of the ruling class elite. 
Ali Rehman, Dr. Hafeez Baloch, Dr. Shazawar Ali and Dr. Gishkori seem to agree on this 
point: the students are not introduced to their own history, culture and languages in the 
educational textbooks in Balochistan. According to these respondents, the textbooks are 
closely tied, firstly, to religiosity and state ideological factors and, secondly, to the creation 
of a holy warrior (Jihadi) mindset. Thirdly, Islamic conquerors are presented as heroes in 
history to produce a sense of Muslimhood. Fourthly, the textbooks aim to curb the modern 
scientific inventions or oppose them. Using the curricula is the best way of achieving these 
aims and objectives in educational textbooks. Hence, in Balochistan the ideology of the 
state and the religion is used to fulfil those objectives. In this context, textbooks are used as 
a weapon to control the minds of school-going children between the ages of 5 and 14.  
   
5.5 Analysing the case of Balochistan  
Pakistan emerged as an ideological state where national identity was defined in terms of 
religion, two-nation theory and the Urdu language. In a country that was ethnically diverse 
and religiously homogeneous in nature, Islam was imposed to serve as a bond that would 
unite the diverse nationalities. Since its inception, however, the state of Pakistan has been 
challenged by the slogans of diverse ethno-nationalist groups who have articulated their 
unease at the creation of Islamic nationalism by the state. To gain a sense of their distinct 
cultural and linguistic identity in the newly created federal state of Pakistan, these ethno-
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nationalist groups have been demanding their cultural recognition in a more inclusive 
national narrative and regional autonomy within the Pakistani federation. Among them, it 
is crucial to mention here the Bengali, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi.  
The state’s response has primarily focused on subduing these regional identity expressions 
through the use of Islam and ideological orientation as the main tool in the creation of a 
Pakistani nation. For these purposes, the state is obliged to create a standard narrative of 
Pakistan's history. The highest priority was given to the revision of the curricula, with a 
view to reorganising the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an 
ideological orientation in order that Islamic ideology might permeate the thinking of the 
younger generation and help them to acquire the necessary conviction and ability to 
refashion society according to Islamic tenets. Since the 1970s, school textbooks have 
systematically inculcated hatred of other nations through historical revisionism. For these 
purposes, Social and Pakistan Studies, which was made a compulsory subject in all 
primary and secondary schools and colleges, is used. Numerous textbooks have been 
published under this heading. Broadly, the textbooks are amalgamated patriotic discourses 
that justify not only the two-nation theory but also biographies of Muslim rule. Endemic to 
the discourse is the polemic about the superiority of Islam as a religion over other 
religions.  
Meanwhile, with the separation of the eastern wing of the country (now Bangladesh) in 
1971, the Pakistani state became ever more conscious of its territorial integrity. This has 
reinforced its commitment to suppress any form of ethnic or national identity, according to 
Ali Rehman in an interview. Given Islam’s Universalist worldview that perceives any 
identity based on birth, race and language unfavorably, Islamism became the strongest tool 
in the hands of the security- and identity-conscious Pakistani state to counter regional 
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ethnic movements. Not surprisingly, Islamabad began supporting Islamists as part of its 
strategy to curb nationalism, particularly the Baloch nationalism in Balochistan, as argued 
by Dr. Gishkori during an interview in 2013.  
Historically, the religious card had been played by states and even by colonial empires to 
divide and rule. This might be exemplified by the history of the British Empire in India. In 
post-colonial states, such as Pakistan, it is evident that religion has always played a role. 
Further examples are provided by the recent history of Iraq and Syria, where the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is using Kurdish people against Kurds in the name of 
religion. The Kurdish people are fighting for their own separate state on the one hand; on 
the other hand, however, there are Kurds in ISIS, a religious fundamentalist group. A 
similar example can be found in the case of Balochistan. 
Pakistan sought to unite different nations under the notion of a Muslim state of Pakistan. 
But Prof. Dr. Gishkori said that the call for a Muslim nation was not well received by the 
Baloch masses, as they have identified themselves as Baloch for thousands of years and 
their ethnic identity was much stronger than their religion. He states that the Baloch 
people’s sense of themselves as a distinct nation is not a new phenomenon. It has deep 
historical roots but has gained momentum since the inception of Pakistan in 1947 and its 
educational policies towards the Baloch people. The prominent Baloch leader, Mir Ghaus 
Bakhsh Bizenjo, clearly denounced the concept of joining the Muslim state of Pakistan in 
his historical speech in the Kalat Assembly. He said that, as two states, we had as separate 
a historical background and culture as our neighbouring states of Iran and Afghanistan. He 
said that “[w]e have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the mere fact that 
we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, then Afganistan and Iran should 
also be amalgamated with Pakistan" (Kutty, 2009: 62). The fact that we are Muslims does 
179 
 
not mean that we have to sacrifice our freedom and amalgamate our country with others. 
If, as Muslims, we are required to join Pakistan, then Iran and Afghanistan, which are also 
Muslim states, should, perhaps, also be required to merge with Pakistan (Kutty, 2009).  
When the idea of joining Pakistan was rejected by the Baloch representatives, the Pakistani 
army marched on Kalat in April 1948. Since then, the Baloch have never come to terms 
with the idea of their homeland being merged into the religious state of Pakistan. 
Furthermore, since the merger of the Baloch state into Pakistan the Pakistani government 
has been treating the Baloch and Balochistan, its land and people, as a threat to the national 
solidarity of the country. Thus, the Baloch people have been excluded from all state power-
sharing and policy-making. As mentioned above, an unfamiliar and foreign language 
(Urdu) was imposed on them, and their native Balochi language was excluded from their 
schools. Their culture, history and heroes are either ignored in the educational textbooks or 
represented negatively. Pakistan’s education of the Baloch people is a mode of control.  
The purpose of this type of education in Balochistan is to produce a good ‘Practising 
Muslim’ and an obedient country-loving person. For this reason, the idea of the two-nation 
theory and Muslim brotherhood were implemented through educational textbooks in 
Balochistan. However, as we observed, the Baloch people and the history of Balochistan 
have been mostly excluded. The exclusion of the Baloch from all state-run institutions has 
led them to believe that there is no hope for their future with Pakistan, as noted by 
Professor Aziz Bugti. It can be argued that the education system of Pakistan ignores the 
ancestral history of Baloch which is highly significant for the Baloch students’ education 




In educational institutions, the state is facing a multi-faceted resistance from the Baloch 
students’ organisation (BSO) for ignoring them and their history. One example of student 
reaction can be seen from the recent raid by Pakistani security forces (January 13, 2014) on 
Attashad Degree College in the Turbat district of Balochistan. The spokesperson for the 
forces announced that “A large quantity of anti-Pakistan literature as well as maps of a 
separate Balochistan were recovered during a raid of Attashad Degree College in Turbat 
district of Balochistan” (Tribune Express News, 2014). 
He further stated that “[T]he recovered material included separatist leaflets, banners and 
posters. The books include Nehru and Gandhi’s biographies as well as books about Baloch 
separation. The books were printed in Karachi and neighbouring countries”. In this hostile 
environment, the education sector, according to HRW, has been grossly neglected. 
Educational institutions have become safe havens for student politics. The Baloch Student 
Organisation (BSO) and others are providing a platform for strikes, the killing of teachers 
and the targeting of security forces. As a result, hundreds of students have disappeared. 
Many of them have been killed or abducted by security and military forces. The question 
that one needs to ask is as follows: Is there an element in the Pakistani education system 
that causes such alienation among Baloch students? 
 
 5.6 Conclusion  
The analysis in this chapter shows that the state primarily aims to control/dominate the 
Baloch through education; this has contributed to the existing conflict in Balochistan, 
which will be discussed later (in chapter 6). The history, culture and language of the 
Baloch people are ignored in the curriculum, and the educational textbooks are used to 
control them. For this purpose, educational policies, Islamisation and the narration of 
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ideological contents are constantly used by the state. Since the creation of Pakistan in 
1947, education has remained part of politics and has been used as a tool under the military 
regimes of Ayub Khan, Yahiya Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq to impose their notion of 
Islam and nationhood. Apart from a few textbook reforms, the majority of educational 
policies and reforms were made under the various military regimes, in particular during the 
Islamisation policy of Zia-ul-Haq. The experience of 1971 demonstrated that the politics of 
religion and education does not work. It could not prevent the secession of East Pakistan 
(now Bangladesh). The educational policies became even more closely tied to the 
ideological factors because dissent still existed in the remainder of Pakistan. Other ethno-
lingual groups and nationalities were struggling to separate themselves from Pakistan, 
including the Baloch people.  
On the other hand, the ruling elite and policy-makers have been in a state of complete 
denial regarding the educational rights of small nations, including those of the Baloch. 
Similarly, in Balochistan the Pakistani rulers have been using the state’s Islamic character 
to keep the country united. In fact, however, they have been producing religious 
sectarianism and fanaticism through their educational reforms, demonstrating their fear of 
the weak structure of their political system. In view of the resistance by the nationalists and 
students, Pakistan appears to be undergoing a crisis of identity. It is fighting a war within 
Pakistan and its Muslim Nation because it has forgotten that it is a multinational state. The 
historical and cultural backgrounds of these ethnic groups or nations, particularly the 









This thesis examines the Politics of Education and Conflict in the case of Balochistan. This 
chapter consists of the outcome of the argument formed on the basis of the significant 
themes that emerged from my fieldwork.  
Broadly speaking, for this research work there are two different theoretical views on the 
nature and purpose of education. The dominant view emphasises the positive role of 
education, as can be seen from the functionalist perspective outlined in chapter 3. 
Functionalists argue that the role of education is to maintain social order. This role can be 
played by schools. Schools provide children with skills, attitudes, behaviour and learning. 
The crux of the functionalist argument is that education is about caring for people by 
helping them to find jobs, acquire certain norms and values, have greater opportunities, and 
live their lives in solidarity and with integrity. 
This thesis has challenged the dominant view of the role of education and has argued that 
there is another side to education. Conflict theory takes a contrary view to that of the 
functionalists, stating that education serves the purpose of control. According to conflict 
theorists, education (school) is politically based on inequality and the social status. It is a 
contested domain that propagates the ideology of the ruling class in society. The conflict 
perspective has numerous explanations of the role of education, as evidenced in 
Balochistan’s education system. In the Balochistan context, an understanding of the 
conflict theory of the role of education is vital, as the Baloch people believe that education 
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is a tool that is used to control them by replacing their history, culture and language. In 
addition, they have limited access to educational opportunities. This chapter will thus argue 
that the education system of the state of Pakistan has accelerated conflict in Balochistan.  
However, education as a tool for conflict resolution is also discussed in this chapter, as I 
discuss the ways in which education might play a role in conflict resolution in Balochistan. 
A crucial question is examined in the context of education and conflict resolution in 
Balochistan: Why do the Baloch dislike the state education? One might argue that, were 
Pakistan to offer a better education system, including better textbooks, it might overcome 
the resentment of the Baloch people. I argue that this will depend on the state and its 
policies on the Baloch people. Should it wish to do so, the Pakistani state might find a 
solution to the long-lasting Baloch problem.  
 
6.2 Education and Conflict in Balochistan  
The conflict situation in Balochistan, which appears to have political, socio-economic and 
ethnic dimensions, has serious implications for the already dysfunctional education system 
in the province. Chapter 2 has examined the historical, political and economic background 
of Balochistan. The chapter mentions that the economic and social disparity among 
Pakistan’s provinces, with particular reference to Balochistan, has created a sense of 
discontent among the ethnic Baloch with the state of Pakistan. The Baloch are not only 
preoccupied with the sense that their economic, political and social rights are being 
usurped by the dominant ethnic group in Pakistan, the Punjabis, but also feel that their 
national identity is under serious threat. That is because the demographic changes taking 
place in Balochistan, with the arrival of other ethnic groups, are believed to be rendering 
the Baloch a minority in their own province. 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, the major concern over demographic change came to the fore 
when the government of Pakistan launched a series of strategic and economic projects in 
Balochistan during the Musharraf era (1999–2008). These included the Gwadar Deep Sea 
Port, Makran Coastal Highway, Merani Dam, Subabzai Dam and a couple of universities: 
Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences; Balochistan University of 
Information Technology Engineering and Management Sciences; and Bahadur Khan 
Women’s University. The nationalist forces termed these developmental schemes of the 
regime a tool to marginalise the Baloch nation in their homeland. Moreover, the Baloch 
feared that there would be an influx of non-local workers and officials to staff these 
projects. 
Due to insufficient educational institutions, including those offering technical training, 
there is a huge skills gap between the Baloch and rest of the Pakistani people. This huge 
skills gap in Balochistan has arisen not because Baloch are incapable but because of the 
very poor education system that has been unable to impart skills to local people, thus 
allowing outsiders to fill the gaps in jobs and numerous mega projects. Hence, in order to 
resist these projects and the resulting non-local influx, the Baloch reacted violently. They 
have resisted this move by using all means available to them. Whatever the reasons for it, 
the conflict is multidimensional. Therefore, conflict has been present since the inception of 
Pakistan. As also discussed in a previous chapter, there are various factors in the 
Balochistan conflict. No previous authors have underlined the desperate state of formal 
education in Balochistan as one of the potential factors fuelling conflict in the province.  
Many scholars, including Davies (2005a and b) and Smith (2005), postulate that formal 
education may play a critical role in resolving conflict; however, this thesis takes a 
somewhat different view and argues that education cannot always be neutral or reduce 
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conflict but under certain circumstances may promote conflict, with particular reference to 
Balochistan. Research also confirms that  
[E]ducation can entrench intolerance, create or perpetuate inequality and intensify 
social tensions that can lead to civil conflict and violence. Education is a key 
determinant of income, influence and power. Inequalities in educational access can 
lead to other inequalities - in income, employment, nutrition, and health as well as 
political position, which can be an important source of conflict (Johnson and 
Kalmthout, 2006: 3). 
 
Many studies have shown the income gap between the Baloch and non-Baloch. This gap is 
about earnings, income and employment. The local Baloch people are far behind in terms 
of socio-economic status as compared to non-Baloch. “Within Pakistan Balochistan’s per 
capita income is less than half of the country‘s average, meaning that an average Baloch is 
likely to be twice as poor as his counterpart living in any of the other three provinces” 
(Institute of Public Policy, 2011 cited in Ahmed, 2013: 104). Ahmed further states: 
It is unfortunate but true that even within the province of Balochistan; an average 
Baloch is twice as poor as an average Punjabi, Pashtun, or Hazara resident of the 
province. Even in the capital city of Balochistan, Quetta, less than one third of the 
households of the provincial metropolis are actually connected with the government 
water supply system and receive between 1-2 hours of water supply in 24 hours. 
The education system in the province is so inferior that those who can afford it 
would prefer to send their children to educational institutions outside the province; 
Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore. The same is true of medical facilities in the province; 
with a little affordability most people prefer to take their sick loved ones to Karachi 
or elsewhere for medical treatment (Ahmed, 2013: 104). 
 
Johnson and Kalmthout (2006) argue that, despite the availability of formal education to all 
in many parts of the world, it (education) has sometimes failed to prevent conflicts from 
taking place. They maintain that, due to increasing globalisation and other global and 
domestic factors, the social and income inequalities among citizens in numerous states 
have plunged the ‘disadvantaged’ classes or ethnic groups into conflict with the privileged 
classes or ethnic groups. During the 1970s and 1980s the Baloch struggle was seen as 
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confined to specific tribes, especially those excluded and impoverished such as the Marri, 
Bugti and Mengal tribes. But now it has changed in nature. The conflict is no longer seen 
as localised or a struggle of poor against rich or disadvantaged against privileged class. 
Many examples might be quoted here; most importantly, non-tribal regions, such as 
Makran division in Balochistan, are intensely engaged in conflict. As the previous 
nationalist movements were based in the Marri–Bugti areas in the east of the province, the 
south-west part remained peaceful. The current nationalist upsurge has seen widespread 
resistance across the region except in the northern districts where Pashtuns are in the 
majority. 
This thesis follows a similar line of argument in the case-study of Balochistan-Pakistan 
relations. The alternative argument discussed here is that education is contributing to 
conflict in Balochistan because of the nature, purpose, policies and role of education in the 
federal structure with regard to smaller ethno-national groups. There is no evidence that 
education is a neutral actor in the case of Balochistan. As in other conflict zones, education 
is always part of the problem. Therefore, I might argue that an education system that is 
constructed on pre-concerned political and ideological grounds is bound to be political and 
confrontational. Again, whether education is part of the problem or part of the solution 
depends on the nature, purpose, function and role of the state educational policies.  
 
6.3 The Purpose of Education: Its Nature and Role in Balochistan 
In Balochistan, the nature, role, form and purpose of education have been shaped in ways 
that have been prone to many errors. On the other hand, it is a controlling education system 
that hides the identity, history, culture, languages, and socio-economic conditions of the 
nations, such as the Baloch. From Pakistan’s educational policies towards Balochistan, one 
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can see that education is part of the problem in two ways: 1) education fails to care for the 
people of Balochistan; and 2) it is a tool used to control the Baloch people. 
As mentioned in the previous two chapters, 4 and 5, the purpose of education in Pakistan is 
to create good, loyal Muslim Pakistanis. Many scholars and interviewees claim that the 
education policies, curricula and textbooks have all been used simply to promote and 
project this type of narrative. The policy-makers have not hesitated to falsify history 
whenever it has suited this particular purpose. Their narrative of Bangladesh’s freedom is 
one such example. The fact of the matter is that the Bengal was separated due to the 
weakness of the political elite in Pakistan (Kokab and Abid, 2013: 1). The failure of the 
Pakistani political system and leadership led to the disintegration of the country; however, 
according to Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur in his interview, India was blamed for Bangladesh 
achieving freedom. The policy-makers hide the atrocities committed by the Pakistani 
military and blame India for the separation. The education they impart is aimed at making 
people believe in Pakistan and its invincibility and purity, as pointed out by Talpur in his 
interview.  
Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur is a 67-year-old Baloch political activist and writer who has 
been associated with Balochistan’s Independence movement for many decades. Since it 
was not possible to meet him in person, the interview was conducted via e-mail exchanges 
in 2014. He taught Baloch refugees in Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992 and argues that the 
nature of the education that Pakistan imparts and delivers can only aggravate the conflict. 
This is because it is entirely at odds with the ground reality. It talks about the glory of 
Islam while, in reality, people are experiencing religious fundamentalism, bigotry, fascism 
and brutality. It has been observed that the writer has published similar contents in a few 
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mainstream newspapers since then. Direct quotes from Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur in this 
thesis are directly taken from his interview. According to Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur, 
The best way to overcome the resistance of an opponent is first to silence him so 
that he can neither communicate with his own kind nor relate the injustices to 
others. The opponent can be silenced either by physically restraining him from 
speaking or by denying him his language; and this latter device is equally effective. 
It is for this reason that Urdu was made the national language. The aim of education 
in Pakistan is to speed up the process of rejection of one’s culture and history by 
the nations it subjugates, and these results in a loss of identity for those learning in 
its schools. Once the sentiments of rejection set in, the attitude of insensitivity 
towards one’s national resources, culture, history and goals take a stranglehold on 
the person’s psyche, which not only makes it easier for the subjugator to exploit the 
wealth and resources of the victim country but also gives him an active abettor and 
conniver in the rejectionist. 
 
Many academic experts describe the religiosity in school textbooks and in educational 
policies since 1947. Educational policies and textbooks have been used to project the state 
narrative to create a spurious sense of unity on the basis of religion and state ideology. 
Apart from the ideological notion of education, the state is afraid of providing democratic, 
rational and philosophical education to students. In Balochistan, many people believe that 
the state has tried to bury the rich cultural and historical heritage of Baloch, Sindhi, 
Pashtun and even Punjabi in order that the fabricated and spurious Pakistani culture and 
history might become acceptable to people. An example that can be quoted here concerns 
the Pakistani security forces’ recent raid on a book fair at Atta Shad Degree College in 
Turbat, Balochistan. Apart from the progressive literature, they even confiscated books by 
Bertrand Russell, autobiographies of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Che 
Guevara, and books about Baloch and Balochistan. This is what Baloch writers and online 
news sources have said. According to Baloch sources, it (the state) deemed these books 
subversive literature. Anything that deviates from the ideology of the elite is termed 
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subversive. This mindset cannot by its very nature allow historical truths and facts in 
textbooks.  
Another example can be found in the same district of Turbat where many schools and 
English language centres were closed down, including the Dynamic English Language 
Teaching Academy (DELTA). Barkat Ismail is an educationalist and the Director of the 
DELTA School and English Language Centre, District Kech, Balochistan. I had a verbal 
communication with him in 2013, when he was working as Divisional Director Benazir 
Income Support Programme (BISP). He stated that 1800 students are enrolled in the 
DELTA English language centre. Similarly, in another district of the Makran division of 
Balochistan province, many of the English language centres and girls’ schools have been 
threatened and closed down by an Islamic fundamentalist organisation known as Tanzeem 
Islami Al-Furqan. According to print and electronic media,  
Tanzeem Islami Al-Furqan, a previously unknown organisation, which has 
distributed pamphlets inside private schools and English language/computer centres 
in the main towns of Panjgur, a district bordering Iran. These Urdu pamphlets 
warned school administrations to immediately stop the co-education system and 
asked teachers to refrain from educating girls (see Newsline, 25 June, 2014).  
 
A total of thirty-five schools have been closed down in Panjgur district. According to one 
estimate, more than 25,000 students are enrolled in these institutions and around 500 
teachers (both male and female) are employed therein. Shahzavar Karimzadi, a UK-based 
academic and Baloch activist, in his forthcoming book Methodology of Deception (2015), 
blames the state of Pakistan for attacks on girls and private education in various districts in 
the province. He writes: 
Pakistan state and security forces are directly responsible for this dire situation. 
They fear most from educated people. In May 2014 an ISI backed Muslim 
fundamentalist group (Al-Furqan) in Panjgur, in eastern occupied Balochistan, 
distributed a leaflet threatening all private girls schools to shut down otherwise they 
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would deal with them according to the worst consequences as prescribed in the 
Quran. Subsequently, all girl schools in Panjgur were closed down for an 
unspecified time (Karimzadi, 2015b: 131–32).  
 
Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur argues that “the Baloch should acquire what colonisers call 
subversive education because the education that colonisers provide can only pollute minds 
and blunt the will for liberty”.44 People of other provinces gladly serve the government 
after education but the government is unsure about Baloch loyalties and therefore 
systematically excludes them. Like many other writers, Karimzadi also describes the 
nature of education in Balochistan as colonial. He argues that:  
One of the most devastating and long-lasting effects of colonialism has been on the 
state of education in Balochistan. All colonial powers that ascended to political 
power in Balochistan have purposely kept this sector incredibly underdeveloped. At 
present, in both western and eastern occupied Balochistan, the standard of 
education is the lowest not only within the boundaries of Iran and Pakistan but in 
the whole world. In eastern occupied Balochistan, girls probably have the lowest 
literary rate in the world. The rate of education hardly reaches double figures 
among Baloch women on this side of Balochistan (Karimzadi, 2015b: 131).  
 
Furthermore:  
One area where the colonising establishments have directed their greatest effort has 
been to keep the Baloch people in ignorance. They have tried their utmost to keep 
them from having a true knowledge of their history, culture and resources. By 
design they have put every imaginable hurdle against conducting independent and 
reliable research on Balochistan’s environment, history, economy, society, 
language, culture, music, and political and legal rights. The occupying states have 
been resolute in their intention to prevent Baloch society from enjoying 
development (Karimzadi, 2015b: 193–94). 
 
                                                 
44
 It should be mentioned here that the writer participated in my research as an interviewee and gave me a 
written interview via e-mail. I have noticed that he published a few materials in different online newspapers 
later. Thus, I have quoted him in a few places in my research from his interview comments rather than the 
published articles.   
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Moreover, not only academic experts but also the Baloch nationalist leaders and students 
consider the nature of education to be colonial. Salam Sabir mentions in his book Nawab 
Khair Bakhsh Marri Ka Interviews (Interviews with Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri) that 
someone asked a veteran Baloch nationalist leader, Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, why he has 
closed around 47 government schools in the Kahan area in Balochistan. Khair Baksh Marri 
replied:  
I wish I could destroy a few schools where the Baloch people are colonised and 
being taught in favour of Punjab. They are taught only to memorise like parrots. I 
salute those people who are able to do this job of destroying the colonial education 
system. However, no one can deny the fact that education is an important element 
of life. No nation can progress without education. This is a universal fact. By 
education I mean a proper education and quality education, not state-sponsored 
education. I am not in favour of the Pakistani or Punjabi education system for the 
Baloch people. I am against those schools that force us to be Pakistani (Sabir, 2011: 
71–72).   
 
As well as academics and nationalist leaders, Baloch writers and bureaucrats also think that 
education in Balochistan is colonial. According to Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch, Director 
General (DG) Special Education, Government of Balochistan, Pakistan is a colonial 
product of the British. Therefore, during the colonial rule the masters wanted to create 
clerks and obedient servants through education. Unfortunately, the ruling elite in Pakistan 
or the Pakistani ruling elite have tried to follow the same aims of colonial education since 
the creation of Pakistan. A majority of scholars seem perturbed by the specified purpose of 
education in Pakistan or in Balochistan. Dr. Shazawar Ali says that education in 
Balochistan is non-existent. It is shaken and ruined, degenerating, de-culturing and 
dehumanising human beings. He further argues that this education system is generating not 
only conflict but also many other things, such as passiveness and idleness. He specifically 
describes how education in Balochistan is uprooting the Baloch from its culture, language, 
history and heroes at any cost.  
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Similarly, other non-Baloch scholars reject the existing educational system in Pakistan too. 
One of them is K. K. Aziz, a prominent Pakistani scholar based in the United Kingdom. In 
his book Murder of History he states the following about Pakistan educational textbooks, 
describing 
[T]he various ways in which history has been manipulated, polluted, ill-used and 
trampled underfoot. Every means of destruction has been employed to achieve the 
purpose. There are plain lies, things which have absolutely no existence in reality 
or fact. There are deviations of all kind: lapses, flaws, self-deception, wishful 
thinking, subjective views, warped notions, loose arguments, pre-conceived ideas, 
parochialism, superficiality, misjudgement, misbelief, oversight, slips of pen, 
inattentiveness, and aberrations of every variety. There are mists of errors and 
eccentricity which conceal the facts. There is a general blankness of mind which 
wallows in ignorance. The adult reader of these textbooks can only stand and stare 
at the drift, shift and swing away from the truth, and slowly sink into a state of 
mental numbness (Aziz, 1993a: 121).  
 
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), Paulo Freire describes ‘The Banking Concept of 
Education’. Banking Education is about the traditional style of forcing and lecturing. The 
traditional style of teaching is not interactive, and questions are not allowed. Students 
accept everything that is taught. These ways of teaching make students passive and 
uncritical. According to Freire’s banking concept of education, the teacher teaches, and 
students are taught. The teacher knows everything, and the students are mere subjects. The 
teacher thinks, and the students have no option but to agree with the teacher’s thoughts. 
The teacher chooses and enforces his or her point of view. The teacher acts and the 
students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher.  
According to Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), oppression exists. Oppression is the 
exercising of an authority that is unjust and cruel. It is about complete control of one’s 
actions, thoughts and desires - complete control of one’s freedom. Freedom is a myth for 
an oppressed person, who accepts the cruel reality of oppression rather than looking into its 
cause. The causes may be economic, social or otherwise, and they keep people oppressed. 
193 
 
It is important to focus on oppression, because oppression in any form results in 
dehumanisation. Pedagogy of the Oppressed was published in the early seventies, at the 
time of decolonisation when former colonies of Latin America, Asia and Africa were 
becoming autonomous states. Decolonisation is an important subject of the book.  
Freire criticised the banking education system and called it an undemocratic way of 
learning and an undemocratic way to glorify a country. Democracy is about raising one’s 
voice. It is about freedom of expression. However, the banking education system lacks 
freedom of thought and action, resulting in oppressive attitudes and practices in society. In 
many countries, including Pakistan, the oppressed people, such as the Baloch, have been 
alienated. As a result, they do not have control of their own thoughts and creativity. Thus, 
people become alienated from their own lives. Freire was concerned about oppression in 
general, but for the pedagogy of the oppressed, the main concern is oppression in 
education. Pakistan is one of those countries where people are oppressed, and they do not 
have control of their educational freedom.  
Statistics, experts’ views and empirical research suggest that the government is either 
unable or unwilling to provide high-quality and secular education (at all levels) to the 
Baloch people. It seems, from the above, that the controlling education system is a vital 
condition if the Pakistani State is to achieve its purposes. As highlighted in the nature and 
purpose of education, one might say that the state wants to control the Baloch people by 
limiting their access to education (see Chapter 4) and promoting the ideological inclination 





6.4 The Lies and the Ills: Status of Education in Balochistan    
Although Pakistan as a country is herself far behind in terms of her international 
commitment to fulfil the basic educational needs of the country (chapter 4), education in 
Balochistan is worse, in terms of quality and quantity, than in the rest of the Pakistan. For 
instance, the Education for All (EFA) target, which was set to be achieved by 2015, will 
not be achieved in Pakistan as a whole, according to the EFA Global Monitoring Report. 
Moreover, Balochistan is the most neglected province and will suffer even more in its 
education sector. Adult illiteracy in Pakistan is expected to reach ‘an appalling 51 million 
by 2015’ (UNESCO, 2014), of whom ‘65% will be females’. As a percentage of the 
population, it will be highest in Balochistan. In answer to the more specific question on 
Balochistan, Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur says that education in Balochistan has been 
systematically and wilfully left in tatters. Literacy rates and standards are very low. With 
regard to the availability of libraries in primary schools and functioning computer labs in 
schools, Balochistan is far behind the other provinces in the country. Mir Mohmmad Ali 
Talpur, in his written interview referring to the ASER (2013) report, argues that  
[F]unctional toilets are available in 86.4 per cent of primary schools in Punjab, 56.7 
per cent in KPK, 49.6 per cent in Sindh and 16.6 per cent of schools in Balochistan. 
As many as 80.5 per cent of primary schools in Punjab have boundary walls, as 
compared to 65.9 per cent in KPK, 63.2 per cent in Sindh and 24.7 per cent of 
primary schools in Balochistan. 
Since 1947, when Pakistan came into existence, education has remained a battlefield of 
political struggle rather than being used for the capacity-building of the people. This 
picture is clear from the fieldwork data I have used in chapter 4 and this chapter, including 
experts’ views and government statistics. Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur mentions that 
capacity-building proceeds when states have no doubt about their ability to survive. 
According to him, “a country like Pakistan, which always seems to be in crisis and is 
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slowly becoming a failed state, tries to survive through projection of its narrative and, 
therefore, education becomes a part of political struggle”.  
I asked Talpur the following question: “In your opinion, do people in Balochistan in 
general and the Baloch in particular have satisfactory and equal access to education”? He 
replied, “No, they do not have equal access because education apartheid is practised vis-à-
vis Balochistan”. He says that the “education apartheid from which Balochistan suffers 
becomes even more evident when the allocations for Islamabad are compared, because this 
comparison nullifies the population-difference argument”. The two top beneficiaries of the 
Higher Education Commission’s (HEC) largesse in the capital are the National University 
of Science and Technology (NUST) and Comsats Institute of Information Technology 
(CIIT). The HEC discrimination against Balochistan has been further reinforced since its 
inception, claims Talpur. He states that “the Balochistan University of Engineering and 
Technology (BUET), Khuzdar, has received Rs 284 million (eight projects) in 10 years but 
Lahore’s University of Engineering and Technology was granted Rs 8,361 million (23 
projects)”.  
Kaleem Ullah Bareach, a historian, mentioned during his interview in Quetta, Balochistan, 
that since 2002 the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) has sent around ten 
thousand Pakistani students to study for PhDs overseas. One may be surprised to learn that 
only a hundred such scholarships were given to students from Balochistan. He also 
mentions that, of these hundred students, only 40 Baloch and Pashtuns were awarded 
scholarships, with the remainder being given to Punjabi settlers. He claims that, according 
to the federal quota formula, 960 scholarships should be reserved for Balochistan province.  
It is clearly mentioned here and in chapter 4 that the state does not care about giving the 
Baloch people an education. Conflict theorists identify higher education as a means by 
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which the upper class maintains its higher economic and social status over lower social 
groups (Collins, 1971). In terms of higher education, Balochistan presents an even worse 
picture. An interview was conducted with Siddiq Baluch, a prominent Baloch journalist, 
who believes that there is a reason for keeping Baloch away from higher education. He 
says that all qualified and educated Baloch are declared dangerous and untrustworthy in 
Pakistan. “An educated Baloch has the potential to understand the world and the subtlety 
of exploitation by neo-colonists” argued by Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur in his written 
interview in 2014. According to him, “the systematic policy of keeping the Baloch 
illiterate” has relegated them to the backwaters of literacy. Furthermore, the 
“Establishment knows that the best way of keeping people enslaved is to keep them 
illiterate”.  
Similarly, it is argued by Carina Jahani, in State Control and its Impact on Language in 
Balochistan, that “The State, i.e. the ruling elite, may desire to keep the Baloch uneducated 
and unable to participate in modern political discourse, but that is definitely no longer the 
desire of a majority of the Baloch” (Jahani, 2005: 156). She argues these points in the 
contexts of both Pakistan and Iran, where, according to her, educational opportunities for 
the Baloch people are very limited. Literacy rates are very low, and girls’ education is even 
worse than boys’ education. According to her observations, despite these limited resources 
and facilities the state of education is gradually improving. The educated enslaved will 
rebel and demand their rights and liberty. Moreover, people understand that education will 
speed up their attainment of liberty.  
As was highlighted in chapter 4, education in Balochistan is lagging behind in terms of 
shortages of schools and teachers, low literacy rates, inadequate budgets, and poor quality 
and quantity of education. Major problems including high drop-out rates, multi-faceted 
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problems of girls’ education, vastness of the territory and other issues were discussed by 
the Secretary of Education, Government of Balochistan, in conversation with the 
researcher. The Secretary of Education, Munir Ahmed Badini, admits that the problems of 
education in Balochistan schools and colleges are numerous. He acknowledged many 
issues in Balochistan’s education system. In his view, all the problems are due to structural 
flaws in education policies for the Baloch and Balochistan. Being a Baloch as well as 
Secretary of Education, he wants to improve the state of education in Balochistan but feels 
helpless to do so.  
He further mentions that the basic problem is the politicisation of educational policies. 
There is a lack of government will to solve the underlying problems. According to him, 
policies are centralised and represent specific aims of the state rather than the needs of the 
Baloch people. It can be argued that the state controls the Baloch people by excluding and 
marginalising them. One area of policy is systematically applied in education. For these 
reasons, textbooks are systematically revised and shaped to ignore the Baloch people and 
represent the ideological notion of the state.        
 
6.5 Annihilating the Baloch History, Language and Culture  
Many scholars believe that curricula, textbooks, and education policies in Pakistan have 
served to create and control submissive followers. The element of care evidenced by the 
creation of opportunities for the people is absent. The interviewees were asked the 
question, “Do you think the Baloch people along with their history and culture have been 
adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the country”?  The majority of 
them, such as Kaleem Ullah Bareach, Qaisar Jamali, and Atique-ur-Rehman, simply 
replied ‘No’. Abdul Rahman Buzdar, Secretary of Fisheries (at the time of the interviews) 
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in 2013, who has served as a Section Officer and Additional Secretary Education, 
Government of Balochistan, argues that the Baloch culture and history have not been fairly 
represented in the education system primarily because the medium of instruction is not 
Baloch. Balochi is the language of Baloch people living in various countries such as 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan (Jahani, 2013: 154). She mentiones:  
Balochi is spoken in southwestern Pakistan, in Balochistan Province, by smaller 
populations in Punjab and Sindh, and by a large number of people in Karachi. It is 
also spoken in southeastern Iran; in Sistan and Balochistan province; by who have 
settled in the northeastern Khorasan and Golestan provinces; by smaller 
communities in Afghanistan (particularly in Nimruz Province); in the Gulf States 
(especially in Oman and the United Arab Emirates); in the Mari region in 
Turkmenistan; in India and East Africa; and nowadays, also by immigrant Baloch 
in North America, Europe, and Australia (Jahani, 2013: 154). 
 
Karimzadi (2015b: 27) states:  
Baloch have been denied the right to use and develop their language. Two other 
languages, Farsi and Urdu, have been imposed on the Baloch people. The 
restriction on the free use of their language has debilitated the cultural development 
of the Baloch nation. Right from the inception of colonial rule in Balochistan the 
colonial states have systematically targeted Balochi art, music, civic institutions, 
library and learning institutions, museums and cultural centers, recreation and sport 
centers. The final blow in dismantling of the whole Baloch identity and homeland 
were the creation of the artificial boundaries of Iran and Pakistan. 
 
Moreover, all the textbooks are geared to represent the state narrative which advocates 
religion and a spurious Pakistani identity. All the heroes and stories are either those of 
post-1947 persons or those of the Mughal and pre-Mughal rule era. There are examples of 
foreign invaders, such as Arab, Afghan, Turkish and Mughal, who are glorified as heroes 
in the various textbooks of the Balochistan Board. Dr. Shazawar Ali, during his interview, 
says that the heroes of the state are imported ones. They are neither Baloch nor from 
Balochistan. None are from the rest of Pakistan either. For example, Mohammad Bin 
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Qasim, Mohmood Gaznavi, Khalid bin Waleed, Aurangzeeb Alemgeer, Nadir Shah, 
Ahmad Shah Abdali, and Shahab-ud-deen Gori are all outsiders. 
One can argue that this may be the nature of the religious state. For example, being Muslim 
does not mean not being Baloch or any other ethnicity. In a wider context, the nature of the 
Pakistani state is about the glorification of Islamic figures rather than its own ethnic 
nations. Everything is borrowed from outside, including culture, language and ideology. 
Pakistan had in fact brought Arabs, Turko-Mongols and others together for the sake of the 
creation of a new identity, i.e. Pakistaniat. It is clear that the essence of the textbooks is 
extremism and fanaticism. The content includes Jihad, conquerors, anti-Western feelings, 
and bigotry. On the other hand, the emphasis is on such themes as ‘Pakistan is a fortress of 
Islam’ and ‘Pakistani people are defenders of the faith’. Karimzadi (2015b: 22) goes on to 
say:  
Human history is littered with invasions by powerful nations, groups or tribes 
leading to the painful subjugation of others. The undemocratic view perceives this 
as a natural order. Their invasions are glorified and the leaders of invasion, the 
plunderers and mass killers are held in high esteem and presented as historical 
heroes. To this very day the name of Alexander III of Macedon (356-323BC) is 
followed by the adjective ‘The Great.’ Those who conquered and pillaged much of 
America, Asia, Africa and other parts of the world, who subordinated many nations 
and gave free rein to unconstrained power, are still remembered as brave victors.  
  
The Baloch are represented negatively, like ‘backward’ people and ‘nomads’. The killers 
and plunderers, on the other hand, are projected as ‘great’ conquerors. For example, the 
people from the rest of the country came to teach the Baloch how to be civilised. This is 
the post-partition Pakistani mindset which exists to inculcate the Baloch generation 
because their elders are nomads, illiterate and backward. This is a colonial mindset in the 
Pakistani elite which perceives itself as more civilised than and superior to other ethnic 
nationalities in the country. Inferiority complexes develop when people from other 
200 
 
provinces arrive with a negative approach and a superior mindset. Their high-handed and 
superior approach is part of a project to educate Baloch people or the people of 
Balochistan. They carry out this project through radio, television, syllabuses, educational 
textbooks, poetry, music, culture, and mainstream print and electronic media. 
The majority of the respondents in this research agreed that the Pakistani state is afraid to 
give a proper education to the Baloch people. In reality, Pakistan is not a one-nation 
country with one culture, language and civilisation. There is in fact no one Pakistani nation 
and nationalism. It is clear that Pakistan is a collection of different nations, such as the 
Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi, Punjabi and others. The people living therein have nothing in 
common, and policy-makers have no clear education policies and educational system to 
accommodate the ethnic diversity of the country. The aim of education is to teach hatred of 
other people and nations to forge an invented nation. Dr. Shazawar Ali talks about 
Balochistan education texts and says that they evidently understand that every nation has 
its own language and culture that must be respected. One textbook claims the following: 
The Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, also supported the Pakistan movement 
and when Quaid-e-Azam came to Balochistan, the Khan extended every possible 
help and encouragement to him. As a result the Congress was almost liquidated. 
When a referendum took place in Balochistan, the members of Shahi Jirga as well 
as the non-official councillors of Quetta Municipal Committee unanimously voted 
for inclusion in Pakistan (for classes IX–X: page, 43). 
 
Interestingly, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, himself rejects this notion 
in his auto–biography Inside Balochistan (1975). This may be why Siddiq Baluch, a writer 
and journalist, opines that the textbooks are full of lies and are chauvinistic towards other 
cultures, religions and histories. According to him, Pakistani education has destroyed the 
history of not only the Baloch but also other nations such as its neighbour, India. Similarly, 
at the time of the creation of Pakistan, the war was with the British, but the state ideology 
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and textbooks declared war on Hindus, not the British. It is a fact that people in the united 
India fought alongside Hindus against the British. In fact, if we look at pre-partition 
Muslim League politics in India, the Muslim League never fought against the British. The 
Muslim League had close connections with the British and was in conflict only with 
Hindus and the All Indian National Congress. Even Muslim leaders were not concerned 
about British rule; they only wanted to escape Hindu dominance. 
In Balochistan, the state wanted to use education to impose a new culture, which is an 
Islami (Islamic) culture, as expressed by Dr. Shazawar Ali during an interview with the 
researcher. However, this is not a new religion at all. The Baloch are Muslim by faith and 
have a sort of Islamic culture. Pro-Pakistani right-wing historians and scholars agreed upon 
the creation of a specific culture, to be called a Pakistani culture. They wanted to 
implement a certain type of education to create Pakistaniat to reflect an Islamic nation. 
The inhabitants of Pakistan have cultures and histories stretching back thousands of years. 
Every nation has its own way of life, including culture. Siddiq Baluch says that any 
attempt to dispose of an existing culture and create a new nationalism of Pakistaniat 
through educational propaganda is unacceptable. Hence, education textbooks are used as a 
controlling system.  
The aim is to root out regional languages and create a Tasawry-i-Pakistan (idea of 
Pakistan). It is the universal right of the people of every nation to be taught in their mother 
tongue, and the textbooks should include their heroes and history. However, education in 
Pakistan means Ak Komi-tasawar (one-nation idea). This aim cannot be adopted by the 
Baloch, claims Ali Rehman (his fictitious name). He says that this belongs to a certain 
people, while our culture already inherently exists. We cannot adopt something that 
opposes our existence through indoctrination by the state education. 
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It is worth mentioning that, apart from the subject of Islamic education, the science 
subjects are saturated with texts of Islamic education and religion. Here, it is very 
interesting to observe that, in addition to Islamic education (which is compulsory for any 
degree), other subjects in science and social studies contain a huge amount about religion. 
The science books contain religion. For example, they speak of Islamic physicists, Islamic 
chemists and Islamic biologists and give many examples and names of those declared to be 
Islamic scientists, such as Muhammad al-Fazari, Al–Khwarzami, Abu-al-Biruni, Ibn al–
Haytham, Omar Khyyam and many others. Similarly, in English textbooks, many of the 
personalities represent the religious ideology. The idea behind this is the oneness of God 
and Muslims as an Ummah (one nation), as claimed in a textbook: 
Starting in Arabia, Islam rapidly spread into Iran, Syria, Iraq, North Africa, Spain 
and India. Along with the preaching of faith, the Muslims established great Muslim 
Empires in these lands. So long as the Muslims acted upon Holy Quran and Hadis 
in these countries, their empires remained strong and stable but when they 
neglected them, deterioration set in. They forgot God’s Command. Hold fast, all of 
you together, to the rope of Allah and do not separate (Textbook for class VII, 
Balochistan Board, 2012: 31). 
 
Here, one notes how the textbook glorifies invasion, rule by outsiders, and plunder. In this 
education system, students are taught to break away from their native culture and forget 
their language and history. This education alienates every individual from their simple 
human status as members of their societies and nations. In this regard, Karimzadi argues: 
The entire media and education in Balochistan is controlled by the occupying 
states. The Baloch people are prevented from using their mother tongue in their 
homeland. Instead they are compelled to speak in the languages of their occupiers. 
This policy puts Baloch children at once at a disadvantage. This discriminatory 
policy gets deeper when Baloch students are deprived of their culture, moral codes 
and history. Baloch history is obliterated totally and in its place there is a made-up 
farcical distorted history that has no base in Baloch past and present. The chief aim 
of this fictitious history is to naturalise colonialism in Balochistan. In their made-up 
history, the Baloch are described as the victims of their own follies - as if the 
causes of all Baloch problems are the Baloch themselves. Lurking beneath this ill-
founded vision is the argument that by taking over the Baloch homeland and ruling 
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them, the colonial states have served the Baloch at their own cost. The invasion of 
Balochistan is seen as an act of kindness and generosity on the part of the invaders! 
(Karimzadi, 2015b: 279). 
 
Conflict theory scholars claim that the role of school is to create inequality in society and 
‘false consciousness’. Schools mentally prepare and guide students to accept their failure 
as a consequence of their lower status (Ballantine and Spade, 2007 and 2015). According 
to conflict theorists, the term ‘false consciousness’ can be traced back to the ideas of Karl 
Marx. This refers to school as an institution. They argue that education maintains the status 
of the elite, their dominant culture and their role in society (Collins, 1971).  
In Balochistan the system of education is based on a centralised bureaucratic structure and 
is shaped by the state to represent the myths of state ideology. The ideology of the 
Pakistani state is to preserve the supremacy of the ruling elite and their language, culture 
and history. In essence, this is the conclusion drawn by most Baloch academics and 
experts. Similarly, it is one of the core arguments of conflict theorists that education 
maintains the ideas and status of the dominant class (see Ballantine and Spade, 2015; 
Collins, 1971). In the same way, the Baloch experts examine education in Balochistan 
within the context of subjugation, annihilation of free thinking, monopoly of expropriation, 
and the lies and ills of the ruling elite.  
In the case of Balochistan, conflict theory is the most suitable paradigm for describing the 
reality of the people’s existence. Baloch are marginalised and excluded from progress, 
development and a reasonably sound education. They face discrimination through limited 
access to educational opportunities, shortages of teachers and schools, insufficient funds, 
poor record-keeping and exclusive educational policies. Therefore, the Baloch masses, 
particularly students, believe that their schools are laboratories in which Baloch children 
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are indoctrinated with the values, attitudes and ideas of the dominant nationality in the 
manner expressed by Siddiq Baluch during his interview in 2013. 
 
6.6 The Inquiry of Reality: Education as a Mode of Control   
Several theories on education and conflict have been proposed to explain the dynamic, 
such as relative deprivation, or the feeling of being excluded from social, political or 
economic benefits. These theories also highlight the process of heterogeneity between two 
groups and the process of homogeneity within the groups, including religion, language and 
tribal affiliation (see Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2009: 97–99). Most importantly, however, 
these theories ignore education as a mode of control. Functionalist theory also overlooks 
the controlling aspect of education. One strand of literature deals with the relationship 
between education and conflict. Therefore, this research deals not only with the causal 
relationship between education and conflict, or the politics of education, but also with 
education as a mode of control. It also provides a theoretical framework for the case of the 
Balochistan conflict in Pakistan. Baloch have experienced the state education and its 
policies, or the lack of them. Either way, they see how it serves the state to dominate the 
people. The Baloch people and their representatives explain that everyday life for them 
continues to be one of suffering, characterised by severely limited access to education.  
Consequently, the Baloch masses, including young people, feel resentment against the 
political establishment that has imposed such a system on them. They blame the 
government for both the poor supply of education and the indoctrination of children with 
religious ideologies in the schools and colleges. Aslam (2011) does not blame the 
government alone for failing to address the grievances of the people. She states that the 
culture of greed encouraged by the Baloch tribal (Sardars) structure is also responsible for 
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the lack of education in the province. This is indeed a contributory factor to the low 
standard of state education in Balochistan. However, a few scholars reject this notion that 
the Sardari system or tribal structure has contributed greatly to Balochistan’s poor 
educational situation. Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur, in his interview, argues that the state 
blames the Sardars, but Makran has no Sardars and yet still suffers from the same policies. 
The Makran region of Balochistan is free of the Sardari system, but the state and its 
establishment have closed down many of its schools recently.  
Having said this, education as a mode of control foments conflict in Balochistan. Low 
investment in education and a deteriorating educational system cause poverty and 
inequality in society, which will lead to hostility and instability as the exploited try to 
express their grievances. This point is connected to state greed and the Baloch grievances. 
In Balochistan, poverty and inequality are evident from various perspectives, such as level 
of income, earnings, education and socio-economic status of the Baloch and non-Baloch. It 
has been mentioned in previous chapters that poor education in Balochistan has created a 
skills gap that is directly or indirectly connected to the discrimination against the Baloch at 
various levels. As a result of these grievances, society finds itself in a chaotic state, thus 
increasing the probability of civil conflict (see Sambanis, 2001; Collier et al., 2003; Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). 
Pakistani education aims to control the Baloch people, because both the Baloch and the 
state have already decided that their relationship is not viable. Educational policies aim 
only to provide education for a few people in certain areas while retaining control of 
society. Furthermore, it can be pointed out that, through education, the Pakistani State 
applies its policy of divide and rule. In the meantime it pretends that the Baloch do not 
want education. Dr. Shazawar Ali argues that the purpose of education in Pakistan is to 
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serve only the ruling establishment interests. It has been the tool of the rulers to exploit the 
common people. Education is about ‘control’ and only ‘control’. This is a mixed education 
of a religio-tribal nature shaped by the state and used as a tool to control the people. 
Subsequently, it is a scheme to divide and rule (Karimzadi, 2015b). More specifically, 
Karimzadi, speaking of Balochistan’s education, states:  
In its place they have instituted a culture of hypocrisy, deception, corruption, false 
promises and religious hatred. Educational institutions are converted to training 
centres for the art of deception and religious fundamentalism. However, one of the 
policies in Balochistan that has been upheld consistently is the scarcity of proper 
education (Karimzadi, 2015b: 278).  
 
Suppressive and discriminatory state-run policies have led to the stirring of student politics 
in educational institutions such as schools, colleges, and universities on various student 
political platforms. Dr. Hafeez Baloch argues that the intermittent army operations and 
lack of government attention to provincial socio-economic development have created a 
sense of deprivation amongst the Baloch youth. They therefore have no other option but to 
seize their rights through strong political mobilisation and agitation, both on and off 
campus. Bansal (2010), supporting this argument, posits that, had there been an equal 
playing field for the Baloch in national policy and economy, there would not have been 
such radical political feelings and agitation amongst the Baloch youth.  
The Baloch Students Organisation (BSO) was founded in 1967 in Balochistan. It has been 
a strong political platform for Baloch students across Pakistan. The BSO has provided a 
space for Baloch students to mobilise and carry out student politics in the province 
mentioned by Dr. Hafeez Baloch. Dr. Baloch maintains that the same organisation has also 
been a fertile ground for the development of political leadership for mainstream Baloch 
nationalist politics. The BSO is now split into several factions. Each faction is pursuing a 
different political line. For instance, BSO Azad was formed by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch and 
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is now headed by Bashir Zaib. Banuk Kareema Baloch, a female student
45
 activist, is the 
senior vice-chairperson of the organisation. They are demanding independence and will 
therefore settle for nothing less than the separation of Balochistan from the state of 
Pakistan.   
Dr. Kahoor Khan Baloch, a Marxist, who was the Chairman of the BSO during his student 
life, further argues that the BSO (M), another faction of the BSO led by Mohiuddin 
Baloch, is affiliated to the Balochistan National Party (Mengal). Another section of the 
BSO has a strong affiliation with the National Party (NP). NP is the mainstream Baloch 
nationalist party. It believes in federation and has a political ambition of achieving political 
rights within the framework of federation. In other words, this party does not demand the 
separation of Balochistan from the federation of Pakistan. This section of BSO has adopted 
a smooth approach to national and provincial politics. It centres its activities largely on 
academic issues and other student affairs within educational institutions. 
Baloch students are aged between 12 and 27, attend various educational institutions 
(schools, colleges and universities), and form the membership of these organisations at 
local, regional or provincial levels. Students belonging to BSO Azad tend to support the 
Baloch guerrilla movement for the separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Therefore, 
Pakistan’s poor education system is nevertheless providing an educated workforce for 
militant organisations in Balochistan.  
Several writers believe that the fragmentation of BSO reflects the tribal characteristics of 
Baloch society in which major tribes such as the Marri, the Bugti and the Mengal tend to 
                                                 
45
Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch is a separatist leader and former president of the BSO. He was abducted by security 
forces in 2005, with a few other Baloch leaders. He was released on bail after one year by an anti-terrorist 
court. Dr Nazar then joined Baloch guerrilla fighters and is now believed to be the head of the Balochistan 
Liberation Front (BLF), an alliance of resistance organisations, which is fighting a guerrilla war against the 
state of Pakistan.  
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retain their separate organisations in order to maintain their tribal loyalties. Although these 
organisations differ in their organisational structure, command and control, they pursue the 
same goal as the other freedom fighter groups. The all share a common objective, which is 
an independent Balochistan.   
Similarly, the Balochistan National Movement (BNM), currently presided over by 
Chairman Khalil Baloch, is a Baloch Nationalist party that has been struggling for an 
independent Balochistan, which they consider to be under occupation by the Pakistani 
state. In 2004 the BNM was redefined mainly by its then Chairman, Gulam Mohammed 
Baloch, who believed that peaceful struggle through democratic means would not achieve 
the Baloch aspiration of an independent Balochistan. Therefore, it focused its politics on a 
single agendum of “struggle until the independence of Balochistan” through peaceful 
political means but without participation in electoral processes administered by the state of 
Pakistan. The BNM believes that the Pakistani parliament and other state departments are 
parts of the occupier state and the Baloch should not participate in parliamentary politics 
under the domination of Pakistan.  
Leaders of the BNM come from various Baloch student organisations. They were mostly 
ideologically close to the Baloch national struggle in their student organisations’ platforms 
during their student life. After the completion of their studies, many of the young people 
join either the BNM or other Baloch separatist organisations. For example, the Chairman 
of BNM, Khalil Baloch, remained an active member of BSO during his student life. The 
BNM, a peaceful political party, believes in humanity and international rules and wants to 
solve the Baloch Problem under the UNO Constitution, as claimed by its members in 
various discussions with the researcher.  Although the workers of the BNM do not directly 
participate in the on-going armed struggle in Balochistan against the occupation, they 
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maintain a bold and unconditional political support for those organisations that are engaged 
in armed struggle. It is worth pointing out that the BNM is a purely political organisation, 
and although it takes a radical stance on Baloch rights and Balochistan’s independence 
from the Pakistani occupation it does not have a militant wing.   
The Baloch National Movement has a long history in the Baloch struggle, going back to 
the 1980s when the party was first founded by a group of seasoned as well as young and 
energetic Baloch politicians. Initially, the party had had a single political objective. This 
was for the restoration of Baloch rights and the termination of Pakistan’s occupation of 
Balochistan. However, in 1988, when Pakistan entered yet another quasi-democratic phase, 
the party participated in elections. Nevertheless, a strong cadre within the party sensed that 
it had moved away from its original manifesto and programme of Balochistan liberation, 
which indeed was not possible through parliamentary processes. Therefore, the same cadre 
under the leadership of Gulam Mohammed Baloch reinvigorated the old spirit of the party 
and focused its political struggle for a just, independent, free and democratic Balochistan 
where peace, tranquillity, equality and humanity might flourish under the tenets of a liberal 
and secular political system. 
Now, we must consider a logical question that needs a brief but lucid examination: To 
what extent might formal education in Balochistan be held responsible for student activism 
and resistance? Formal education in Balochistan is structured in a way that negates the 
rights of other nations. However, since the formal education in Balochistan, particularly in 
government-run schools, is highly biased against the Baloch culture, history and social 
structure, it is a potential cause of retaliatory behaviour among Baloch students. I have 
discussed the politics of the representation of Baloch culture, language and history in the 
government-run public schools in chapter 5. The student organisations, which are active in 
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educational institutions, seize upon the contents of the syllabus to support their arguments 
that the state has engineered the education syllabus in order to steamroller the Baloch 
identity. This persuasive assertion by student organisations incites the Baloch students to 
engage in student activism and, subsequently, mass resistance.               
The leadership of BSO has trained its members and makes extensive use of study circle 
meetings, magazines and booklets as a part of the ideological training. This provides an 
opportunity for Baloch students (both male and female) to receive ideological education in 
reaction to state ideology. In the politics of resistance, this is the source of a constant 
supply of cadres for Baloch human rights, pressure groups and liberation organisations. 
The state is conscious of the threat posed by these student organisations. It has retaliated 
coercively and violently in order to crush and dismantle the student organisations in 
educational institutions. Dr. Hafeez Baloch argues that the state apparatus applies various 
coercive means: killings, disappearances, intimidation, torture and the economic blockage 
of students, teachers, and other professionals active in radical politics in order to crack 
down on the organisational structure of the BSO both on and off campus. This 
indiscriminate state retaliation is used by the student leadership to support its radical 
stance. They argue that, since the state is determined to crush even the legitimate political 
struggle for Baloch rights, the Baloch have no option but to adopt militancy as the only 
way forward in the struggle to safeguard Baloch rights. 
At this juncture, a very important point warrants investigation. If students are actively 
involved in politics, particularly radical politics, during their student lives, and use 
educational institutions as fertile grounds for their political activism, thereby affecting 
academic activities through strikes, agitation and mobilisations, what might be the ultimate 
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academic outcomes for these institutions? This question was put to various interviewees 
during this research.  
Balochistan has a history of army operations that go back to the initial years of the creation 
of Pakistan. Kaleem Ullah Bareach also mentions that the current one, which began in 
2002 and was still on-going during the writing of this thesis, intensified in 2006 when 
Nawab Akbar Bugti, former Governor and Chief Minister of Balochistan and a veteran 
Baloch nationalist leader, was killed in a military operation. The Nawab Bugti 
assassination enraged Baloch students across Balochistan. They reacted violently, setting 
fire to university and college buses, buildings and other infrastructure.  
This classic example of mass reaction illustrates how easily educational institutions have 
become victims in Balochistan. Students’ anger has been demonstrated in many ways in 
the past during armed resistance. On all those occasions the violent reaction was confined 
to the rural areas and mostly in tribal regions in Balochistan. The educational institutions 
situated in cities and towns were not the prime targets in the past. In recent years, the 
violence became brutal when college and university teachers started being targeted. As a 
result of the sensitive security situation on university/college campuses, the government 
deployed military and paramilitary forces in educational institutions. This provided an 
excuse for the military and paramilitary personnel to crack down on student political 
activities in order to secure the teaching community against targeted killings. 
The apparent cause of the problems is of a political nature and has led to a sense of 
deprivation and socio-economic and political exclusion that has taken a violent course, not 
only engulfing the entire Baloch society but also putting the future of education in 
Balochistan in jeopardy. The violence in educational institutions has brought a heavy cost, 
as some of the most highly qualified and experienced teachers and academics have been 
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targeted and killed over the last two years, as noted by Jamila Qazi. Professor Jamila Qazi 
served as a Registrar at SBK Women’s University, Quetta, Balochistan, in 2013. I 
interviewed her at her residence in Quetta in 2013. She says that some of them had been 
living there for more than four decades and were immersed in the local culture. The 
majority of those who were assassinated during these years had one thing in common: they 
were all non-local and hailed from other provinces, especially from Punjab. The 
repercussions of these targeted killings are multidimensional but the main victim appears 
to be education, a fact that manifests itself clearly in the above findings. 
It is crucial to acknowledge that the ultimate cause of the Balochistan conflict is political; 
however, every section of Baloch society is being affected by this conflict. Many people 
have been killed and wounded, most of them students, academics, professionals and 
ordinary people. 
The recent phase of unrest that started with the murder of Akbar Bugti in 2006 took a 
ghastly turn when academics came under attack, many being killed and wounded. These 
killings had followed chain reactions. Kaleem Ullah Bareach, who is head of the History 
Department at Balochistan University, mentions that teachers who came from other 
provinces suddenly felt threatened and started applying for transfers to other provinces. 
According to one estimate, more than 70 faculty members of the University of Balochistan, 
which is the premier university in the province, have submitted transfer applications to 
universities situated in other provinces. This is a very large number of faculty members. A 
sudden and en masse departure of qualified faculty members would have a huge impact on 
the quality of education in the province, said Jamila Qazi.  
Jamila Qazi says that, besides the universities, a large number of intermediate and degree 
colleges have also suffered from this state of turmoil: non-local teachers, for security 
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reasons, rejected postings to Baloch-populated areas. The school system, especially public 
sector schools, although staffed with local teachers, has also received a heavy blow over 
the last seven to eight years as politically motivated schoolchildren have joined routine 
political agitation and strikes. 
She further expresses that this is a disturbing situation that has a direct impact on 
Balochistan’s younger generation. I agree with Qazi on a couple of details that she has 
rightly pointed out; however, one might disagree with her underlying narrative. For 
instance, she argues that the numerous closures of educational institutions, the sudden 
departure of qualified faculty members, the highly intolerant attitude towards other ethnic 
groups and a threatening environment on campuses has indeed had a long-lasting negative 
impact on academic life in Balochistan. The current political conflict in Balochistan has 
pushed the province back in every aspect of life - and it had already been lagging behind in 
terms of socio-economic and human resource development. Ultimately, it is predominantly 
education that has become the prime target. Her point concerns outsiders, the presence of 
whom, according to her, is inevitable.  
Contrary to her argument, one might therefore conclude that a weak and dysfunctional 
education system that has been presided over, arguably, by biased central and provincial 
authorities, has produced illiterate, untrained or poorly trained human resources who are 
unable to compete for provincial and federal-level jobs (both public and private) and have 
become inclined to violence. Thus, it may be argued that, had high-quality education been 
provided to all people in Balochistan, irrespective of their ethnic background, the province 
might not have experienced insurgency after insurgency against the state over the last 
sixty-seven years.  
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One may not agree with this argument that conflict would not have occurred had there 
been more education in Balochistan. The simple reason is that many educated young 
people are involved in the Balochistan movement. Dr. Allah Nazar, founder of the BLF, is 
the most prominent example, and there are many others. However, I would argue that those 
people with better educations, degrees and jobs are not part of the armed struggle directly. 
Perhaps people have sympathy with the Baloch struggle, among them many of the service 
class.  
During recent years the conflict has become increasingly bloody. The Pakistan Human 
Rights Commission (PHRC) has reported indiscriminate bombing and strafing by the 
government side, resulting in hundreds of students, doctors and civilians dead and 
wounded, and thousands of disappearances. The Baloch reacted and started targeting 
security forces, provoking a sudden mass departure of qualified teachers from Balochistan, 
which resulted in the long-term closure of educational institutions (HRW, 2010). This has 
had a negative impact on the academic environment in Balochistan, which is already 
lagging behind in terms of access to basic and higher education. Many of the scholars 
believe that the recent phenomenon of political revenge has been taken out on teachers and 
educational institutions that now see themselves as victims in a province where literacy is 
already alarmingly low and declining in terms of net primary enrolment (see HRW, 2010; 
ESP, 2009). Education in Balochistan is in a deplorable condition, with its low quality and 
poor literacy rate. Lack of education has impeded socio-economic development in 
Balochistan, and from this emanates a sense of deprivation, which ultimately generates 
conflict between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan. The former believe that the latter is 
solely responsible for keeping them backward socio-economically and politically. 
According to Karimzadi:  
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The introduction of correct education in Balochistan is incompatible with the 
colonial rule. That is why the occupying states have been targeting the most 
conscientious and informed Baloch. These states have killed most of those Baloch 
whom they considered to be aware of their democratic rights. Losing such people in 
such a manner, in their youth is the most critical reason for Balochistan’s severe 
underdevelopment, poverty and illiteracy. After all, these individuals are the 
progressive elements of their society. They are the thinkers who implant the seeds 
of freedom, democracy and prosperity in their homeland. Physically removing 
those who are able, who think rationally and critically, who ask for equality and 
freedom will only aim to push history backwards or keep it stationary (Karimzadi, 
2015b: 278).  
 
Analysing the situation since 1947, in terms of how successful the state’s controlling 
policies towards the Baloch students have been, it can be argued that the state has failed to 
achieve its aims and objectives in Balochistan compared to the other provinces. Clear 
examples are provided by the current insurgencies in Pakistan as a whole. It has even failed 
to impose the Urdu language as a symbol of the Pakistani nation. Although the state is 
powerful and has succeeded in specific places in particular provinces such as Punjab, the 
reaction and demands of the Baloch people are clear and unfulfilled to the present day. 
And these demands are to have their own way of life, their education in their mother 
tongue, and their own heroes in their books.  
Consequently, Baloch youth, particularly university students, started attacking institutions: 
burning buses, destroying buildings, disrupting libraries and attacking non-local 
academics. These disgruntled students’ awareness of the consequences of such acts may be 
related to the formal education system they received before enrolling in universities for 
graduate and postgraduate courses. That is because the formal education system in the 
province is heavily biased against the Baloch culture, language, history and, above all, its 
national identity, causing the Baloch youth to feel that the state’s education policy is 
designed to erode Baloch identity, as mentioned in chapter five. Hence, when the same 
youths reach the graduate/postgraduate stage, they show their dissatisfaction in a violent 
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manner against the state of Pakistan using the BSO and other student organisations’ 
political platforms. This violent trend among resentful students will have dire 
consequences for Baloch education in the long run. The HRW (2010) Report and Bansal 
(2010) argue that, since 2008, more than 200 teachers and professors have either 
transferred from Balochistan or left the profession, and almost 200 others are in the process 
of being transferred. 
The literature on education, conflict and conflict resolution clearly shows that most conflict 
zones are poor, weak and fragile. Two different issues are discussed in the literature. One 
is the notion that conflict impacts on education; this is empirically verifiable, which is what 
the literature does. As has been mentioned in chapter 3, education may resolve conflict 
through various channels. With regard to Pakistan and Balochistan, I make no bold claim 
that education might resolve this conflict. In view of the education and conflict literature, it 
is quite another thing to claim that education will resolve conflict in the case of 
Balochistan. I would say that no type of education will be able to resolve this conflict 
unless there is a major change in Pakistan’s approach to the Baloch people. Conflict 
resolution in Balochistan depends on the nature of the Pakistani state and its educational 
policies. As I have mentioned in Chapter 2 of this research, this conflict has historical roots 
and political grievances as well as economic exploitation. One must be optimistic that, 
should the Pakistani State wish it, there will be chances for conflict resolution. 
 
6.7 Education and Conflict Resolution in Balochistan  
This research found that the control over education is adding to the existing political 
conflict in Balochistan through various means. Control of education (schools in particular) 
should not be the necessary condition for achieving the state’s goals in Balochistan. 
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Education must be considered a fundamental human and democratic right of the Baloch 
people and children rather than the state’s controlling apparatus. Thus, one can argue that 
education as a human development tool may contribute to conflict resolution. Human 
development can be measured by life expectancy, educational attainment, and purchasing 
power (see UNDP, 2005 and 2010; Smith, 2009). Education is an important sector in any 
country, along with health, economics and politics. It is one of the sectors contributing to 
the human development of a society, according to Mundy and Murply (2001). These 
researchers state that a prosperous and developed society should consider education a 
major catalyst for human development. In Balochistan, education demands extensive 
planning and efficient resource allocation along with an effective implementation strategy. 
It is argued by many scholars that education in any country acts as a barometer of human 
development (see Mundy and Murply, 2001). The more educated a society, the better its 
chances of being able to develop its human resources. Education is a driving force in 
human development. It decreases the level and intensity of conflict among individuals, 
groups and states. This might be case in Balochistan.  
Duggan (1996) declares that, since the 1960s, numerous countries have seen an enormous 
expansion in educational facilities at all levels: primary, secondary, tertiary, technical and 
professional. The provision of education for children, both as a human right and as an 
investment in human capital, has been broadening the capacity for human development in 
these countries, although Duggan does not name any particular country or region. It is clear 
that education has been taken into account in terms of human development and rights in 
developed nations.  
Education must be considered a fundamental right of the Baloch masses, including their 
children, as stated in the 1973 Constitution of the State, Article 25A. The Baloch should 
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not be discriminated against on the bases of their distinct identity, culture, language and 
way of life, as promised in educational policies. In 1948, education was enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and in 1960 there was a UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (Salmi, 2000: 7-8). These declarations 
proclaim education to be a fundamental right of the people and it is the duty of the 
government to provide it. Therefore, education in Balochistan should be treated as a right 
of the masses.    
Education should empower the Baloch people politically, socially and economically. 
According to the functionalist theorists, education should provide jobs, skills, training and 
merit. Johnson and Stewart (2007: 247) point out that education is a source of power and 
income in modern societies. According to them, “access to jobs depends on the kind and 
level of education attained and, similarly, political participation at higher levels, 
particularly in the civil service, depends on education”. Lack of education, poverty and 
other social problems are generally acknowledged as being the key causes of conflict. 
Educational level, as one of the human development indicators, helps to improve people’s 
wellbeing and income and, most importantly, empowers people socially and politically. 
One might argue that education, delivered by properly trained teachers, will increase the 
level of understanding, empowerment and skills of the population in Balochistan.  
In so doing, education in the province will not only help to increase human awareness but 
may also be highly effective in other aspects. A well-educated individual or nation has a 
much higher probability of earning a good living than does a poorly educated one. 
Likewise, individuals in Balochistan would have longer lives and healthier living standards 
were they to receive a good education, compared to having limited, or zero, access to 
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education. For instance, educated nations and individuals have a higher purchasing power 
than their uneducated counterparts.  
Many scholars believe that education plays a pivotal role in human development. It is 
conceded across the board that developed nations are better equipped to resolve their 
internal socio-economic and political conflicts than less-developed nations. Therefore, 
arguments that maintain that there is a strong relationship between education and human 
development may not be spurious. Education is an important factor in overcoming violent 
conflict, since an educated population is less likely to resort to violence (French, 2005). 
Thus, it can be maintained in the case of Balochistan that better education would help to 
resolve both national and international conflict. Among other social indicators, education is 
considered one of the most important in the overall development of Baloch society.  
In the modern world, a nation without a sound educational base will lag far behind in every 
aspect of socio-economic and human development, irrespective of its natural endowments. 
Those who have ignored the importance of education have been left far behind in their 
attempts to reap the rewards of their economic opportunities. In a country such as Pakistan, 
where social diversity is extremely high and ethnic divisions are numerous, the pivotal role 
that education might play in the scaling down of social and ethnic strife is undeniable.  
As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, there is educational inequality in Balochistan. There is 
inequality in terms of funding, training, and limited numbers of schools, colleges and 
professional institutions. This is connected to the inequalities in educational access, a 
predominant form of inequality which leads to other horizontal inequalities in income, 
employment and health, as well as in political participation. Therefore, educational 
inequalities are likely to be an important source of violent conflict. These are some of the 
established arguments explaining how educational inequality leads to grievances. This 
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research also looks at the education/conflict relationship in a different way, as seen in the 
previous chapter, which discussed how education has created resentment among the 
Baloch students. They consider these limited educational facilities as a political tool of the 
state apparatus. The state should revise this strategy of providing few or very few 
educational opportunities.   
Another important aspect that must be discussed here concerns the state and its education 
policies. The purposes of education policies should not be political, religious or military. 
From Chapters 4 and 5, it can be observed that Pakistan’s educational policies are closely 
tied to the religious-military establishment and bureaucracy. Policies are delivered via a 
top-down approach and aim to inculcate state ideology and praise for military dictators as 
well as illegitimate rulers in Pakistan, such as Ghulam Muhammad (1951–54) and 
Generals Sikandar Mirza (1955–58), Ayub Khan (1958–1969), Yahya (1969–1971), Zia-
ul-Haq (1977–1988) and, last but not least, General Musharraf (1999–2008). In chapter 4 it 
is made clear that all educational policies are shaped by the military rulers according to 
their needs. Masood Akhtar Zahid, Assistant Professor, National Institute of Pakistan 
Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, criticised military dictator Zia-ul-Haq’s 
educational policies. About Zia, he states:   
He used education as a foil and as an instrument of state control. Diversity in 
curriculum was discouraged in Curzonian fashion with added emphasis on 
uniformity and Islamicity. National Curriculum Committee of the government was 
tasked to review and amend the work of Provincial Committees and standardise it 
in cahoots with the National Educational Policy. To inculcate national fervour and 
patriotism among the youth, a compulsory subject of Pakistan Studies was 
introduced for the Secondary, Collegiate and First Degree examinations. The 
syllabus of history courses was revised to begin with the Arab conquest of Sind in 
712 and omitting the pre-Islamic period of Indian history. As in post-revolution 
France, Soviet Union, and Iran, government approved text-books became a vehicle 
of subjective history, official nationalism, and state biases. Democracy and 
pluralism received hardly any support from the obscurantist ulema and their patron, 
General Zia (Zahid, 2011: 16).  
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As mentioned above, this should not be the case in the Balochistan education system. 
There should be inclusive education for the whole country, particularly in Balochistan 
where people think that their history, culture and language have been ignored by the state 
policy-makers. The Baloch should be taught in their own language (Balochi). This 
argument is supported by various participants in this research. The Baloch heroes, music, 
art, culture and geography must be recognised in educational textbooks. This might 
represent initial steps towards conflict resolution.  





 Before the 18
th
 Amendment, the Federal 
Education Ministry was responsible for preparing the Curriculum, Textbooks, Policy, 
Planning, and National Standards. But now education has become a provincial subject. The 
18
th
 Amendment should be properly implemented in practice. But in reality, nothing has 
been changed in the educational curriculum, pedagogy and policies as of the completion of 
this research in 2015. One example can be mentioned here. On October 28, 2014 the 
Higher Education Commission (HEC) issued a letter to the universities in Pakistan, entitled 
‘Adherence to Ideology and the Principles of Pakistan’. This letter stated:  
Universities and Degree Awarding Institutions (DAIs) have a great responsibility of 
promoting ideology and principles of Pakistan through teaching, dialogues, 
meetings, conferences, formal and informal gatherings and societal discourse. 
Demonstrations of such rightful perceptions promote nationalism, dispel confusion 
and infuse beliefs and principles that bring harmony in a society, and bolster unity 
and performance. Regretfully, it has been observed that a few activities that are 
directly or indirectly hosted or sponsored by Universities or DAIs include 
discussions or presentations contrary to the ideology and principles of Pakistan, 
perhaps due to the fact that program details are not reviewed and approved 
discretely by the Universities/DAIs. Such instances not only tarnish the image of an 
institution but fortify negativism and chaos. In view of the above, we would solicit 
your kind support to remain very vigilant and forestall any activity that in any 
                                                 
46
The various challenges that the provinces face include “expertise, institutional and capacity issues, forging 
national cohesion, uniform standards for textbook development, and quality assurance” (Education for All 
the Plan 2011–2015: 14).  
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manner challenges the ideology and principles of Pakistan, and/or perspective of 
the Government of Pakistan thereof (HEC, No.10–1/A&C/HEC/2013/869).   
 
Looking at this official letter from the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan, it might 
be argued that the federal government is still unwilling to implement the 18th 
constitutional amendment practically. This is a clear direction of and interference in the 
provincial educational structure; it even tells the universities what is to be included in and 
excluded from curricula. Universities are the highest educational institutions, in which the 
government should encourage creativity, research, thoughts and various perspectives on 
different issues. Unfortunately, in Pakistan higher education is also controlled by certain 
defined principles and policies which are no different from those applied to school 
textbooks and the curriculum.   
There are various types of educational system in Pakistan and Balochistan, but they should 
be uniform for everyone. Among the various types of education, the elite children have a 
different syllabus and education system, such as city schools, Bacon House, Little Angel, 
English Grammar Schools and Cadet Colleges. The upper class has nothing to do with the 
public education syllabus. They import the ‘A’ Level and ‘O’ Level syllabuses or others 
from the UK and USA. Here, one can say that education should be for all and made 
compulsory for every school-age child, as mentioned in the Constitution of the country. 
This should not remain a mere promise.  
Syllabus, curriculum and teaching methodology are academic issues that determine the 
quality of the educational system and behaviour of the pupils. They include the objectives 
of syllabuses and guidelines for the preparation of textual material, teachers’ training and 
evaluation objectives. Under the 18
th 
Constitutional Amendment of the state of Pakistan, 
the Balochistan provincial government must be given complete authority to design its 
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syllabus and curriculum according to its needs and local demands. In this way, education 
might address the educational resentment, as mentioned by various participants. Dr. 
Shazawar Ali is of the opinion that there are no educational policies and planning. The 
only policy is for the masters to remain masters and for people who are subservient to 
remain subservient. In Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, the education system is an abuse 
and an organ of exploitation. He furthers states:  
Educational policies are made in air-conditioned rooms somewhere in Karachi and 
Islamabad according to their (elite, either local or non-local) needs. They call it a 
policy. The education syllabus, whatever it is, comes from above and does not 
represent the Baloch people. It doesn’t come from within society and for society. 
The State itself is based on religious ideology, so anything that is contrary to the 
religion is left out of the course.  
 
As I have mentioned in Chapter 2, the Balochistan conflict is not just political or strategic 
– it also has a strong socio-economic dimension, which is evident from the aforementioned 
statistics. The vast majority of the people in the province – mainly in its Baloch-dominated 
central and southern regions – live below the  poverty line, with virtually no or very few 
means of earning a living (Ahmed, 2013). They have minimal access to education, health, 
roads, electricity and other means of communication. Therefore, one might argue, based on 
the above statistics and discussion, that the Balochistan conflict is a human development 
issue. Balochistan is lagging far behind in terms of all human development indicators. In 
the other two indicators of the Human Development Index (HDI) – health and per capita 
income - the province performs very poorly. However, it is education that is the worst 
affected. The HDI is believed to improve people’s consciousness and incomes; most 
importantly, it provides political and socio-economic empowerment (UNDP, 2005 and 
2010). Better education helps to improve the other indicators of HDI, particularly per 
capita income. Therefore, high-quality educational provision to all Baloch people might be 
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a means of producing socio-economic development, which would consequently help to 
scale down their grievances. 
The Baloch Student Organisation’s (BSO) argument in this regard may corroborate our 
stance on the significance of improved HDI in conflict resolution. The BSO highlights the 
weak human development conditions of the Baloch in order to incite them to violence. The 
organisation in its close circles often cites the weak educational infrastructure in 
Balochistan as representative of the excesses of the federal government. To them, this 
weak educational infrastructure is being used as a strong weapon to keep the Baloch 
backward in all aspects of life. Moreover, the elite and upper middle-class Baloch youth is 
not attracted to student politics. The BSO and other student organisations are strictly 
banned from the educational institutions, such as cadet and residential colleges and city 
and English grammar schools where those children are educated. Baloch families with 
better living standards and decent income levels have their children educated at leading 
educational institutions both within and beyond Balochistan. Thus, they are able to 
compete for jobs and become part of greater society.  
On the other hand, the middle or lower middle classes, who send their children to poorly 
run government schools, boost the membership of various student organisations including 
the BSO. Meanwhile, the lower class in Balochistan, who constitute virtually 60 per cent 
of Baloch society, cannot afford to send their children to school. Due to the lack of 
education and dearth of any other opportunity to seek any kind of job or engage in other 
commercial activity, the lower-class youth are prone to joining the militant organisations in 
Balochistan. This illustration underlines the centrality of education in conflict resolution in 
Balochistan. Here, one can argue that the state, rather than prioritising education and other 
social provisions in Balochistan, has opted to resolve the provincial issue through military 
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means, which has produced a reaction from the Baloch, particularly Baloch students, 
against Pakistan. However, this reaction is found largely among the “disadvantaged” class, 
which therefore makes it easy to understand the vulnerability of illiterate or semi-literate 
social groups to the overtures of militant organisations. 
For any conflict resolution, such as in Balochistan, political deliberations among the 
stakeholders are pivotal. Naseer Dashti writes in one of the online websites, ‘The Baluch’, 
that the political settlement of the Balochistan conflict will be possible when a serious 
dialogue between both sides (the state of Pakistan and the Baloch) takes place. A capable 
and aware Baloch delegation, be it mainstream Baloch political parties, militant 
organisations or student organisations, might negotiate and settle its issues with the state. 
Thus, an educated Baloch nation that produces a well-trained and educated leadership is 
more likely to resolve its conflict with the state of Pakistan than any ill–prepared and 
divided Baloch leadership.  
The education situation might be improved in a variety of ways, such as through 
government investment in education or by providing a strong system of education. 
According to Thyne (2006: 734), grievances might be reduced if there is investment in 
education. In this way, education might generate economic development and social 
equality. This may be one of the solutions to the problem.  
According to the World Bank report, if there exists a powerful tool to reduce deprivation 
and address the grievances of the people, it is surely education. It can empower a nation 
with techniques, skills and knowledge and, thus, earnings potential, and can also help to 
improve the health of the nation (Aoki et al., 2002: 4). The report goes on to describe how 
education serves as a means by which the government can ensure peace and address other 
grievances in society. For example, people need to be satisfied with the infrastructure and 
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atmosphere in their schools. Unequal educational investment and poor infrastructure 
demonstrate government ineptitude, indicating that the government cares little for its 
people, a situation that could encourage rebellion.  
I have evidence in this regard that the lack of provision of education is considered by the 
rebels to be a grievance, and that this is one of the reasons why they join militant groups, 
which foments civil war. For example, according to Brown and Hunter (2004) most of the 
civil conflicts in Latin America are indirectly due to governments’ and regimes’ low 
investment in education. This is indeed why the vast majority of children who join militant 
groups do so. Thyne (2006: 735) argues: “we have at least preliminary evidence indicating 
that the lack of social investment in repressive regimes generates grievances, which may 
ultimately lead to rebellion”.  
Other studies directly link education, grievances, conflict, and government policies. For 
instance, the Sudanese government has failed to deliver sufficient educational resources to 
its southern region. There have been major grievances for decades, resulting in an old and 
on-going civil conflict. Further it can be argued that poor investment in education might be 
one of the reasons. Similarly, Peters and Richards (1998: 187) suggest that there is a 
relationship between education, conflict and grievances. They refer to various interviews 
with ex-fighters in Sierra Leone, who declared that they had joined militant groups because 
of educational grievances. They argue that ‘‘[T]ime and again interviewees return to the 
theme of educational aspirations” as causes for joining the fighting (Peters and Richards, 
1998: 187). This generates conflict in the region.  
This supports the evidence that education in Balochistan is one of the main grievances of 
the people. Generally speaking, Baloch people consider the lack of education their 
strongest grievance. This illustrates (with reference to the two arguments above) how 
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education has both a direct and indirect effect on these grievances, which may either 
foment or resolve conflict in Balochistan. This research provides a way of examining how 
the provision of better education might address the grievances and help to resolve the 
conflict. There is a need for an increase in the educational budget at primary, secondary 
and higher levels and greater enrolment in order to deliver high-quality education to the 
population; this would decrease the likelihood of conflict by addressing the grievances of 
the Balochistan people.  
For the Baloch people, the state should provide better education, more education and a 
different type of education to re-address their grievances. As I have mentioned above, 
under the 18
th
 Constitutional Amendment and even the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, education is compulsory and declared the birth right of all children. 
Every child is guaranteed free and compulsory education according to the government 
policies, which need to be implemented without further delay or state control.    
Education in Balochistan is an instrument for acquiring the knowledge and skills required 
for economic development, according to the government. In Balochistan, I argued that 
education is a potentially powerful tool that could be used for ideological purposes. I also 
mentioned that the purpose of education should not be simply to render the Baloch good 
Muslims or patriotic Pakistanis. It is very important to the policy-makers that education in 
Balochistan should be unlike the existing education in its type, quality, quantity and 
contents. Similarly, it should not serve the purpose of a group, a community and even the 
state itself. Different and better education must be based on creative thinking and 
interactive systems of learning, and it should be an empowering tool for the people and, 
particularly, for the students. 
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Hence, a constructive and qualitative education for all in Balochistan, incorporating Baloch 
culture, language and national identity, may produce a human resource that discourages 
violence and becomes a potential hub joining the Baloch masses to mainstream society. 
For instance, those students, particularly children of the elite class in Balochistan, who 
happen to receive their education from the only cadet colleges in Balochistan and from 
other premier institutions around the country, are not inclined towards violence and 
virtually none of them supports the conflict with Balochistan. The reason for this is 
obvious: the formal education they receive puts them on a par with the national level, 
enabling them to easily compete not only for provincial-level jobs but also for a fair share 
of those at the centre. This illustration supports our argument that high-quality formal 





This thesis contributes to debates over the politics of education and conflict in Pakistan’s 
Balochistan. The main question examined in this research is the following: In what ways 
do the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled Balochistan exacerbate 
the on-going conflict there? Can education offer a venue for conflict resolution in 
Balochistan? 
The literature has been critically reviewed, emphasising the relationship between education 
and conflict, which has received considerable attention, not only in public discourses but 
also in a great deal of academic research. This research is also devoted to exploring the 
various dimensions of this relationship. Education appears to be a double-edged sword. It 
can play a major role in resolving conflict; however, it may also generate a new conflict or 
exacerbate an existing one. This is because socio-economic outcomes such as economic 
growth, the development of human capital, democratisation and the promotion of tolerance 
through the provision of high-quality education will help to resolve conflict. Education is 
used as a ‘political tool for ideological development’. 
To aid an understanding of these three views on education and conflict, this research has 
examined different perspectives on the role of education, such as the functionalist and 
conflict perspectives. The former argues that education serves the purpose of care. This 
theory is mainly about the positive role of education. However, the latter, known as the 
conflict perspective on the role of education, is the opposite of the functionalist 
perspective. According to this theory, education is a mode of control, which may 
exacerbate conflict.  
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Conceptually, it has been clarified that education is a contested phenomenon. Functionalist 
theorists have ignored the possibility that education plays a controlling role. Education is 
about control in Balochistan. To provide an understanding of Balochistan’s education and 
conflict, two separate chapters discuss the role of education; does education in Balochistan 
enhance the wellbeing of the Baloch people or does it serve the purpose of controlling 
them?  
This research draws on data collected during my fieldwork. Qualitative methods, such as a 
case-study of a specific region (Balochistan Province), in-depth interviews, visual data and 
observations, were used for this research. Twenty-eight semi-structured interviews with 
various stakeholders were conducted. The participants were educationalists, experts, 
subject specialists, political commentators, and government officials. Nineteen of the 
twenty-eight participants were Baloch, four were Pashtun and the remainder were Punjabi 
and Urdu speakers (Muhajir). There were four female participants, both Baloch and non-
Baloch. The reason for interviewing only four females has already been mentioned in the 
limitations of this project. This diversity among my interviewees provided a rich insight 
and different perspectives that helped me to revisit the research question of this project. 
The research question is briefly revisited in a different section.    
 
7.1 Reflections and Findings  
Evidence from interviews and fieldwork helped us to conduct a theoretically and 
empirically rich research project. In order to aid an understanding of the conflict in 
Balochistan, chapter 2 discusses the various dimensions of the conflict in the province. I 
found that the conflict in Balochistan has existed since the inception of the province within 
the state of Pakistan in 1947–48. In addition, different schools of thought regarding the 
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annexation of Balochistan by Pakistan are discussed therein. According to government 
officials, Balochistan joined the state of Pakistan willingly. The Shahi Jirga (Quetta 
Municipality Committee) had voted in favour of Pakistan in 1947, as mentioned in Chapter 
2. However, the chapter showed that many Baloch nationalists argue that the State of Kalat 
(Balochistan) was forcibly annexed by the state of Pakistan in 1948. It has clearly 
discussed and distinguished between the British Balochistan and the State of Kalat, in 
which both schools of thoughts (the Baloch and the State) are based.  
Whatever the truths of the arguments, various other reasons for the conflict in Balochistan 
are proposed, such as local, national and international politics, geo-politics and historical 
background. The discussion identified various phases of the conflict in Balochistan 
between the Baloch and the state of Pakistan since 1948: the first phase: 1948; the second 
phase: 1958-59; the third phase: 1963-69; the fourth phase: 1973–77; and the fifth phase: 
2002 to the present day. Thus far, the conflict in Balochistan has been multidimensional. In 
the Balochistan context, the researcher makes no bold claim that education is the only 
factor generating conflict in Balochistan. The outcomes of the chapter indicated that there 
are numerous other reasons too. 
The conceptual chapter, chapter 3, has shown how the education system perpetuates 
conflict. It has reviewed the literature on the relationship between education and conflict. 
In a critical discussion on education and conflict as conceptualised in international 
scholarship, we found three fundamental possibilities: 1) education contributes to peace 
and conflict resolution; 2) certain aspects of education generate conflict; and 3) education 
is a neutral actor. Education as a neutral actor is not an insignificant part of the literature. 
However, the notion that education resolves conflict is the main argument of much of the 
scholarly research. This argument was also studied in this research. 
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Precisely, this chapter also mentioned the idea and philosophy of education in Western 
civilisation. It clarified that education has been considered capable of achieving different 
objectives from ancient times to the modern world. Enlightenment ideas replaced the 
traditional political hierarchy and social structure by bringing the ideas of freedom, 
equality for all and the principle of human reason based on philosophical enquiry. Yet, the 
reality of education’s role in society has been very different. For instance, the imparting of 
education and the access to it is limited to a specific class in Balochistan. Education 
policies are made by a specific group of people, the elite; to achieve particular objectives. 
Education has failed to care for the people while offering the State the means to exercise 
control. 
The statistics are presented in chapter 4, which highlights a glaring but painful fact about 
the politics of education and the conflict in Balochistan. The empirical results presented in 
this chapter are derived from a close analysis of all educational policies to provide an 
understanding of the nature and purpose of the education system in Pakistan, particularly in 
Balochistan. A clear picture emerges, indicating that all educational policies are closely 
tied to the interests of the ruling elite. The state has been shaping policies that are tied to 
national narratives and ideology as well as religiosity, i.e. Islam.  
Since the birth of Pakistan, the declared educational policies have not been implemented in 
practice. In addressing the main research question, it is noted that the type and quality of 
education in Balochistan is inferior to that of the other provinces in Pakistan. There is a 
dearth of schools, funding and teachers, both male and female, in Balochistan. All the 
statistics provided by government officials and from interviews conducted with 
stakeholders show a huge difference. There are many ‘ghost schools’ in Balochistan. These 
are schools that exist on paper and in official records but not in reality.  
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A crucial factor is the vast size of Balochistan, which accounts for almost half of Pakistan 
but contains only six per cent of the country’s population. From fieldwork statistics it can 
be argued that a calculation of the area of Balochistan reveals one person for every two 
kilometres (KM). This factor has never been considered seriously by successive 
governments, and it remains unresolved in terms of the development of educational 
infrastructure. From the analysis, it became obvious that the state does not care whether the 
Baloch receive an education. Education has become an arena of political struggle in 
Balochistan rather than being used for capacity-building in the province.    
Another leading argument that I have concluded from the empirical chapter, based on the 
representation of the Baloch and Balochistan, concerns its culture, language, history and 
politics of control. The crux of the argument in the aforementioned chapter is that the state 
wants to control the Baloch people through the education system. This has been done by 
alienating the Baloch and removing their history, culture and language from their 
educational textbooks. The result showed that the majority of the scholars agree that the 
Baloch students are forced to read, write and speak languages other than Balochi (their 
mother tongue) in schools and colleges. As argued by the interviewees, the Baloch children 
are learning three languages: Urdu, English and Arabic; however, their own language is 
not part of their education system.  
The history of the Baloch and Balochistan has been absent from the syllabus. The Baloch 
are not part of the education system, and their heroes, history, geography and culture have 
been systematically ignored. This research mentions that the state is afraid of providing 
education to the Baloch people. Based on the research findings, one might conclude that 
there is a growing resentment among the Baloch masses, particularly the Baloch students, 
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that education is being used to make them obedient citizens. Moreover, people are more 
anxious about their own culture. They want to know about their own language and heroes.  
The researcher observed that in many parts of Balochistan (in Baloch areas) parents have 
asked the private schools to teach the Balochi language to their children. Many private 
schools in the Makran division of Balochistan include the Balochi language and the Baloch 
heroes, poetry and history as an optional subject without any government support. I also 
mentioned in chapter 6 that many of these private schools and English language centres 
have been closed down, partly due to the fact that those schools and language centres were 
teaching the Balochi language as an optional subject.       
Pedagogy of the Oppressed is one of the most influential books among Baloch students 
and insurgents. In this book, Paulo Freire presents the idea of ‘Problem–Posing Education’.  
According to him, there are two propositions of critical pedagogy. The first is to accept the 
existence of oppression, while the second is that transformation is possible if a nation 
struggles and believes in the right to self–determination. According to him, transformation 
is not a gift; it must be achieved through struggle.  
Education must be based on creativity and critical evaluation. It should stimulate true 
reflection and action upon the reality of Baloch and their society. The teacher may no 
longer be merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who also learns through dialogue with the 
students. It is clear that problem-posing education cannot serve the interests of the 
oppressor. Baloch student organisations believe that the idea of education should be based 
on critical reflection and action, as argued in Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 
Baloch students believe that the idea of education should be based on critical discussions 
and dialogues. In educational institutions, the Baloch student circles emphasise dialogue. 
There is an interactive learning system in Balochistan. Within educational institutions, 
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albeit outside the classrooms, there are informal circles of Baloch students who always 
question the state education system. In addition to the school system, there are informal 
circles of student organisations based on an interactive system. 
The central argument of the whole discussion is concluded in chapter 6, which mentions 
that the Pakistani state pretends to honour its duty of care to provide education to the 
Baloch people and the people of Balochistan. Looking at the various statistics and expert 
opinions, the ultimate question in the final analysis is as follows: “Has the State succeeded 
in its goal of providing good-quality education to Balochistan? If not, why not?”  However, 
can the statistics and interviews with relevant people, educationalists and activists, as well 
as Baloch nationalists, sustain an argument that the Pakistani state has failed in its duty of 
care? To what extent do poor formal education and conflict go hand in hand in the 
province and how has the government failed in its duty of care in Balochistan? The 
answers to these questions may substantiate our argument that controlling educational 
policies and textbooks, religiosity, and weak and dysfunctional education in Balochistan 
are prime reasons for conflict with the state. 
This empirical chapter has discussed the alternative arguments and the conflict perspective 
on the role, nature and purpose of education. This is also applied in the case of 
Balochistan, in that education in the province is being used as a controlling apparatus of 
the state through various means. There are many issues regarding the state of education in 
Balochistan, such as the drop-out rate from primary to middle schools, and again from 
middle to secondary schools, insufficient quantity of books, lack of coordination and 
knowledge-sharing between public and private schools, lack of efficient monitoring of 
schools, shortage of trained teachers, shelterless schools, overcrowded schools, lack of 
teachers’ accommodation and facilities, and shortage of girls’ schools; all these are 
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discussed in the chapter. Challenging the argument on the duty of care, this chapter 
mentions that the state seeks to control the Baloch people through educational textbooks, 
syllabuses and curricula. This is done by misrepresenting thousands of years of Baloch 
society, history, culture, language and political and legal development. 
Finally, it has been argued that, to resolve conflict in Balochistan, the state must change the 
manipulative nature of education in Balochistan. Education in Balochistan demands special 
attention and rigorous planning and finance, similar to that applied in other parts of the 
country. Thus, we can conclude that the major problems of Balochistan education need to 
be discussed in order to identify the major issues at policy level. If this were done, 
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This thesis is also based on twenty-eight interviews conducted during my fieldwork to 
Pakistan and Balochistan from January to June 2013. All but two of the interviews were 
recorded in their entirety. The researcher noticed a few sensitive statements given by the 
participants; therefore, pseudo names are used for six interviewees for security reasons. 
The names and descriptions are withheld to protect the identity of these six interviewees.   
 
Aamir Naeem. Former Deputy Director of Provincial Institute for Teacher Education 
(PITE). Professional Development Specialist, Teacher Education Project, USAID. 
Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu). 
 
Abdul Qayyum Babai. Chairman, Balochistan Textbook Board, Quetta. Interview made in 
2013 (on tape in Urdu).  
 
Abdul Rahman Buzdar. Secretary, Fisheries. Former Section Officer and Additional 
Secretary, Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in 
English and Urdu).  
 
Ali Rehman. (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Balochi).   
 
Atique-ur-Rehman. USAID, Coordinator, Strategic Planning and Development, 
Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Aziz Bugti. Former Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Balochistan, 
Quetta. He also served as a Deputy Director and Director of Education, Government of 
Balochistan. Interview made in 2013. Questions put by written interview due to disability 
and advanced age. 
 
Behram Imtiaz. (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English). 
 
D. K. Riaz Baloch. Managing Director, Education Foundation, Balochistan. Interview 
made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Dr. Abdul Rafiq. (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape Balochi and Urdu). 
 
Dr. Gishkori. (Name withheld). Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Balochi). 
 
Dr. Hafeez Baloch. (Name withheld). A Medical Doctor by profession, and affiliated with 
Baloch Student Politics during his student life. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in 
English).  
 
Dr. Kahoor Khan. Director, General (DG) Special Education, Government of Balochistan. 
Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Dr. Shazawar Ali. (Name withheld). A writer, activist and a scholar. Interview made in 
2013 (on tape in English and Balochi).  
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Jamila Qazi. Registrar, Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s University, Quetta, Balochistan. 
Interview made in her residence in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).  
 
Kaleem Ullah Bareach. Chairman, History Department, University of Balochistan (UOB). 
Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Major General Zia Ullah Khan. (Retd), Inspector General, Frontier Core (IG FC). 
Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).  
 
Mir Mohmmad Ali Talpur. A prominent columnist in the Daily Times and a Baloch Human 
Rights Activist. He has been associated with Balochistan’s Independence movement. He 
taught Baloch refugees in Afghanistan from 1978-1992. Written interview via email in 
2014. 
 
Munir Ahmed Badini. Secretary, Education, Government of Balochistan. Interview made in 
2013 (on tape in English). 
 
Munir Ahmed Nodazai. Former District Education Officer, Kech District, and Controller, 
Balochistan Board, Quetta. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Nasreen Ayaz Baloch. Lecturer, Department of Education, Sardar Bahadur Khan, 
Women’s University Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and 
Urdu).  
 
Nizam-ud-Din Mengal. Additional Director of Education (Schools), Government of 
Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and Urdu).  
 
Qaisar Jamali. Provincial Coordinator Education, UNESCO. Interview made in 2013 (on 
tape in English).  
 
Rashid Razzaq. Additional Secretary in Secondary Education Department, Government of 
Balochistan, Quetta. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Saadullah Khan Tokhai. Chairman, Balochistan Board of Intermediate and Secondary 
Education (BBISE), Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in both English 
and Urdu). 
 
Sadia Rasheed. Lecturer in Education Department Sardar Bahadur Khan Women 
University, Quetta, Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in Urdu).  
 
Siddiq Baluch. A writer and journalist. He was awarded lifetime achievement award by the 
Prime Minster of Pakistan, in 2015. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English and 
Balochi).  
 
Talat Abbas. Deputy Focal Person, Capacity Development, Education Department, 
Balochistan. Interview made in 2013 (on tape in English).  
 
Zarina Rashid. Head of Education Department, Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s 





Appendix I:  
Consent Form  
 
Mr Jalal Faiz is collecting data in the form of taped/recorded interviews. These data will be 
used for his doctoral research and thesis at the University of Westminster, London, United 
Kingdom (UK).  
 
This research is about 'The Politics of Education and Conflict in Pakistan’s 
Balochistan’. In addition, the thesis will explore the causes of conflict in Balochistan, the 
politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani state, and the significance of 
these politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict. The primary research question is as 
follows: Does the nature, type and extent of education in Pakistan-controlled Balochistan 
exacerbate the conflict there or does it offer opportunities for conflict resolution?  
I give my consent to the use of data for this purpose on the understanding that: 
 All the identities of the interviewees will be kept confidential. The material will be 
treated as confidential and kept in secure storage at all times. 
 This study follows the voluntary participation of the interviewees in the research. 
 All the names of participants will remain anonymous throughout the study if that is 
their wish.  
 All personal data will be kept in a locked cupboard on University premises.  
 Participants can withdraw from the interviews at any stage without providing an 
explanation. 
 If you wish, you will be sent information on the results of the research. 
 The researcher can be contacted after participation by e-mail or telephone (details 
below).  
 
Personal Information of the Participant 
Note: This consent form will be stored separately from any data you provide in order that 
your responses/views/opinions might remain anonymous. 
I have read the information and I am willing to act as a participant in this research study.  
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1. Your name please:_________________________________________. 
2. Your age please: _______________________________. 
3. Your gender please: _______________________________. 
4. Your political affiliation and position please: __________________________ 
5. Your ethnic background please: i) Baloch ii) Pashtun iii) Punjabi iv) Sindhi v) 
Saraiki and vi) Muhajjar-
________________________________________________ 
6. For how long have you served or remained in Balochistan and in what post or 
position? _________________________________ 
 






Participation Information Sheet  
 
Dear Participant (s), 
I am Jalal Faiz, a PhD student at the Schools of Social Sciences, Humanities and 
Languages (SSHL), Department of Politics & International Relations (DPIR), University 
of Westminster, London. I am undertaking my doctoral research on Politics of Education 
and Conflict in Pakistan’s Balochistan. In addition, my research will explore the causes 
of conflict in Balochistan, the politics of formal education as promulgated by the Pakistani 
state, and the significance of these politics in fostering and/or managing the conflict. The 
emphasis is not only on theorising conflict but also on providing a conceptually sound and 
empirically rich analysis of the politics of education in a specific conflict region. This 
research will intervene in the debate over whether education ameliorates or exacerbates 
regional ethnic cleavages in a conflict region by focusing on Balochistan in Pakistan. 
 
My supervisors are Dr. Dibyesh Anand (D.Anand@westminster.ac.uk), reader (associate 
professor) at the DPIR, University of Westminster, London, and Dr. Ricardo Blaug 
(R.Blaug@westminster.ac.uk ), reader (associate professor) at the DPIR, University of 
Westminster, London. This research is a critical analysis of primary and secondary 
literature/data and a discourse analysis of textbooks as well as interviews. A qualitative 
method will be adopted to carry out this research. In order to do so, this study employs 
multiple data sources: documentary data, semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, 
visual data and observations in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. This research applies 
a semi-structured method to interview the stakeholders (educationalists, academics, 
historians, scholars, policy-makers and politicians) and uses grey literature in order to 
explore the politics of education and conflict in Balochistan.  
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The interview should take around 40 to 60 minutes of your time. I would like to assure you 
that all respondents’ comments will be anonymous and all transcripts will be treated as 
confidential. I would like to record the interview(s) so that I have an accurate record of our 
discussion. I have received ethical approval from the University of Westminster for this 
study according to United Kingdom rules for data protection.  
 
I hope you will be able to take part in this study. Therefore, please specify a day and time 
that would be convenient to meet up. I am looking forward to hearing from you. I enclose a 
consent form in the hope of a positive response. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you 







Can you please say something about yourself? 
May I quote you openly in my thesis? 
May I use your name in my thesis? 
What is your connection to Balochistan and education or education in Pakistan? 
 
Section 1: Condition of Education in Pakistan and Balochistan 
 In your opinion, what is the purpose of education in Pakistan? 
 What are the main achievements and problems of the education system in Pakistan? 
 How would you describe the current condition of the education system in 
Balochistan? 
 In your opinion, do people in Balochistan in general and Baloch in particular have 
satisfactory and equal access to education? 
 In your opinion, what are the key factors that keep Balochistan backward in terms 
of education as compared to other provinces? 
 
Section 2: The Politics of the Representation of Power, Curricula, and Textbooks  
 In your opinion, have curricula, textbooks, and education policies in Pakistan 
served to control and make obedient citizens or there is an element of care in 
creating opportunities for the people?  
 Do you think the Baloch people along with their history and culture have been 
adequately and fairly represented in the education system of the country? Please 
give reasons for your view. 
 How do you see the future of education in Balochistan in the present circumstances 
in the context of the closure of school premises, targeted killing of 
teachers/students, and teachers migrating from Balochistan due to the law and order 
situation? 
 
Section 3: The Politics of Education and Conflict in Balochistan 
 In your opinion, how has the current insurgency affected education in Balochistan?  
 Do you think education is a site of political struggle or has it been instrumental in 
capacity-building? 
 To what extent can education be effective in resolving conflict in Balochistan?  
 Are there any additional comments you wish to make on the politics of education 
and conflict in Balochistan that I have not yet addressed but that may be helpful to 
me or my research? 
 
Section 3: Extra questions, if you wish to answer  
 As an academic/expert, how do you describe the politics of power in state school 
textbooks and all educational policies since 1947? 
 How satisfied are you with the funding allocation for education in Balochistan? 
 Do you think that education has been the priority of successive governments in 
Pakistan? 
 In your opinion, has the primary purpose of education in Balochistan been to 






Appendix VI:  
Participant’s Biographies   
 
S.N Name/Pseudonym Job Description Sex Ethnicity Age 
(year) 









Male Baloch 47 
2 Professor Saadullah 










Male Pashtun  45 
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6 Professor Dr. Gishkori 
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Male Baloch 55 to 65 
18 
 
Siddiq Baluch  A writer and 
journalist. He was 
awarded lifetime 
achievement 
award by the 
Prime Minster of 
Pakistan, in 2015 
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20 Aamir Naeem  Deputy Director 
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Talpur  
A Baloch political 
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